


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RECENT POETS ON MAN AND HIS PLACE¹

ONE OF THE founders of this Association used to say: "The need for technical philosophy is small. But all things should be studied philosophically." This not only states clearly, in my opinion, the most frequent use of philosophy but hints at philosophy's best resource for her own continuing fruitful existence. In harmony with this view of philosophy's wider task, I have chosen for my theme the definition of essential traits in one art — poetry; in one period — the last half-century; and in one relation, viz., to the eternal philosophical problem of man and his place in the world.

Although to fix in definitions the nature of poetry and the arts has always been difficult, the great ones of our tradition have rarely failed to attempt it. Plato by no means failed to try, in spite of his fear of poetry's potency. Certainly Aristotle — Aristotle ancient and Aristotle medieval — brought a conspicuous kind of order into the field; for Aristotle ancient made of tragic poems a paradigm of necessary sequence, a symbolic revelation of probability; and Aristotle medieval framed cosmology on architecture. Again, in that age when mathematical science most throve, Spinoza freed the imagination by noting its uncontending multifariousness and pictorial vividness, even before he wrote his philosophy *more geometrico*; and Leibniz, co-inventor of the calculus, almost fell into Pythagoras' danger of making the universe too musical. If, lately, some of our strict reasoners have warned their professional brethren to remain drily consequent if they would be honest, the gentle spectator of philosophers' careers has marked in several, who first agitated a philosophy strenuously scientific, a homecoming after a time to beauty and the arts for ampler truth. Have we

¹ Presidential address delivered at the meeting of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association at the Hotel Taft, New Haven, Connecticut, December 27, 1946.

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not read in the later Whitehead: "Philosophy is the endeavour to find a conventional phraseology for the vivid suggestiveness of the poet"? And he who now represents us among the scientists argues in his latest discourse for the indispensable aesthetic component in an adequate world view.

On the whole philosophers have been not so much unmindful of the importance of poetry as impatient with its detail and suspicious of its nimble wit and far ranging. To be sure, virtual papers of separation have sometimes been drawn up. At such times pure philosophers and poets have made a convenient compact as to the duty of each. Poetry is what it is, according to this understanding, by its clean detachment from fact, and free fancy. Its function is restorative, image-forming, and beguiling, but not instructive. Science and philosophy are, according to this view, the authorities on verifiable knowledge, and the assumptions and relations involved. Now to such an understanding, the objection is: Only the developing history of the human spirit can show what in their courses poetry and philosophy are and do. The systematic distinction of functions, though necessary, draws lines where none exist in nature. Certainly much poetry moves in *faërie* and "nothing affirmeth, and therefore never lieth." But no eternal law prohibits to poetry concern with facts and general ideas. At any rate, in the past fifty years, poets have appeared to intend many satirical comments on the surrounding state of affairs. Not only within their shaggy verses have they passed judgment on the society in which they live, but they have used philosophical sanctions for their judgments. Plato's ghost is invoked by one to serve as a chorus to scoff at such of our fellow-citizens as are throughout life "perfectly adjusted"; Socrates' ghost, by another, to sustain the hope that we do not know what we think we know when we look around us. Still another threads a lament over the decay of human dignity and passion upon the symbol of Heracleitean fire. More significant than words and names, however, is the tone and intention. In the midst of his poet's *Note-Book*, Paul Valéry suddenly says: "I was wishing to speak of philosophers — and to philosophers" (p. 188). What he had on his mind was to suggest that philosophers might profit in their capacity to express their ideas exactly by submitting themselves to the severe discipline of poetical composition. He implies that they are insufficiently aware of the fine

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relations of language to thought, and of the interaction of the parts of language with each other. This then is a contribution poetry feels itself competent to make to philosophy. But it is not of philosophy's need of poetry that William Butler Yeats talks. In his late prose writings he recurs more than once to the absorption of philosophy by poetry in the period between 1920 and 1930. In the twenties, he says the poets put into their poems a sense of suffering that was no longer passive, "no longer an obsession of the nerves," but one that "philosophy had made a part of all the mind" (p. xxxvii). And Hopkins, the poet who—born before his time—by common consent has influenced our contemporary poets most, insists upon engagement with reality, seriousness, as the proper virtue of right poetry. "A kind of touchstone of the highest or most living art is seriousness," he says, "not gravity, but the being in earnest with your subject . . . reality."

Quotations from recent poets containing such words as "reality" and "seriousness" and reporting "the sudden return of philosophy into English literature about 1925" do not of course establish in themselves kinship with what philosophers themselves understand by "reality" and "philosophy." A poet's employment of these terms, even if Valéry is right in claiming for them superior subtlety, would cause a use both more concrete and symbolic than professional sorters of facts and ideas would often approve. The Heracleitus of the hearthstone and liturgical torch is not the Heracleitus among the cosmologists. But this stricture does not affect the special claim of our argument here. Though recent poets have sometimes used verse for general reflection, on the whole it is by an intensification of their own special habits that poets offer suggestion to philosophy and touch its borders by fruitful contrast or supplementation. We must agree that the moving power of poetry can only seem relevant to strict philosophical reflection if it can somehow be placed by reason in a world where reason orders. But we intend to maintain the paradox, even so, that the new style, whatever the roughness of its manner and apparent madness of its moods, is the outer sign of a new inner seriousness and intense engagement with reality. We are to hold that our poetry has been dense and incoherent in recent years partly because its authors have suffered from the world and have in turn bitten into it to an unusual degree, and have made this double interplay fuel and shaper of song. This same double phe-

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nomenon — acting and being acted on — can appear, we remember, in the far recesses of metaphysical discussion as a candidate for “mark of being.”

We said just now that the contemporary poet's relevance to the philosopher was largely the result of an intensification of the poet's traditional habits. What are these habits?

The poet's way of behaving Milton called “sensuous and passionate.” Poetry, he would say, is more immediate than thought, closer to the impact on eye and ear of color and sound; and that inside the poet the reverberations of these fresh impacts still are preserved and mingle in his song. But along with this “heat” of the poet, Croce has placed the contrary quality: “coldness.” Croce means that when the poet works as artist he maintains a certain aloofness from his kind and the world about him, and acknowledges no law but that of his own craft.

That there is a deep paradox in the poet's nature many have recently noted. I shall only be putting my own interpretation and mode of expression on a common observation when I draw out what the paradox seems to me in part to be, and what its use for us.

The poet belongs to the class of sensitive beings. Whatever goes on around him, or echoes within, finds him attentive beyond the average. He is finely aware, but he is also strongly aware. His mode of taking impressions suggests to the onlooker something like physical disturbance, or at least visible excitation. One recent poet has said of all poets that their particular faculty is to receive vibrations and transmit them. “Vibration,” “trembling,” “throbbing,” “pulsing” — these words are noticeably frequent in descriptions of the way the poet is affected by experience. When the stimulus reaches the limit of its importance for him, he is said to be in ecstasy—that is, moved out of position. All these metaphors bear witness to the delicacy with which the poet's nerves are swung and the ease with which they are deflected.

But it is no less striking a fact about the class of beings called poets, that they are the origin of impresses received by other things. Indeed, unless a poet has energy enough to plant a shape he wills on what he treats for the time being as mere stuff — mere potentiality of existence — he is no poet. Sometimes we call this side of the poet's nature the artist or craftsman in the poet. But that is quibbling, for the word *poet* itself means maker. Unless the poet shows himself, from one point of view, as first cause of permanently delectable aesthetic effects from

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measured language — even suggesting divinity in his power of making and unmaking waves of air and chance impressions — we classify him as a man of sensibility only. An epigrammatic definition of the imagination stamped out by Gerard Manley Hopkins — “the imagination is the hand within the mind” — is token of the fact that a poet more molds sensation than collects it. In general, we now suggest, the poet is the doer-and-undergoer, *par excellence*.

The doubleness of the poet shines out in his relation to his two chief pieces of equipment: images and rhythm. Are they presents to him, or does he construct them? Both. The musical alternation of rhythm, by his own testimony, is the effectual afterimage, in his pulses and interior conversation, of the advance and recession of waves upon the shore, swaying of boughs in the wind, or other rocking thing in nature or his own processes. But to this origin in the end goes less than half the credit. If the swinging of wind and waves or hands and feet is born again as thesis and arsis, caesura and phrase, the imagination's “hand within the mind” gives what so comes its final form. Poets put into a kind of inner laboratory of cadences and balances those little tunes that they find singing themselves within. Their cunning devises tricks of acceleration and retardation and sudden shifts of melody to impress an idea, as thus:

And for darkened Man, that complex multiplicity
Of air and water, plant and animal,
Hard diamond; infinite sun.

The whole puzzling paradox of where rhythm comes from is debated by Wallace Stevens in his “Idea of Order at Key West.” Of a singer making music by the sea he writes:

It may be that in all her phrases stirred
The grinding water and the gasping wind.

i. e., nature furnishes part of the cause. But the human act, and articulate language, he immediately adds, are a larger part.

But it was she and not the sea we heard.
She sang beyond the genius of the sea.
The song and water were not medleyed sound
Since what she sang was uttered word by word.

He puts his finger on the human motivation when he says that the maker, man, has a passion to order, with his language, the words of the sea.

On the semantic side, the poet's material is imagery. Here also there is ambiguity, for imagery seems lately to have moved both closer to

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and farther away from reality. On the whole the recent poets' images have deepened into symbols. The tendency to depict the lovable shows of nature by delicate comparisons, while always with us, has yielded in large measure to adumbrations through imagery less sensuous and more reflective of hidden forms. Or rather, imagery's mode has split itself into the full compass of possible contradiction. The symbol is designed to tell some kind of serious truth about the bottom of the soul or the naked twentieth century. Yeats has noted the pervasiveness of the symbol "bone" in recent verse and remarks that the image of the "star" flourished in an earlier time. He attaches meaning to this shift, and certain it is that not for nothing have unhappy figures of deserts and carrion, filth and asses, thickened on the poets' pages. But while images are used thus starkly to convey with force the nature of our ugly environment, the poet is also more than commonly concerned with a symbol's intrinsic, half-drunken multifariousness. He uses fantastic forms, as if he were engineering a ballet. Indeed, part of the obscurity of recent poetry comes from its double aim, to wit: both analysis of reality into essential meanings, and also a delighted tumbling about with the possible multiple suggestions of words as such. Nonsense and a sybil's wisdom seem both to be courted. The poet, says Stevens, in "Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction" went into the park, sat down on a bench, and passed into the poet's trance. The lake in front of him became his

Theatre of trope . . .

The water of

The lake was full of artificial things,
Like a page of music, like an upper air,
Like a momentary color, in which swans
Were seraphs, were saints, were changing essences.

In the trance, the poet continues, metaphor became a kind of irresponsible vagabond, that made "iris frettings on the blank." Yet a favorite emphasis in Stevens is the danger of anthropomorphic thinking.—Again the same poet who, exulting in aesthetic freedom, wrote,

Gather me

Into the artifice of eternity . . .

I shall never take

My bodily form from any natural thing
But such a form as Grecian goldsmiths make
Of hammered gold and gold enameling . . .

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also wrote:

Parnell came down the road, he said to a cheering man:
Ireland shall get her freedom and you shall break stones.

A third example: The same poet who seemed to send forth her mesmeric lines,

Monotonously fell the rain
Like thoughts within an empty brain

for whatever suggestion the sound and symbol could evoke, found the same image crystallizing itself to stand for the raids on London in 1940:

Still falls the Rain —
Dark as the world of man, black as our loss.

We have been saying that poetry, born in the vibration of its inspiration, sustained in wavering rhythms and ambiguous symbols, is always characterized by double or plural pointing, even to the height of its completest communication. Indeed, it often prospers best if its residual meaning strains against nature, making two great faces of things confront each other and strike fire for the imagination through their friction. In other words, important poetic fiction may by its apparent intense unreason throw light on those metaphysical first principles that Whitehead says "mutely appeal for an imaginative leap." Those early metaphysical poets with whom the moderns feel so close a kinship conveyed their meaning by daring conjunctions and vast alternatives, as: lust and religion, Heaven and Hell, woman-angel and woman-Eve, the Universe and the bridal bed.—Donne wrote:

She's all States, and all Princes, I
Nothing else is.

The reflective and disturbed poets of the twentieth century draw their multiple meaning and vast alternatives mostly from what the twentieth century or the recent past presents to them. Even when they veil their meaning in old Greek or Irish myths, the tenor is often contemporary. Inspecting these poems, we find burdening their course the oppositions of war and peace, dead culture and eternal salvation, socialism and capitalism, tyranny and freedom. But we also find properly metaphysical problems: the relation of time to eternity, the bounded object to space, and — our own problem in this paper — man to his world. "What can man do?" "How effectual is man's will?" "How far is man creature and in what sense creator of his world?"

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These questions sound familiar to philosophers. Examination of recent poetry reveals their presence there. Sometimes the problematic situation of man in his world is stated plainly as in W. H. Auden's:

We are created from and with the world
To suffer with and from it day by day:
Whether we meet in a majestic world
Of solid measurements or a dream world
Of swans and gold . . .
Our claim to own our bodies and our world
Is our catastrophe. What can we know
But panic and catastrophe until we know
Our dreadful appetite demands a world
Whose order, origin, and purpose will
Be fluent satisfaction of our will.

Plain putting of the question is frequent in Wallace Stevens. In fact he seems half-consciously to debate the claims of man, the natural reflex of his environment, versus man, source of his experiences and shaper of his history. The first claim is the theme of the half-humorous tiny poem "Theory":

I am what is around me
Women understand this.
One is not a duchess
A hundred yards from a carriage.

These, then, are portraits:
A black vestibule.
A high bed sheltered by curtains.

In general, Stevens is fond of saying that men are nothing more than "invisible elements of places made visible."

The soul, he said, is composed
Of the external world.

The man in Georgia walking among pines
Should be pine-spokesman.

But Stevens does, even so, impute a very powerful imaginative faculty to his earthy men: He writes:

the mind
Turns to its own figurations and declares,
This image, this love, I compose myself of these
As in the powerful mirror of my wish and will.

Poets are not usually at their best when abstract questions appear baldly in their verses. But the way recent poets have expressed through images human suffering, and at the same time reached after some faith

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in and way of conceiving human power, makes, in the interaction of the two, a clear call to the thinker's ordering function. How can the sorter of ideas reconcile Hopkins' man: "soft sift in an hour-glass" with Stevens': "the doer of all that angels can" and "crystallizer of the revolving world"? The problem is admittedly universal and eternal. Older poets have aired it in their manner. But the new poets, introspective and rebellious, have often carried both their problem and their technique into the ferment of the soul's "dark night." Their style and thinking have been aptly described by Yeats: "constantly interrupted, broken, twisted into nothing by its direct opposite, . . . [qualified by] nervous obsession, nightmare, stammering confusion . . . loss of self-control . . . unbridged transitions, unexplained ejaculations, that make (the) meaning unintelligible" (xxv, intro. to Anthol.).

I have chosen to analyze the suggestions of these difficult poets, as they bear on our main problem, under three symbolic captions:

1. Man, the puppet. I draw here from Thomas Hardy.
2. Man, the cutter of agate. The phrase is Yeats's.
3. Man, the leaping laugher. This is the title of a poem by George Barker.

These three categories stand for various ways in which man is active and passive in his world. My first source, Thomas Hardy, is relatively simple. In him, man is passive — even worse, a puppet.

Thomas Hardy published *The Dynasts* in 1903. In the preface he states that the poem was shaped to give a "modern expression of a modern outlook." What he takes the "modern outlook" to be he describes a little further on. "The meditative world," he says, "is older, more invidious, more nervous, more quizzical, than it once was, and . . . unhappily perplexed by —

Riddles of Death Thebes never knew" (p. xi).

He chooses for the expression of these unhappy perplexities certain "phantom intelligences" that he domiciles in an "Overworld." From this unearthly perspective "The Ancient Spirit of the Years," "The Spirit of the Pities," and the "Spirits Sinister and Ironic" comment through their dramatic choruses on the Napoleonic wars. Hardy is a vivid chronicler. Some of the scenes of the historical pageant, such as that of the death of Nelson on the "Victory" at Trafalgar and of com-

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mon British soldiers dying in dark cellars in Spain, no reader is likely to forget. Yet it is not so much with the desperate human interest of these characters, actions, passions, and events that Hardy is ultimately concerned as with their record on the high balance sheet of the Phantom Intelligences. For Hardy as for Aristotle, tragedy, though an imitation of the actions and passions of men, is more serious and philosophical than history. He like Aristotle is interested in the element of necessity present in human affairs. He ruminates the riddle of predicates of value.

The comments from the overworld, as they issue now from the Spirit of the Years who is the spokesman of the clocklike Mechanism at the Back of Things, and now from the Spirits of Pity and Irony, are logically incompatible, as dramatic statements have a right to be. But there is a flash in the collision of Hardy's Mechanism and Humanism as if from the broken colors in Impressionist painting. On the one hand, values are made nonexistent. The Universe is an automaton.

Unweeting why or whence.
It works unconsciously . . .
Eternal artifices in Circumstance . . .
 the pulsion of the Byss

.....

Unchecks its clock-like laws.
. . . The systems of the suns go sweeping on . . .
In mathematic roll unceasingly . . .

Or, as Hardy's metaphors accumulate, the Universe is "a sublime fermenting-vat," "a knitter drowsed," "a viewless, voiceless, Turner of the Wheel." It is obviously nonsense to speak of good or evil in such a context. On the other hand, Pity not only assigns at the outset a value — a negative one — to all terrestrial history, but at times breaks into the earthly scene, e. g., to protest in Napoleon's ear his treachery to the cause of Liberty, or to ask for the merciful coup de grâce for wounded soldiers crazed, blaspheming, and in agony. The Spirits Ironical and Sinister, though less Heart and more Intellect than the Spirit of Pity, collide even more effectively with the World Mechanism. Pity is indeed made "loving-kind" by Hardy but also young and ineffectual. Pity chants a vague melancholy sentiment at the beginning of the Poem:

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"We would establish those of kindlier build,
In fair Compassions skilled,
The mild, the fragile, the obscure content. . . .
Those, too, who love the true, the excellent,
And make their daily moves a melody."

And she voices another vague sweet wish at the end:

that the rages
Of the ages
Shall be cancelled,
Consciousness the Will informing, till It fashions
all things fair.

The Spirits Sinister and Ironical on the other hand are powers with cutting edges. Their remarks shock us because the more the Tale becomes humanly tragic, the more it feeds their dramatic intelligences with food for laughter. Pity, grieved past bearing, cries that she cannot bear the beacons of war lit on Egdon Heath, but Spirit Sinister says:

"This is good, and spells blood. I assume that It means to let us carry out this invasion with pleasing slaughter, so as not to disappoint my hope?"

and after a few minutes makes this generalization: "My argument is that War makes rattling good history; but Peace is poor reading. So I back Bonaparte for the reason that he will give pleasure to posterity." When the Spirit of Pity says of General Mack before Ulm, "The clouds weep for him," Spirit Sinister answers:

If he must he must;
And it's good antic at a vacant time.

If one now inquires: What place does man occupy in Hardy's universe, one would be tempted to answer first: "A place on a puppet's stage. In other words, no place." Hardy himself uses the metaphor of puppets for his characters and the pulling of wires for their actions. But he also lets his Phantom Intelligences call attention to the intolerable contradiction "of making figments feel,"

that they feel, and puppetry remain
Is an owned flaw in [Nature's] consistency.

So the second answer is: Man appears in Hardy's world as the sufferer. The poet, we said at the beginning, is acutely sensitive to the impressions moving in on him from the natural and human world. Hardy is such a sensitive; he so vibrates; he so makes us vibrate by

his imaginative vision of the victims of the Napoleonic wars. If now we change our position, taking Hardy with us, from drama to orderly and consistent philosophy, we must say: it cannot be both ways. Suffering is not a mechanical event. Either the Universe is different, or man is different from Hardy's picturing. We can say more: Though Hardy's characters suffer and Hardy must have had parallel feelings in construing his scenes, Hardy has been a powerful maker in the process of building his puppet show. A man who can originate such a momentous spectacle is not a passive creature in a fermenting vat. He is what every great poet is, an amazing agent. He was not fitted to picture rebels, nor actuate on his stage the morally responsible soul. But such beings are implications of Hardy's own functioning.

With the arrival of our second phase — man, the cutter of agate, the fine craftsman — our subject becomes more complicated. The artist in the poet now swells almost to the point of crowding out the physical and historical man in his human environment. The "place" of the poet's concern is his own workbench.

"The chief use of the meaning of a poem," says T. S. Eliot, "is to keep the [reader's] mind diverted and quiet, while the poem does its work upon him; much as the imaginary burglar is always provided with a bit of nice meat for the house-dog" (*Use of Poetry*, p. 151). Eliot is speaking of only one class of poet. But this class has lately been conspicuous. The business of such a poet, Eliot is here suggesting, is to polish his instrument and discipline his hand, using a recognizable subject only as a concession to our habitual un-fineness. When Eliot uses the expression, "while the poem does its work upon him," he apparently means: "while the poet awakens the reader's pure sensitivity." Concentrated incantation is always part of what a poet does and may be all. Listen to Paul Valéry: "The thought must be hidden in verse as nutritive virtue is hidden in fruit. Fruit is nourishment, though it seems to be nothing but delight. One perceives only pleasure; and yet one receives a substance — Enchantment — *that* is the nourishment conveyed to one. And sweet is its going down" (*Le passage est suave*).

The implementation of this "suave passage" is then, in the belief of the delicate carvers of verbal agates, the poet's main task. Interest

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in texture, rhythm, pattern, and structure for the moment outweighs interest in objective reference. The new group have adopted a new principle of metrical equivalence which supplants for them the simple old way of measuring feet by counting off equal numbers of syllables, somewhat as the far subtler nuclear physics has made obsolete the older theory of atomic substances. According to the principle of metrical equivalence, the cadence and balance of verse depend in part on a fine, felt awareness of the pressures and resistances of nuanced vowels and operated consonants, labials, and sibilants. Here is an example of slow movement, sibilants, thin vowels: "A mouth like old silk soft with use." In:

Like gript stick
Still I sit

there are sibilants and thin vowels, but the vowels are tightly wrapped in difficult consonants, and there is effort in movement. Texture is interwoven with subtly counterpointed rhythm so that the total metrical pattern becomes rich and varied, almost to the confounding of old reading habits, as in the following:

He comes among
The summer throngs of the young
Rose, and in his long
Hands flowers, fingers, carries;
Dreamed of like aviaries
In which many phoenixes sing,
Promising touch soon
In summer, never to come.

Rhyme is often in the middle of lines, instead of tapping off conclusions, and the delicious near-rhyme pleases these poets more than full echo.

On grounds of harmony and proportion — and lack of verifiable meaning — Valéry classifies Pascal's famous line "*Le Silence éternel de ces espaces infinis M'EFFRAYE*" ("The eternal Silence of these infinite spaces frightens me") as a "perfect poem" — not a "thought," as it is classified by its author. Here, says Valéry, is rhetorical symmetry; a formidable metaphor of equilibrium: the noun "silence" balances the noun "spaces"; the adjective "eternal," the second adjective "infinite"; again, this whole massive characterization of the cosmos is set in contrast to its little human offshoot, in the short verbal sign of his terror: "*M'EFFRAYE*."

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The creation of enchantment by formal devices may go so far as the creation of an artificial universe. This is precisely what Valéry claims for the quoted "Pensée" of Pascal. "This vast verse," he says, "constructs the rhetorical image of a system complete in itself, a Universe." (p. 42) Here is that supersensuous body that imagination's rhythms and timbres engender. The carved agate, the beautiful crystal, thus slips into the place vacated by common subject, common meaning, man and his world.

The airy affinities of this delicate workmanship are mathematics and music. In such fields grow harmonious fictions whose validity is not measured in terms of common experience. Our poets often use the musical analogy, as in

a vivid apprehension . . .
In an interior ocean's rocking
Of long, capricious fugues and chorals.

and:

the study of the music
Of *Ash-Wednesday* should compel the minds of all
Poets; for in a hundred years no poem
Has sung itself so exquisitely well.

Poetry's linkage with music reminds us that "elliptical," oblique, unearthly poetry may, like music, have symbolic meaning. And the question arises whether symbols may give a richer content and suggestiveness than more familiar representation can. The fact that "subject" is thrown to the common reader like a piece of meat by the burglar to the house dog does not exclude a symbol's "evocation." If one then asks what is the deliverance of "evocation" on the problem of "Man and his Place," the answer proves to be less tenuous than one at first thought. Of course "evoked" meanings are not convertible into factual propositions. They stir up sentiments and actuate moods. The words "eternal" and "infinite," says Valéry, as he develops his analysis of Pascal's "perfect little poem," "are symbols of non-thought. Their value is wholly affective. . . . They provoke the particular sensation of the impotence of imagining." But there is more in some recent poetical music than sensation and affective value, or a kernel of vague enchantment. There is a kind of semantic revenge, or public meaning-in-spite-of-intention. The subject that pervades a considerable body of this delicately carved poetry is the ruin of our present civilization by greed and worldly ambition. Flashing across the dark

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picture are nostalgic memories of the author's own childhood. In their search for the rightly weighted set of sounds and the rhythms counterpointed and wavering, our enchanters confess that — at least in part — they look deep within themselves as they pass into lyricism. There they find not only little tunes, and an urge for swinging, varied balance, but flickering scenes, memorable because of blissful, irresponsible playdays.

In Eliot's "Burnt Norton," for example, after a few solemn lines, without any explicit bridge there comes this:

Footfalls echo in the memory
Down the passage . . .
Towards the door . . .
Into the rose-garden. My words echo
Thus, in your mind.

Then we get a faint reference to birds, rose leaves, a pool, laughter — then:

Go, said the bird, for the leaves were full of children
Hidden excitedly, containing laughter.

At the end, in symmetry, there is the same dim recalling of childish games in the rose garden. Except for bright reliefs like this, the "subject" runs on the surrounding vulgarity and spiritual death. Man's place for many an agate-cutter is a pessimist's chaos, ugly, selfish, obscene. Its west has declined; its values are decadent. It is a "rat's alley," "stony rubbish," "a heap of broken images." The inhabitants of "The Waste Land" are "hooded hordes swarming" over endless plains, stumbling in cracked earth. Individually they are palmists, scented with synthetic perfumes, toothless whores, drowned and having their bones picked, lean solicitors reading last testaments. Man and his place is here — dust-to-dust. Eliot reveals his core of feeling in *The Waste Land* when he says: "I will show you fear in a handful of dust."

Edith Sitwell calls man's place a "spider's universe," — "the idiot drum of a universe changed to a circus."

The problem that the agate-cutter sets for the consistency-loving philosopher is, in our present context, this: The poet, as refiner of language, finds his tool both instrument of enchantment (the functioning of language here being at the same time language as intrinsic value) and instrument of satire, fit to scorch our world. He makes a

world of his own which is music; he uses that music to tell off contemporary manners. The resultant effect is that simultaneous tension of hating and loving such as Sappho and Catullus ascribe to the distracted lover. In the behavior of these poets as I have interpreted it, there seems to be a maximum of contradictory attitudes: a repudiation of a beastly world and the fine evocation of a world of carved autonomous beauty. The location of the behavior betrays, I think, the source of the contradiction. Both in doing and undergoing, these poets transact, by and large, with surfaces. Fastidious sensibilities as they essentially are, they recoil at once from filth and greed as they see it in its outward shows, and they make, for their consolation, exquisite textures, which are also word surfaces that they tend to caress with the sensitive surface of their imagination's hand. Both the doing and the undergoing are nervously energetic but plastically inhibited, because of the immediacy of the reaction; one might without too much exaggeration say that the poet remains suspended, vibrating, between what comes into him and what goes out from him. Is a philosopher prepared to say that if the poet's theme is the world around him, and without him, he takes it inadequately when his references are typically "pejorative"? Does such a poet perhaps not know incisively and thoroughly the good side of essential humanity? If he both felt and worked with a larger part of himself and deeper layers of his place, would both the tone and the reference of his poetry change?

Although the contradiction of the Hardy-esque mood is gone (man made a puppet by a man who is anything but a puppet), still a degree of the passivity of Hardy's attitude survives. The poet of our second type is still too impressionable for one whose calling is "making."

Yeats wrote "The Cutting of an Agate" between 1903 and 1915. He then declared that he hoped to have got far enough away from life to "make credible strange events and elaborate words." He came back to life about 1925 along with many other poets who, as he tells us, awoke in that day to a sense of their responsibility. On Christmas day, 1936, he wrote:

"I am an old man now and month by month my capacity and energy must slip away, so what is the use of saying that both in England and Ireland I want to stiffen the backbone of the high-hearted and high-minded and the sweet-hearted and sweet-minded, so that they may no longer shrink and hedge, when

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they face rag-merchants like X. Indeed before all I want to strengthen myself. It is not our business to reply to this and that, but to set up our love and indignation against their pity and hate."

Here the poet assumes a moral duty: to stiffen the backbone of the spiritually distinguished by the diffusion of joy based on a vision of truth. But what the poet's work is, once he has become a brother of the common life, may easily be confused by him and by others. He is to diffuse joy, but as only he can, and with a new emotional accent. The poet's place in the world is still the place of the poet, even if the poet claims participation in what concerns us all. He is still the explorer and master of language, the speaker of "imagination's Latin," even if his language aims at wider relevance. In "*Esthétique du mal*," Wallace Stevens, conning over man's ills, asserts in a setoff distich that our savior, in this plight, is the music of language:

Natives of poverty, children of malheur
The gaiety of language is our seigneur.

Indeed it is by remaining poet that the poet best fights for his country. Stevens says:

The soldier is poor without the poet's lines,
His petty syllabi, the sounds that stick
Inevitably modulating, in the blood.
And war for war, each has its gallant kind.
How simply the fictive hero becomes the real;
How gladly with proper words the soldier dies,
If he must, or lives on the bread of faithful speech.

I mentioned earlier that the modern poet has offered his practical services to the philosopher for instruction in the sharpening of speech. Workers with words have a good housekeeper's revulsion against messiness in verbal indication. A recent poet has said that public life would benefit if our legislators could achieve something like verbal-surgical cleanliness through the emulation of poetic practice. The suggestion that language is bread for the soldier and surgical instrument for the statesman has the advantage of implying that words are more than signs and symbols. It emphasizes their common use and makes them a kind of thing in the world of things. But teaching philosophers and lawmakers how to read and write is still an avocation of the poet, rather than his vocation.

"Illumination of plain and common things," one poet suggests, is the work of the poet, false romanticism having now been dismissed. So

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he sings about "Ploughing on Sunday," and "Lilacs in Carolina," "Two Pears," and "A Glass of Water." Another poet asks poets in the same vein: "Are we, perhaps, here just for saying:

House,
Bridge, Fountain, Gate, Jug, Olive tree, Window, —
possibly: Pillar, Tower? . . . but for saying, remember,
oh, for such saying. . . ."

As Americans I think we may congratulate ourselves on the success of our poets in this kind. We celebrate with felicity the homely things in our landscape: stone walls, birch trees, and subways. It proves that the salt of lightness seasons our poetical feasts, and that we know the high value of democratic conviviality — living with things around us on gay terms. If Democritus' Ghost would protect me, I would even suggest that a more literal kind of conviviality is a holiday invocation of the poet:

Noah he often said to his wife when he sat down to dine
I don't care where the water goes if it doesn't get
into the wine.

Yeats listed "humorous self-forgotten drunkenness" and mischievousness, along with physical beauty and courage, among "beautiful lofty things."

My father upon the Abbey stage, before him a raging crowd.
"This Land of Saints," and then as the applause died out,
"Of Plaster Saints," his beautiful mischievous head thrown back.
Standish O'Grady supporting himself between the tables
Speaking to a drunken audience high nonsensical words;
Augusta Gregory seated at her great ormolu table
Her eightieth winter approaching: yesterday he threatened my life,
I told him that nightly from six to seven I sat at this table,
The blinds drawn up.

This transition from nonsense to courage brings us back to Yeats's pronouncement: that the work of the poet as distinctive agent in the common world is to stiffen the backbone of the spiritually minded by the diffusion of joy based on a vision of truth. The mood required is that of a curious double-edged laughter, laughter that attacks as well as rejoices.

You remember Kant's definition of laughter: expectation suddenly brought to nothing, the traumatic collapse of psychic habit setting up a spasmodic vibration of the diaphragm. If we may be pardoned violence to Kant's formula we may say: Poetic generation as leaping

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laughter is here and now ordinary expectation suddenly brought to *something*, to dangerous lyrical potency, the collision setting up a trembling of the whole man. For a poet's laughter, on this view, "completes the partial mind" and marks an access of energy that spreads over the entire organism. *Poesis* often signalizes a moment of excited discovery. There is a sudden discontinuity when the poet strikes in and makes his fertile encounter. With Louis McNeice, he exclaims, "The world is suddener than we think it." His insights, Wallace Stevens says, are

moments of awakening
Extreme, fortuitous, personal, in which
We more than awaken, sit on the edge of sleep,
As on an elevation.

This laughing poetry crowns discovery with "sudden glory" and acts both as release and recharge. The poet is all at once aware that he can triumph over the toughest, hardest material: his own inertia, if he is old,

. . . My temptation is quiet,
Here at life's end . . .
Grant me an old man's frenzy.
An old man's eagle mind;

—his own ambition, if he fancies himself important.

Ambition is my death. That flat thin flame
I feed, that plants my shadow;

his fear of his own body, if he has never felt at home in it; the rough, cruel world, if he recognizes his tendency toward oversensitivity,

Many men mean
Well: but tall walls
Impede, their hands bleed and
They fall, their seeds the
Seed of the fallen . . .
Whom the noonday washes
Whole, whom the heavens compel
And to whom pass immaculate messages . . .
Impede impediments
Leap mountains, laugh at walls.

But the double edge of the laughter implies contrary moods as well as collision of a poet with his weakness and his world. Irony and bitterness, sometimes vulgar, defiant riotousness, pull against complaisance and gaiety. Yeats, in a memorable passage, claims for today's poetic laughter a component of savage triumph that recalls Hobbes's concep-

tion. He quotes the saying of Swift, "When I am told that somebody is my brother protestant, I remember that the rat is a fellow creature," and comments: "That seems to me a joyous saying." Now we delight in this example; but when Yeats introduces a more sinister element in a quotation from a Dutch mystic we are startled. The mystic said: "I must rejoyce, I must rejoyce without ceasing, though the whole world shudder at my joy." What kind of joy is it, I ask, that causes universal shuddering? A joy, I answer, whose energy has passed beyond the control of reason. And yet, if reason is the function in man, which we believe directed toward objective report and actual fact, it is reason which is immediately associated by Yeats with the Dutch mystic's joy: These emotions, he says, do not desire to change their object. They are "a form of eternal contemplation of what is."

I think the philosopher may question whether the rejoicing poetry of today, in becoming active, acknowledges any more the contemplative virtues. Practical in a sense the new poets are; engaged actively with the world they would be; and also aware of world-wide, deep-set human problems, but too engrossed in their rich ambiguous rejoicing for the difficult "contemplation of what is." They sometimes confuse, I think, predilection for the palpable, and a "large, loud liberty" with truth-telling, and dismissal of traditional belief with sense of fact. Ashamed of an earlier fastidiousness, they have adopted a complementary one and so remain in their own way unobjective. Two examples must suffice: the grosser aspects of life are not only given their proportionate place but the protruding foreground—a baroque thrust—and the moral attitude of compassion tends to be frowned on as weak. Yeats's prayer secured for him I think, his "old man's eagle mind." All must acknowledge the lusty power of his late verse. Out of what does song grow? he asks, and answers: "Five things: the virgin, the harlot, the lion, the eagle, and the wild." Here the statement is powerful, but balanced. But he is too harsh when he writes that his inspiration is

A mound of refuse or the sweepings of a street,
Old kettles, old bottles, and a broken can,
Old iron, old bones, old rags, that raving slut
Who keeps the till. Now that my ladder's gone,
I must lie down where all the ladders start,
In the foul rag-and-bone shop of the heart.

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Again, it is neither the virgin nor the harlot that Wallace Stevens' poet yearns for, but

the most grossly maternal, the creature
Who most fecundly assuaged him, and not the mauve
Maman. His anima liked its animal
And liked it unsubjugated.

"*Mauve maman*" is here perverse, I think. Again: granted that Auden is right in his commentary on "The Tempest" in redeeming the unfairly treated Caliban and setting him beside delicate Ariel, even so, on the whole, one hears too much of "earth's frankly brutal drum."

You will recall that Thomas Hardy, our first great poetical example, represented the spirit of pity as young and ineffectual; but yet he knew it deserved a place among the heavenly intelligences. What the new poets intend to do with pity is well expressed by Auden, when he says:

" . . . it is precisely in its negative image
of Judgment that we can positively envisage Mercy."

Mercy — compassion — pity — this class of emotional attitudes seems, to these writers as it did to Spinoza, a lack of perfection, a failure in active virtue. The detached attitude of judging facts and values, or the ebullient one of rejoicing and so triumphing, is substituted. In Spender's phrase, "pity is the same as cruelty," because it turns life into water. He laughs at it with bitter satire:

To the hanging despair of eyes in the street, offer
Your making hands and your guts on skewers of pity.

Christian pity is one of the mistakes of our traditional anthropomorphic religion, says Stevens:

The fault lies with an over-human god,
Who by sympathy has made himself a man
And is not to be distinguished when we cry
Because we suffer [from] our oldest parent.

.....
If only he would not pity us so much,
Weaken our fate, relieve us of woe both great
And small, a constant fellow of destiny,

A too, too human god, self-pity's kin
And uncourageous genesis. . . . It seems
As if the health of the world might be enough.

However dangerous a drug pity is, is it not unrealistic to envision men as everywhere healthy enough to dispense with it? If a too human

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God pitied us too much, does not the middle, limited location of humanity itself require its presence for the maintenance of a tolerable lot? Hardy made pity a celestial power. Hopkins, though he could reject even in his agony "carriage comfort," was not able in the end to live without a desperate dose of pity for his own suffering:

My own heart let me have more pity on; let
Me live to my sad self hereafter kind,
Charitable; not live this tormented mind
With this tormented mind tormenting yet . . .
Come, poor Jack self, I do advise
You, jaded, let be; call off thoughts awhile
Elsewhere; leave comfort root-room. . . .

Perhaps one of the tasks of the moral philosopher is the re-evaluation and redefinition of compassion, in order that from him it may pass better understood into humane literature. Perhaps the poets have suffered so much that they have become not only active but hard. At any rate, if the present spirit of Caliban, romping riotously in poetry, excludes pity, then the element of earth is more hostile to humanity than the element of air, for Shakespeare made Ariel teach the revengeful Prospero to supplant revenge with humanity; Prospero said reflectively to Ariel:

Hast thou, which art but air, a touch,
a feeling
Of their afflictions, and shall not myself,
One of their kind, that relish all as sharply
Passion as they, be kindlier moved than thou art?
Though with their high wrongs, I am struck to the quick,
Yet with my nobler reason gainst my fury
Do I take part.

Here a poet praises the philosopher's instrument, reason, in that it restores a neglected value, compassion. Recent poets, however incoherent and ironical, have opened new experience to us through linguistic invention and have quickened and intensified the philosophical problem of doing and undergoing. Could we remind them, in return, of a fading quality in our common life, a slighted human excellence?

KATHARINE GILBERT

Duke University

A DEFENSE OF SUBSTANCE¹

I AM GOING to argue tonight that some hypothesis such as that of substance as an ultimate category is presupposed by our belief that we can learn from experience. I shall defend the view that *if* empirical knowledge is possible, or if such notions as thing, property, cause, order, law, or even process, are to have the objective significance they do have in our interpretation of the world and are to play the role they do play in our knowledge of the world, then the category of substance is indispensable. I am not going to argue for the proposition that empirical knowledge is possible, or that the notions we have just mentioned do have objective significance; hence, I am not categorically supporting substance. I confess, however, a firm and unequivocal belief in empirical knowledge. It is for this reason that for me, as it should be for any believer in science, a discussion of substance is serious philosophic business.

I shall introduce the problem of substance by considering the meaning and status of dispositional properties. I begin this way, not because I think that the acceptance or rejection of substance turns upon the analysis of dispositional properties, but because the issues raised by such properties lead directly to the problem of substance and thence to the relations between substance, causation, and natural law.

To say that gold is fusible, that sugar is soluble, that arsenic is poisonous is to attribute to these things dispositional properties. When I say that this lump of sugar is soluble in coffee, I do not mean that it ever was put into coffee and dissolved or ever will be put into coffee and dissolve. Nor do I mean simply that if it was put into coffee, it did dissolve, or that if it shall be put into coffee, it will dissolve. I mean also that if it *had been* put into coffee, it *would have* dissolved. Similarly, when we say that arsenic is poisonous, an essential part of

¹ Presidential address delivered to the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association, University of Oregon, December 28, 1946.

our meaning is that if certain conditions *had been* satisfied, it *would have* poisoned someone.

Such properties must be distinguished from those which are not dispositional. Thus, when I say that a sense-datum is yellow, I am attributing to it a nondispositional property. When, however, I say that the case of my watch which is now in my pocket is yellow, I use "yellow" in a dispositional sense, meaning roughly that if anyone having normal vision had looked, or were to look, at the case in daylight, he would have had, or would have, a sensation of yellow. Of course someone might hold that my watch case is yellow also in a nondispositional sense: that the physical object is yellow independently of conditions of illumination or the presence of a perceiver. I hardly need to point out that most of the properties we use in identifying physical objects and defining their kinds are dispositional.

The notion of dispositional property leads to substance in the following way: When we assert, for example, that if this lump of sugar had been put into coffee, it would have dissolved, then we are asserting that the lump of sugar is "something which may be in various states, and may stand in various relations to other things at various times."² We are implying also that it "*might instead* have been in a different state or stood in different relations to the same or different things *at that time*."³ And this implies that the sugar has a *nature* which does not necessitate its being in just this state or in just these relations to these other things at this time, and that it would have been the same thing even if it had not been in these states or in these relations in which it now is. The lump of sugar is then a *substance*, and its specific nature as such is constituted, at least in part, by certain of its dispositional properties.

Disquieted by the fact that relatively permanent substance seems in this way presupposed by dispositional properties, some philosophers have endeavored to show that dispositional properties are not ultimate and, in this way, have hoped to removed at least one reason for taking substance as a metaphysical category. They have tried to do this by expressing in nondispositional and nonsubstantive terms everything that we can sensibly express by employing such terms. Success in this

² C. D. Broad, *An Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy*, I, 149.

³ *Ibid.*

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project requires that statements in terms of the alternative set of categories be equivalent in the strictest intensional sense to the original statements. Such translatability is a *necessary* condition of the avoidance of dispositional properties and of substance, unless of course it can be shown that the very notion of dispositional property, or of substance, is infected with contradiction.

In the present positivistic and antimetaphysical milieu of philosophic thought, many thinkers have pinned their faith on the notion of "process" as the category most promising of liberation from metaphysics. I use the word "faith," because, though the recommendations of process are legion, closely reasoned expositions detailing precisely how a reconstruction in terms of it can be accomplished are astonishingly rare. C. D. Broad's argument in his *Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy* is one of the exceptions. In attempting to reduce substance to process, he does an excellent, though not entirely convincing, job until he comes to dispositional properties. There his attack takes the form of arguing that conditionals contrary-to-fact, which are expressions of dispositional properties, are nonsense insofar as they be construed to be about a singular subject and are sense only if they be construed to be about a class or kind, and that when so construed, they are equivalent to functions expressible in the indicative mood.⁴

Thus, if in expressing my belief that a particular vase is fragile, I say, "If this vase had been hit a sharp blow, it would have shattered," I am speaking nonsense if the subject of my proposition is *this* vase. And if I am not speaking nonsense, then I mean that if at any time any substance of the same kind as this vase were hit a sharp blow, it would shatter.

Though this language suggests that Broad is merely replacing a subjunctive conditional about an individual by one about a kind, and consequently that he has just shifted the problem from individuals to classes, I doubt that this is what he intends. Rather, I believe he means that the proposition about kinds is a functional law, which can be expressed in the indicative. Then he would reinterpret our original proposition about "this vase" as an instance of the law. Accordingly, the original statement that this vase is fragile would then have as its analysis the conjunction of the general law about vases and the follow-

⁴ *Op. cit.*, ch. xiv, esp. 274-287.

ing two propositions about "this vase": (1) If this vase ever was hit a sharp blow, it then shattered; and (2) if this vase ever shall be hit a sharp blow, it will then shatter.

On this argument I would comment as follows:

(1) Broad has not shown that it is nonsense to use a conditional contrary-to-fact about singular things. As far as I can gather from his discourse, his reason for rejecting such conditionals is this: If x had property ϕ at time t , then there is no sense in supposing that x did not have ϕ at time t . He asks what sense can be given to it, and from his admitted inability to supply an answer, he concludes that it has no sense. At least part of his difficulty seems to be due to his failure to see that the proposition that the world is so determined as to leave open no physical possibility does not imply that physical possibility is meaningless. Take the proposition: "If Roosevelt had not died on April 12, 1945, Truman would not have been President on April 12, 1945." Let us grant that Truman's being President on April 12, 1945 was a physically determined resultant of the particular state of the world eons ago. Nonetheless, his being President on April 12 was as contingent as the laws of nature and as the particular state of the world at any previous date. Hence, though his being President then may have been physically necessitated, it was not logically necessitated, and the denial of it is not meaningless. Only if every truth about a thing were part of its essence — i. e., only if the most rigid theory of internal relations were true — would it be nonsense to contemplate Truman's not being President on April 12, 1945. Though I can hardly believe that Broad could have held that if, as a sheer matter of fact or as a result of physical determination, a particular has a certain property, then the proposition that it does not have that property is meaningless, still I am at a loss for any other explanation of his position. Consequently, I must conclude that he has not successfully supported his denial of sense to conditionals contrary-to-fact about singulars, and, therefore, that he has not shown how to translate subjunctive conditionals expressive of dispositional properties into indicative equivalents not involving such properties.

(2) The denial of sense to subjunctive conditionals about singulars makes a travesty of much of our use of functional laws. Their application both in practical and in theoretical contexts often involves

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judging what would have happened if something had happened, or of predicting what would take place in the future if such and such alternative were adopted. Moreover, even the functional laws themselves are for the most part idealizations never realized in fact. A good example is the law of inertia.

And finally, as I shall argue later in this paper, even if dispositional properties could be dispensed with in favor of events and their laws, still the very notion of law involves the notion of substance.

Before turning, however, to that matter, I want to mention one other attempt to avoid the consequences entailed by dispositional properties, namely, Professor Carnap's.⁵ Beginning with a "language" not having dispositional words, he would introduce them into that language, not by definition, which he admits is impossible, but by the device of "reduction sentences." Such sentences state in terms of the initial language and the logic of material implication, sets of conditions under which the dispositional words may be used and other sets under which they should not be used. Suppose, for example, we want to introduce into our language the dispositional adjective-word "fragile." We stipulate: (1) If x is hit a sharp blow and shatters, then x is fragile; and (2) if x is dropped to the pavement and does not shatter, then x is not fragile. In this way we stipulate positive and negative conditions for the employment of the word "fragile." Such reduction sentences do not tell us the meaning of the word but enumerate conditions of its applicability and of its inapplicability. Additional reduction pairs enumerate further such conditions, with the result of a progressive determination of the correct application of the word. But, as Carnap freely admits, the determination will always be partial. With respect to the kinds of circumstance not enumerated, the expression " x is fragile" would, Carnap says, have "no meaning." This is sufficient to show that reduction sentences do not provide a definition.

On this mechanism of Carnap's I would remark as follows:

(1) Since the determination is always partial, the *meaning* of the dispositional adjective-word has not been introduced into his language. This would be true even if we could specify all the test conditions, positive and negative, of the application of the word, because such an

⁵Rudolf Carnap, "Testability and Meaning," *Philosophy of Science*, III, no. 4 (Oct., 1936).

exhaustive enumeration would be nothing but a *formal material equivalence* — not an identity — between the disjunctive enumeration of the positive conditions and the truth of the function, x is fragile, and a similar equivalence for the falsity of the function, x is fragile. Let us consider another example. Even though it were possible for a physiological psychologist to state an exhaustive set of conditions under which a human being may be said to be conscious, and an exhaustive set of conditions under which a human being may be said to be not conscious, still these sets would miss entirely the meaning of consciousness. Or, a corresponding statement of all the physical or physiological conditions under which one will have a sensation of red would not give the sensory content of the experienced red. However important such "behavioristic definitions" may be, we must not fail to recognize that they are not definitions in the usual sense — in the sense in which the *definiendum* may always be replaced by the *definiens* without any change in *meaning*. Carnap has not then shown us how to introduce into a nondispositional-word language the *meaning* of a dispositional word. All that his device of reduction sentences does is to determine to some degree the conditions of the correct application of such a word.

A few moments ago I said that Carnap did not attempt to *define* dispositional property adjectives. At least one reason for this is certain paradoxical consequences which result from the use of the notions of the logic of material implication. These consequences follow principally from the fact that false propositions materially imply all propositions, and that functions may be vacuously true. An example of such a paradox is this: If we define " x is soluble in water" as "Whenever x is placed in water, x dissolves," we are driven to affirm of anything which never has been and never will be placed in water that it is soluble in water, regardless of what it is made of.

Though I do not have a formal proof, I doubt that dispositional properties can be defined, or conditionals contrary-to-fact can be expressed, solely in terms of nondispositional terms and the concepts of material logic. I doubt it, not just because no one has successfully done it, but because formal implication and equivalence, being extensional functions, hold between many properties not only physically unconnected but totally independent in meaning, and also because propositions asserting them may be vacuously true.

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I might add in passing that since the relation between the facts expressed by the antecedent and by the consequent of the expression of a dispositional property is not a relation belonging to logic, such a property cannot be defined in terms of the relations of a strict or intensional logic.

It is interesting to note that all attempts, or at least all attempts with which I am acquainted, to get rid of dispositional properties, either by reduction or by translation, possess one or both of two characteristics: (1) the exclusive use of a material logic, and (2) the exclusion of the notion of causation in any sense stronger than that of a mere constant conjunction in experience—i.e., in any sense not expressible in terms of a formal implication or equivalence.

Although I believe that dispositional properties involve connections not expressible by indicative conditionals of the "if . . . then" form, I do not object to expressing certain implications of propositions involving such properties, by sentences of that form, provided we carefully distinguish between (1) the logical relation holding from the antecedent to the consequent proposition, and (2) the relation between the states of affairs expressed by these propositions. This latter relation is, as we have said, the one involved in dispositional properties; and, not belonging to logic, it cannot be expressed exclusively in terms of the notions belonging to logic.

I fully agree with the familiar view that this relation is *causal*,⁶ provided the causal relation be synthetic and yet genuinely connective. I shall argue later that causation in Hume's sense is inadequate to ground empirical inference. I shall argue also that the synthetic connectedness required of causation presupposes substance, and that, consequently, causal law too involves substance. If this is right, no resolution of physical things, or even of minds, into processes or series of events exemplifying natural law could remove the need for substance. It would merely displace the locus of substance from things or minds to events and the relations between them.

I turn now to the relation between substance and law. The close relation between substance and causal law has been suggested by the fact that the conditional propositions expressive of dispositional prop-

⁶ C. J. Ducasse, "On the Attributes of Material Things," *The Journal of Philosophy*, XXXI, 3 (Feb. 1, 1934), 57-72.

erties are often stated in causal terms. I shall begin my discussion of this relationship by calling to mind Leibniz' view that the successive states of a substance form causal series, or, as some say today, form series which obey the laws of physics, and that the identity of a substance involves "the persistence of the same law of the series."⁷ Leibniz went so far as to say, "That there should be a persistent law, involving the future states of that which we conceive as the same, is just what I assert to constitute it the same substance."⁸ Thus he came close to identifying substance with law, but he did not make the identification. Russell, however, in discussing Leibniz' notion of substance, suggests "how easily Leibniz could have got rid . . . of the appeal to subject and predicate, and have substituted the unity of the law or series for that of the logical subject. . . ."⁹ Such an identification seems to be what many recent philosophers have aimed at. Perhaps they have overlooked the fact that such an identification would drop out of causal series the connectedness between its terms, which makes it causal rather than coincidental.

But just what is meant by the unity of a law? In what does it consist? Do all laws have unity, or only some? What is the mark of its presence? I suspect that the use of such language without elucidation is a positivistic trick of smuggling in in disguise what is being denied. Such talk about unity seems to be either a concealed acceptance of substance or an attempt to introduce a generality or genuine connectedness not given in experience, without however admitting the inadequacy of strict empiricism to validate either conception. I think Hume was right in denying that we find in sensory experiences of allegedly causal transactions anything but conjunctions or successions. In them we find no necessary connection between cause and effect, no generality, and no objective unity. Repetition given in experience is essentially different from generality or universality. In empirical conjunctions we discover no constancy or generality which is other than that expressible by an enumeration of singular propositions. If there is any unity or generality expressed by a universal proposition, then that which makes such a proposition true transcends sensory experience. To sup-

⁷ Bertrand Russell, *The Philosophy of Leibniz*, p. 47.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 48.

⁹ *Loc. cit.*

ply this nonsensory element is one of the functions of substance, which therefore is a hypothesis explanatory of whatever repetition we do get in experience. Thus, the powers of Locke's substances or the activities of Leibniz', or the "secret connexions" of Hume grounded the unity intrinsic to law and the constancy intrinsic to causal action. They were the stable generating agencies of those empirical series which may be expressed as laws.¹⁰

Russell has expressed one of his most widely known theses as follows: the "ground for assuming substances . . . is purely and solely logical. What Science deals with are *states* of substances, and it is these only that can be given in experience. They are assumed to be states of *substances*, because they are held to be of the logical nature of predicates, and thus to demand subjects of which they may be predicated. The whole doctrine depends, throughout, upon this purely logical tenet."¹¹ I do not wish to deny that this cherished doctrine of his has truth in it, or that it is an acute historical observation. Nonetheless the metaphysical function of substance has not been simply that of a subject of predication. It has been, rather, also to provide the connection presupposed by the *stable* compresence of qualities and, let it be emphasized, of dispositional properties. It has been also, as we have already explained, to connect the successive states of a series exemplifying a law.

The unity presupposed by the stable compresence of qualities may be approached by reflecting upon Mill's definition of matter as a permanent possibility of sensation.¹² Thus, to say that my desk is material is tantamount to saying that it is a permanent possibility of, for example, visual and tactual sensations. It does not imply that it now manifests any such qualities as brown or hard but simply that under certain specifiable circumstances such qualities would be manifested. Thus, according to Mill, when I say that my desk is brown, I mean only that if certain standard conditions of illumination are fulfilled, then, if a

¹⁰ I wish to make explicit that in referring to Hume's analysis of experience, I advisedly limited my acceptance of it to *sensory* experience. I am not prepared to follow him in his assertion that in the introspection of, for example, voluntary action, we get nothing more than conjunctions. In Chapter II of his *Mind and Matter*, Stout has, in my opinion, shown the inconclusiveness of Hume's argument on this point.

¹¹ *Op. cit.*, 49.

¹² *An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy*, chs. xi and xii.

perceiver looks in the proper direction, he will get a sensation of brown. Similar definitions would hold for other qualities or properties of the material desk: for its rectangular shape, hardness, and weight, for its being combustible, destructible, etc. Hence, if Mill is right, a material thing is a set of compresent possibilities of several different kinds and related to each other in complicated manners.

Mill's choice of the word "possibility" is obviously misleading, however revealing it may be of his positivism. He meant more than logical possibility, for by a physical object he meant more than a permanent logical possibility, since anything less than a sheer contradiction would satisfy that description. Also he assigns to them a relatively fixed spatial location: "When we change our place we do not carry away with us the Permanent Possibilities of Sensation: they remain until we return. . . ."¹³ In view of the function of these possibilities, they seem to differ little from dispositional properties or from the "powers" of Locke. To assert that nonactualized possibilities keep together, remain at a place, and will be manifested when certain conditions are satisfied is hardly less than to assert the presence of a permanent substance with its powers. Mill avoided substance only in name.

I would make similar criticisms of such treatments of physical things as Russell's construction of them out of sensibilia. His constructions are simply formulations of certain orders of data, or possible data, totally devoid however of any provision for the stability of those orders or for the laws governing changes in them. The conception of an object as a many-dimensional continuum of radii, each composed of a continuous order of sensibilia, utterly fails its metaphysical function because it provides neither a ground for, nor an explanation of, the formal unity and order so fancifully portrayed. As a logical analysis, it is worthy of the genius of Russell; but as metaphysics, it makes nobody the wiser.

Though I know that the word "power" is vague and figurative, and abhorred by many, still I think it is useful in expressing some of the things I want to say about substance. Accordingly, I ask your indulgence while I state more carefully my conception of power, of its function, and of its relation to properties.

When I say that a substance has the dispositional property of, for

¹³ *Op. cit.*, 202 f.

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example, fragility, *part* of what I mean is that it now satisfies some but not all of the necessary conditions of being shattered. Amongst these conditions may be certain qualities or relations. Part also of what I mean is that it provides the connection or *synthesis in virtue of which* (1) the necessary conditions it now satisfies and (2) the other necessary conditions are combined and together form a sufficient condition of being shattered. That is, the substance synthesizes conditions into a sufficient condition. This capacity to synthesize is the essence of power. To say that something has a certain power is to say not only that it has certain characters which, when supplemented by others, constitute a sufficient condition of the specified result, but also that it has the *capacity to synthesize* these conditions and thereupon generate the result, e. g., the shattering. To have a power is to have a power to do something, or to act in a certain way, when certain stimuli or influences are given.

I want to emphasize that, though having a certain power does involve certain necessary conditions, *power* itself is not a set of conditions in the same sense but is of a different order from that of the conditions or of the consequent manifestation. It is not a set of qualities or relations, but is that which makes qualities and relations relevant to other qualities or relations. Hence, to expect to have enumerated a set of qualities or relations in answer to the question as to what a power is, is simply to expect the wrong kind of answer. Such a set of qualities or relations would miss entirely the power.

I suspect that power is indefinable, but this does not entail that nothing of importance or enlightening can be said about it, or that it cannot be significantly related to other ideas and thereby clarified by them and they by it. It is just this sort of thing I have been trying to do and want to continue to do now by suggesting the hypothesis that causal action is the synthetic-creative activity of substance and finds its locus in substance. Thus, when I say that something is fragile, I mean, in part, that it right now has a nature which contains part of the cause of shattering. The addition of the other necessary parts of the cause then realizes the cause of the shattering, which is the effect. In a case of causal action, the substance accordingly does three things: (1) It supplies part of the cause; (2) it synthesizes this part with the other parts coming from outside it; and (3) it generates the "shattered-

vase" situation called the effect.

In extending this elucidation by interrelation, I wish now to relate the notion of physical object to the conception of substance which we have just put forward. It is common practice to explain regular or orderly behavior by supposing the existence of objects possessing certain properties; and, conversely, we refuse to allow that a thing is a physical object unless its behavior conforms to rules, i. e., unless certain conditional propositions are true of it. An object must have the potentiality of manifesting or causing qualities in conformity with rules, which qualities do not now characterize it or which are not now exemplified, or even which it never has displayed and never will display.

Further, these rules or laws in accordance with which a thing behaves are, as far as experience reveals them to us, *synthetic*. The tie or connection between the events described by the antecedent and consequent of the law is not given in our experience of those events, and, as Hume also taught us, it is not given in any sensory experience. Now, either there is such a connection, or there is not. If there is none, then regular behavior is a matter of sheer chance, is inexplicable, and is not a valid indication of physical objects or of anything more than the given data themselves. If however there is such a connection, it must be granted a genuine status in the world. It is given that status by a hypothesis we already have at hand, namely, the hypothesis of substance with its synthetic-generative powers. Let me repeat: If the Humean analysis of sensory experience is correct, our senses are blind to genuine connections; and, again, if it is right, the ground of any stable orderliness sense-data have cannot be immanent in them but must be something transcending them. It must be, if we may use Hume's words, the "secret connexions" which bind events together. Our hypothesis is that this ground is substance.

Now, if law is general not only for a simultaneous cross-section of the world, but also through time, and so is stable, then the connective or synthetic function of substance, and therefore substance itself, must have a corresponding permanence. The significance of the permanence of substance is therefore not alone that of the existence of things through a duration but that of the stability of natural law. The analysis of this permanence and of the relation of substance to time is indeed

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fraught with problems quite as difficult and elusive as those involved in the notion of power. Though I do not have time even to mention the issues, and certainly I do not pretend to know how to settle them, still I do not believe that their existence is an objection peculiar to the category of substance. I do not believe this, because these difficulties will beset any hypothesis designed to account for the stability of law. For example, if a law is to be stable through time, it must transcend time. If it does not, we shall be threatened with difficulties similar to the one Descartes sought to solve by making God a conserving cause. And if law is to transcend time, substance or any other ontological ground we assign to law must do so too. To explain how this transcendence is to be conceived — whether, for example, by making time immanent in substance or dependent upon it in some other way — is, fortunately, beyond the scope of my topic. Now we must forsake these speculations for more down-to-earth considerations.

I have asserted that any evidence that the data of experience occur according to stable law or in an orderly manner is evidence of the existence of substance as a ground of that law or order. I fear that this proposition will be taken by many as anything but self-evident. It will be alleged that all possible data of experience are orderly and cannot fail to be orderly; and hence, that, unless every possible experience is evidence of substance, no experience is. A favorite resource in support of this position is the truth that any given finite set of elements having certain quantitatively assignable dimensions can be shown to be an instance of an order, and that that order can be formulated in an equation. That is, a law can be derived which assigns to each element a specific place in an ordered whole. From this it is concluded that the demand for order cannot fail to be met, and, consequently, no ontological ground for order is needed. Now, I admit this mathematical premise; but I deny that the conclusion alleged to follow from it does follow from it. All that follows is that *ad hoc* orders into which the given data will fit can always be formulated. This however is not sufficient to scientific inference. No one today will deny that, to be acceptable to science, an empirical law or generalization must be fruitful in prediction. This means that the law or generalization must order not only the elements whose dimensional values have been used as data in formulating it, but also other elements of the same class

whose dimensional values were not included in the data. It is no answer to say that an *ad hoc* law can be continually corrected as more and more instances are observed, because such a corrected law is, at every stage of the process, an *ad hoc* affair, which is descriptive of the data upon which it is based, but which is not a sufficient ground of probable success in predicting further data.

Let me give an example. Suppose that at a given time in the history of an honest or perfect roulette wheel, the winning numbers in order of their selection be given. Then it is possible to formulate a law or function, such that the dependent variable will be the selected number, and the independent variable will indicate the ordinal position of the selected number. Now this function or law is of the kind I have called *ad hoc* because, though it holds of the data used in discovering it, it will not enable us to predict any future selection with a higher probability than that of any other selection of the same form. This means simply that we cannot learn from experience how to win at honest roulette. On the other hand, the hypothesis that we can learn to win at roulette entails that the wheel is not honest but has some constant bias in favor of some numbers as against other numbers. In that case, a law is derivable from past selections, which will make prediction, or winning, probable.

In general then we can say this: Anyone who believes he can learn from experience not just what experience has in fact already presented to him but what it will present to him presupposes not only (1) that certain orders exemplified by past events will be exemplified by those of the future as well, but also (2) that, in spite of the number of such orders fitting events up to any specified date, the data presented up to then render it probable that a certain finite set of those alternative orders contains the stable order which will not be invalidated by future events, and (3) that additional data will confirm some and invalidate others of the remaining alternatives. An accurate statement of these formal requirements is beyond the scope of this paper. What I am insisting is that the validity of empirical knowledge presupposes the truth of such formal requirements, which, in turn, have ontological presuppositions reaching beyond the data of experience. That is to say, in order that there may be genuinely prognostic laws, there must be some objective matrix which transcends the data of ex-

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perience and which will be the ground not only of the truth, but of the very significance, of scientific laws and generalizations. The hypothesis of substance is designed to provide just such a matrix and ground.

Obviously, an analogous argument can be framed in terms of causation, which concludes that causation, as Hume defined it, is inadequate to the validation of empirical inference. Hume himself frankly recognized this; and, since it has been pointed out time and again ever since, it should not be necessary for us to discuss it anew. Nonetheless, because it is still a commonplace to accept the Humean analysis and yet not to profess its skeptical conclusions, I trust you will bear with me while I repeat briefly, in causal terms, the preceding argument for an ontological ground for knowledge.

We must distinguish, as Hume at times did distinguish, the kind of *evidence* we have for the proposition that changes of kinds A and B are causally related *from* what we mean by their being so related. As I have said, I think Hume was right in holding that the only evidence presented in sense experience is particular instances of the conjunction of A's and B's. From these instances *we* generalize to the universal, "All A's are followed by B's," which is, on Hume's definition, just another way of saying that A's cause B's. Now generalizing is a valid mode of inference only on the credentials of a theory of the generation of events — of a theory implying that the occurrence of any change A involves a change B in virtue of ontological conditions such as we set forth earlier in discussing powers, and which we found to be essential to causal action. Hence, rather than causation being constant conjunction, it is that which explains constant conjunction and justifies extrapolation from some instances of conjunction to further instances.

We might well pause a moment in the presence of the fallacy of confusing the evidence with that of which it is evidence. This confusion has been technically refined, elevated to the status of a principle and precept, and, in this exalted role, it has been a favorite weapon of the antimetaphysicians. Bared of its technical dress, it is revealed as a trick deriving whatever philosophic power it may have from implicit assumptions. Its structure is essentially this: We have a class A of data, which are taken as evidence of B, and which would, accordingly, be explained by the hypothesis of B. Then we define, or to use more fashionable, albeit less perspicuous, language, we *construct* B out of

the data of A; and so we have B as well as A, apparently without invoking any metaphysical dispensations. In justice to Russell I should say that he has never been quite taken in by this trick he so ingeniously perfected but has always recognized that its philosophic employment has presuppositions transcending the given data; e. g., continuity, irrelevance of space and time to laws, etc., which assumptions reinstate the metaphysical problem. We might observe too that Hume himself was not as guilty of this type of reasoning as have been many of his followers. Let us not forget that Hume did not deny, but actually affirmed, the existence of "secret" causes and of "secret connexions." What he denied was that experience teaches us anything more than "how one event constantly follows another."¹⁴

In regard to the definition of causation as constant conjunction, I want to make one further point; namely, even if the "constancy" of any experienced conjunction were not infinitely less than that asserted by a universal proposition — even if the known constancy were universal — still by itself it would have the status of a coincidence. It would be unexplained, would itself have no explanatory value, and be no more a part of science than a statement of the number of grains of sand on the sea shore. Universal propositions are significant for scientific knowledge only on the assumption that their truth is grounded in some sort of connectedness which explains the correlations they express. Perhaps we can put the point this way: The significance of the "general term" of an order is not simply that every particular term is an instance of it, but also that it expresses the *principle* of the order, which principle is ontologically prior to its specification in instances. Hence, our generalizing from particular terms to the "general term" is justified only on the premise that the data are so connected and generated that the "general term" is a *de jure*, not just a *de facto*, representative of all instances of their kind. If this premise is false, general propositions reduce to statements of accidents, staggering perhaps to our imaginations but still accidents. But in order that it may not be false, some such hypothesis as that of substance must be true.

A distinguished philosopher has recently said, "Nothing in experience or in events experienced either requires, or justifies, or would be illuminated by the hypothesis that causation is really some other

¹⁴ *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, sec. VII, pt. I.

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sort of relation than that of regular correlation. . . ."¹⁵ It is indeed true that nothing actually in experience or in events actually experienced requires anything more than regular correlation; in fact, I should go further and say that they themselves require nothing, not even regular correlation. Nor do they justify as brute data of sense any theory of causation at all. So far as I can see, nothing requires any justification for its sheer existence, unless it be a moral justification. But this does not imply that nothing needs justification. What does need justification is our belief that one happening is a cause of another in such a way that one of them is a reliable sign of the other. But this reliability does not follow from the theory that causation is nothing but constant conjunction. Not only that, but the Humean definition is not a *theory* of causation at all; nothing follows from it; it is, rather, a denial of the possibility of a theory explanatory of sequences of events. Unless we believe that there is something more to causation than constant conjunction, we might as well discontinue counseling the employment of the methods of science in the quest for knowledge.

Now I know that, influenced as we are by the great empirical tradition of modern philosophy and sensitive to the vigorous positivism and naturalism of today, few of us feel comfortable or at ease discussing, let alone defending, substance or powers or synthetic connections. I agree with these tendencies of thought in believing that it is healthy and just that every belief involving anything transcending experience should be viewed with suspicion and should be subjected to tests not only of truth but of meaningfulness as well. In this spirit, let us ask concerning the assumption of substance or power or connection, which can be neither confirmed nor invalidated by experience, just what cognitive meaning it has. Also, since every possible sequence of experience is consistent with it, what difference can its truth or falsity make?

In answering these questions, I want first to admit that the truth or falsity of such an assumption can make no experientially discernible difference; and that, therefore, any difference it makes cannot be found in the data of experience. But from this it does not follow that no propositions about experience would be true in one case but not

¹⁵ W. R. Dennes, "The Categories of Naturalism," in *Naturalism and the Human Spirit*, ed. by Y. H. Krikorian, p. 291.

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in the other. Let us refer back to our distinction between order and stable order. No set of events can be inconsistent with the proposition that they exemplify a stable order, or with the proposition that they do not. Hence, at any given moment of history, the events of the past cannot be, by themselves, evidence for or against the proposition that they exemplify a reliable order holding in the class consisting of them and of future events. For all we know, the regularities recorded in history and used as the data of science may be purely accidental runs of events. At any specified date in history the empirical situation will be the same. But at any such date there are presumably events to follow, and the question then posed is this: Are these past data evidence of what will occur in the future? Though the answer will not be available, the question does have sense because we know an important and significant implication of each of the two possible answers; namely, (1) if past data are evidence of future ones, then scientific inference is valid; and (2) if past data are not evidence of future ones, then science is nothing but a blind illusioned faith, and any success it has is not its success but its *luck*. Accordingly, the difference transcendent connections or substance can make is the difference between the reliability and the unreliability of inference. This, I insist, is a meaningful difference. To say that events of the past are reliable signs of events in the future is to say something about those events. The difference might be compared to that between going up a blind road and proceeding to the destination. At no time before completion of the journey can we be sure that the highway is not a dead-end street; nonetheless the rationale of our continuing lies in the probability that not all roads are blind alleys. All of our practical activities, and all of pure science, presuppose that this is the case. This assumption, then, is the epistemological cash value of such a category as substance.

I realize that at every stage in my argument I have passed over problems inextricably involved in the problem of substance. For example, what is the relation between different substances? Can substances be parts of other substances? If so, are the properties of the whole derivative from those of the parts, or vice versa? Answers to these questions might have an important bearing on the nature of historical and social science. Nor have I said anything about the relation between those quasi-substances called events and the substance pre-

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supposed by an ordered series of events. These issues are part and parcel of two basic metaphysical problems raised by our thesis that substance is the metaphysical ground of law, namely, the qualitative and the quantitative problems of monism and pluralism. Into these questions I do not have time to go, except to say, in regard to the qualitative problem, that any theory ascribing to substance an inert or purely passive nature is inadequate to the synthesizing and causal role it plays and belies the dynamic aspects of existence. In regard to the quantitative problem, I want to say that insofar as there is law or unity in the world, there must be substance as pervasive as is the law or unity itself. The history of metaphysics may be read as the attempt of philosophers to steer a middle course between extreme pluralism, which would destroy knowledge by disintegration, and extreme monism, which would destroy it by making nonsense of all the distinctions attested by experience and presupposed by the very possibility of empirical knowledge. We can keep off the rocks of pluralism only by charting a course in terms of ontological *connections*, and off those of monism only by construing those connections as *synthetic*.

Of all explanations so far proposed, this hypothesis of substance, with its powers and synthesizing activities, is for me the best able to provide for these ontological synthetic connections and for the dynamism found in experience. As an ultimate category it has the virtue of interrelating such basic notions as things, property, causality, and law. As for its transcending experience, I would put the case this way: *If* we believe that we can learn from experience — if we believe in science — then we have to face up to admitting some ontological ground transcending the data of experience.

EVERETT J. NELSON

University of Washington

THE ROLE OF THE PHILOSOPHER¹

I. INTRODUCTION

IN THINKING, no beginning can be made without assumptions. No matter how basic the problem, there is no absolute starting point behind which there remains nothing to be defined. As Santayana points out in *Skepticism and Animal Faith*, the philosopher must perforce begin his philosophizing by plunging in *medias res*. From then on, he must follow the advice of another great philosopher and "have the courage of his own absurdity."

To attempt to escape this necessity is a discouraging business. There is the case of the deep thinker who set out to make a definitive statement of an important philosophic truth. He began, of course, with the definition of a basic concept. Almost at once he uncovered an implied concept which seemed not too clear, and he quite properly stopped to define this. Whereupon the same thing happened. And then it happened again, and again, and again. Finally, much to his embarrassment, the original concept turned up; and the philosopher discovered that he had been going backward instead of forward. It was no doubt this sort of occupational risk that prompted the late F. J. E. Woodbridge to propose, playfully, to open a series of lectures which he was about to give in Germany with the statement: "*Das Denken ist auch ein Leben.*"

In concerning myself with some matters which may justly be considered as preliminary to the discussion of my topic, I am thus well aware of the risks involved. However, there is currently sharp disagreement among us as to the proper approach to the problem of the role of the philosopher in American education. There are those who believe that it would be more profitable to undertake the definition of

¹ Presidential address delivered at the Forty-fifth Annual Meeting of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association at Iowa City, Iowa, May 9, 1947.

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the role of *philosophy* rather than of the *philosopher*. There is disagreement on another point. Some, including myself, think it for the most part a waste of time to talk about the role of the *philosopher*: they believe that we should concern ourselves with the identification of the specific role of the logician, the metaphysician, the moralist, etc. In view of these disagreements, it seems advisable to state and to some extent to explain my own preferences rather than to allow them to become apparent in the course of the discussion as implicit assumptions.

There is a strong temptation to dismiss the first point with the observation that the philosopher is merely philosophy personified. But it is clear that the role of philosophical ideas may be very different from that of the philosopher. That ideas may have a history independently of those who profess them can be acknowledged without thereby making common cause with the epiphenomenalist. The philosopher is often much less, and sometimes much more, influential than his ideas warrant. For the power of ideas when professed by the living philosopher is determined partly by the kind of human being he is and partly by the circumstances in which he professes them. Thus the impact of philosophical ideas is a function of the character of the ideas, the philosopher, and the environment in which he professes and practices.

But all this can with equal truth be affirmed of other kinds of ideas, for example, religious and political ideas. It follows, therefore, that there is no private and unique problem here for the student of the role of the philosopher, unless it is true that the personality of the philosopher or the circumstances in which he lives, or both, are private and unique. This is not assumed here. Rightly or wrongly, it is assumed that the philosopher is, roughly speaking, like any other thinking human being and that his circumstances are likewise similar, and that, therefore, we need here to be concerned only with him as one who is professionally interested in philosophical ideas, and who tries to do something with them.

The belief that we should think and talk about the role of the logician, the metaphysician, etc., instead of about the role of the philosopher may itself be the revelation of profound philosophical convictions or be simply the expression of a preference in the matter of procedure. Some hold this belief because they refuse, on principle, to have any commerce with "phantom" universals. Others think it expedient,

without being unprincipled, to define for the uninitiated the particular functions of each kind of philosophical specialist. The opposition is convinced that all the specific philosophical disciplines have an essential character in common, and that therefore it is not only possible but necessary to define the philosopher as philosopher, or, to use more professional language, the philosopher *qua* philosopher.

In view of the variety and persistence of radical disagreements among philosophers with respect to solutions of their problems, proponents of this view are naturally inclined to look for the essential common character of philosophers in what they attempt to do rather than in what they profess to have accomplished. Thus the philosopher is defined as one whose task it is to produce ultimate definitions. The acceptability of this definition obviously depends upon the meaning of the word, ultimate. To insist that it means final, once-and-for-all, eternal is to read the pragmatists out of the party. The latter might be willing to accept the term in the sense of "final to date" — a kind of "last bulletin" business; but this qualification would be completely unacceptable to two, otherwise radically opposed, schools of philosophers, namely, those who believe that they can fixate the description of reality in eternal essences, and those who believe that nothing final can be affirmed of reality except that it is eternally changing. To interpret the term, final, as "completely accurate" may disarm criticism and win agreement, but it will permit every disciplined thinker to claim to be a philosopher and thus only emphasize the fact that the definition does not identify the philosopher's professional sphere of operation.

Blanshard's definition of philosophy as the search for truth rather than truth itself is another example of this type of definition by function. (In examining this definition, we should not allow ourselves to be confused by the fact that its author is also the author of two volumes of what is clearly intended to be philosophic truth.) Blanshard explains what he means by his definition when he says that philosophy "offers certain principles of evidence and proof" and thus "a method by which all ultimate beliefs must be attained and validated." This statement cites the authority on which the philosopher should be accepted as "the intellectual conscience of the community." The philosopher thus is conceived as an expert on sound reasoning, having become so by virtue of his professional inheritance of the results of centuries

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of critical study of reasoning itself, and by virtue of his own personally acquired skill.

If the philosopher is an expert in the methods of discovering truth, his subject must obviously be propaedeutic to the search for any specific type of knowledge. In that case, the philosopher should have the courage to insist that sound and adequate training in philosophy must be prescribed for all students. No one will have a better case, not even the professor of Freshman English. If the real function of the professional philosopher is to offer a running critical commentary on human claims to the possession or discovery of specific truths, then his pedagogical problem is twofold: first, the training of expert critical commentators, and, secondly, the development of a willing and sensitive audience.

Unfortunately, experts in other fields of knowledge refuse to recognize his professional authority in either of these senses. The philosophically more acute point out that the philosopher's claim rests on the assumption of the ultimate reliability of the philosopher's own thinking, and that he, the critic, considers that he has just as sound ground for assuming his own. Others willingly grant that the philosopher has developed great expertness in abstract and symbolic thinking but insist that the highly specialized character of this expertness correspondingly delimits the scope of this authority. They deny that the philosophic mind has a universal, generic, pansophic power of judgment and should therefore be listened to as the intellectual conscience of the community.

The failure of these definitions and others of this type to stand up under analysis gives one an uneasy feeling. In life's darker moments, this failure may even evoke the wild notion that possibly philosophy has no claim to a place of its own in education. The existence of teachers and courses is, after all, no guarantee of legitimacy. Whatever we ourselves may think, many of our colleagues agree with the lay philistines that, if he is not a parasite, the philosopher at least does not earn his academic bread honestly. We may justly ascribe most of this unfriendliness, distributively, to the ignorance of the layman, to resentment by our academic colleagues of our sometimes arrogant claims, to the short-sighted impatience of the practical man, and finally, to the undeniably esoteric character of some of the interests and methods of

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philosophy itself. There will remain the fact, however, that five of our "best men," after a carefully planned and conscientious inquiry of more than a year's duration, could not agree on a *general* definition of philosophy acceptable to their contemporaries. There is good reason for a different approach, therefore, and for attempting to identify the role of the philosopher by a description of the interests and methods of each of the philosophical disciplines.

2. THE ROLE OF THE LOGICIAN

When we undertake the definition of the philosophical specialist, that is to say, of the logician, moralist, etc., the difficulties inherent in generalization do not of course disappear. Since the reference of the concepts is not absolutely specific but only more limited, differences of opinion are merely more sharply focused. Thus conceptions of the nature of logic, to begin with this discipline, both with respect to subject matter and purpose, vary considerably. In regard to analytical penetration and complexity of symbolism, types of logic range from the simple and transparent Aristotelian formal logic to the extremely technical symbolic logic of the contemporary specialist. Notions concerning the function of logic also vary greatly, the sharpest opposition being between those who consider logic to be merely a descriptive and normative study of the processes of thought and those who believe that the analysis of these processes is at the same time the revelation of the ultimate nature of being.

It seems foolish to expect to encompass such basic differences in a single definition. It may be argued by those who believe it possible to define philosophy as a whole that consistency requires that each of these different conceptions of logic also requires its own specific definition. It cannot be denied that this might be advisable in a more exhaustive study than this. To omit this here is justified, first, by the important fact that the various types of logicians at least make the same approach to their subject and, secondly, by the fortunate circumstance that the additional area claimed for logic by some proponents lies clearly within one of the other philosophical specialties. Once all the specialties have been defined, each theorist can thus make such readjustments and reassignments as seem necessary to him, without thereby invalidating completely the limited definition of any specialty.

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The common initial approach of all logicians is to examine the mental activity which men call disciplined thought, to identify its elements, the inherent relations between these elements, and the reasoning processes which the nature and relations of these elements seem to permit. Generically considered, the technique of all logicians is very much the same: the elements, relations, and processes are reduced to type, the common form of each type is abstracted and represented by symbols, after which the laws of thought, whether conceived as descriptive or prescriptive, are formulated in terms of this symbolism.

The purpose of the student of logic is the purpose of all scholars: to attain useful understanding and to understand and to profit by this understanding. If the scholar is interested only in his own profit, it matters not if his discoveries are unintelligible to others. If, however, he is anxious to improve the thinking of his fellowmen, the matter of the availability of his learning becomes vitally important.

Since the higher reaches of symbolic logic are sometimes unintelligible even to other philosophical specialists, and since, moreover, the latter seem to be professionally successful and respectable in spite of this, it can hardly be maintained that all the learning of the logician must be made available to the general public, or even to the educated layman. It should comfort and sober the radically "social-minded" reformer of philosophy to recall that a substantial amount of the world's eminent thinking was produced without benefit of the professional logician. This is true even in the area of the natural sciences, which in their practices have been more sensitive to, and more directly influenced by, logical theory than have some of the other disciplines. Finally, even common-sense thought is moderately self-critical, thanks to the accumulation of a kind of homely logical wisdom which clearly tells the sinner when he has sinned, though it cannot put a technical name to it. Common sense, in short, has an elementary intellectual conscience of its own.

These facts do not, however, justify the indifference of so many professional logicians to the application and applicability of their special knowledge. To the uninitiated, the proof of this indifference is the highly technical character of most of contemporary logic. This opinion, to be sure, reveals the bias characteristic of the layman. Only the specialist himself is competent to determine to what extent he

needs a special technique and a private vocabulary. The esoteric character of logic is for the most part a logical consequence of the nature of logical inquiry. The symbolism of logic is a new language, superimposed on the symbolism of ordinary language. There is thus bound to be a wide semantic gap between the symbols and the things symbolized.

A sounder basis for criticism of contemporary logicians is the fact that they show little interest in helping other specialists, to say nothing of educated laymen, to bridge this gap. Constant association with symbols has developed in the logician an Olympian indifference, not merely to mystified colleagues, but even to the knowns and knowables to which his ingenious symbolism is supposed to refer. Manipulation of symbols has become an end in itself. The intent and scope of this criticism should not be misunderstood. Let it be noted here as an underlying assumption of this paper that complete absorption of a scholar in "pure" science is justified, not only because the advancement of a science is partially dependent upon this but also because it is a source of personal satisfaction and thus an important source of value.

Now these facts may be acceptable as a justification of the interest and practice of any particular devotee of the science, but they cannot be accepted as defining the purpose of the science as a whole or of the functions of its devotees as a class. The substance and practice of a science must be made available to mankind, and some of the specialists in that science must accept the responsibility for doing this. Whether this can best be done by a division of labor among the specialists themselves, or by the education of specialists in other fields, or by the training of an intermediary group will need to be determined by the interested parties. It cannot be left to processes of natural diffusion or precipitation. Society has a right to demand of the expert conscious attention to this problem.

It would be foolish to entertain extravagant hopes of the success of this project, however. In the first place, the direct transferability of highly specialized logical knowledge and skill is small. To apply the concepts and formulas of symbolic logic in a particular science requires an understanding of the meanings of the terms used in that science which the logician is not likely to possess. On the other hand, the scientist is not likely to have the technical knowledge and skill of the

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logician, and he can therefore make little or no use of these materials "on his own." It is relevant here to note that, on the contrary, and for obvious reasons, communication is easy between the symbolic logician and the pure mathematician; in fact, one is readily transformed into the other.

There is a second difficulty: when the application of logical laws is transferred from the realm of symbols to the realm of concrete meanings, a new and troublesome set of strains appears. Symbols are emotionally neutral, but words standing for things are often emotion-laden. Even the logician himself is likely to lose his professional objectivity when he thinks about his stomach, Stalin, or the president of his university. He is likely to be like the mathematician who could manipulate irrational numbers without any lift in blood pressure, but who became emotionally upset in his daily bouts with apparently completely rational students. Finally, there is some ground for doubting that the quasi-mathematical character of modern logic is going to be of much help in the solution of those human problems which most urgently need solution. There may be some reason for the charge that philosophers in increasing numbers are taking to symbolic logic because association exclusively with symbols, though sterile, is safe.

3. THE ROLE OF THE METAPHYSICIAN

In defining the role of a second type of philosophical specialist, the metaphysician, it is again not possible to be completely specific; there are too many different kinds of metaphysicians for that. If all are to be included, little more can be said than that all want to have the last word about the universe. Unhappily for our present purpose, there is no agreement as to what this last word is, or what it is about. Respectful reference should be made here, parenthetically, to the growing number of philosophical colleagues who believe that this last word is not worth having.

Traditionally, metaphysicians have claimed that this last word would make the universe completely understandable. It was assumed that the intellectual orientation which this effected would enable man also to adjust himself to the universe emotionally and practically. In consequence, the educated layman has been accustomed to look upon metaphysics as the counterpart of religion, that is to say, as a secular

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guide to life. In a narrower sense, but for the same reasons, the educational philosopher has looked to metaphysics for an integrative principle which would unite the special sciences and disciplines and give educational processes a common goal.

Are these expectations justified? The complete answer must be looked for in the record of the activities and accomplishments of the metaphysicians; a partial answer, which is all that the present occasion permits, may be suggested by a consideration of some of the different opinions held by metaphysicians concerning their professional task. Such differences must logically be the basis for a consideration of their professional responsibilities.

The most ambitious type of metaphysician claims to offer mankind a revelation of the essential nature of reality and of its organization and behavior. The widest divergence of opinion within this type is between those who claim that this is a revelation of a sub- or super-reality which transcends science, and those who believe it to be merely an all-inclusive scientific synthesis. To be sure, among the former there are some whose revelation consists of little more than the denudation of familiar existences of all interesting and significant characteristics and the consequent exposure of "pure" being. Since the purity of this ultimate is the purity of nothingness, this revelation offers neither enlightenment nor entertainment and may be left to the contemplation of those who contrived it.

Those metaphysicians who claim to reveal to their fellow man the essential nature and order of the universe assume a serious responsibility, for they undertake to tell him whether the universe in which he lives is dependable or eccentric, whether it is friendly, inimical, or indifferent. Moreover, since an interpretation of human nature must necessarily be included, they cannot avoid suggesting to him how he should live, and what the future of him and his kind is likely to be. Although it is true that most metaphysical speculation goes on far above the heads of even the most expertly educated, history clearly reveals that the indirect influence of metaphysical generalizations may be dramatic and far-reaching. A historic example is the system of Christian metaphysics. Familiar to us in recent experience are the concrete applications of the metaphysical concepts of Shintoism, National Socialism, and Marxism.

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Granting that the metaphysician should not be held accountable for unwarranted applications, there are serious responsibilities which he must recognize and accept. He should, to begin with, serve as his *own* intellectual conscience. Let him remember that what may be for him little more than an intellectual game may be for his fellow man the final determinant of feeling and action, and thus the guide to life. Let him not claim to have the answer to the riddle of existence if he has nothing more than a speculative clue. If he knows his metaphysical entities to be no more than hypostases or symbols, let him say so. Then each inquirer will be left free to choose, as Santayana recommends he should, that system which is most congenial to his spirit.

Some metaphysicians will have nothing to do with this business of defining the essence and order of ultimate reality and consequently disclaim all responsibilities associated with it. They conceive it to be their professional task to discover and define the predicates which all existences have in common. They are careful to point out that this is not the same thing as defining the predicates of ultimate reality, an enterprise which is virtually identical with that of defining the essential nature and order of the universe. The predicates with which they are concerned do not add up to a sub- or superreality. These philosophers are concerned merely with the definition of existence *qua* existence, or being *qua* being, etc. It is clear that if these predicates are so abstract or so neutral as to defy applicability to concrete living, these philosophers need have no concern about their human responsibilities, broadly conceived. Whether their definitions are, directly or indirectly, significant for living or not, will depend upon the definitions.

A third group of metaphysicians believe it to be their task to integrate the realm of science and thus to recover the (supposed) unity of nature lost sight of in the course of the development of the special sciences. That this task is never finished, and that the conclusions are always tentative and fractional, is readily acknowledged. It is agreed that the best that can be done is to keep mankind abreast of developments from the standpoint of the combined significance of specific discoveries in the special sciences. This type of metaphysician is inclined to be cautious and modest, being most anxious not to be confused with preachers, prophets, and such colleagues as may claim to be bearers of the last word. Some go so far as to insist that they are

engaged in what is really an intellectual game, since no one can possibly know enough about all the sciences to construct a comprehensible synthesis. Others take the position that the intellectual unification of the sciences is not conceivable on the level of substance but is attainable only in terms of method, that is to say, in the realm of logic and epistemology.

The potentialities of each of these types of metaphysicians for guiding or for misleading earnest students and for playing a part in the direction of human life in general cannot here be appraised in detail. However, since it now seems clear that scientific knowledge may well be the means by which man may encompass his own destruction, the metaphysician, insofar as he undertakes the synthetic interpretation of science, is bound to have something to say on this subject. If he sets up as a metaphysician in the grand style, he will be bound, sooner or later, to assign science a place in cultural history and thus, by implication, determine its intellectual authority and moral adequacy. If he assumes the less ambitious role of analyst and critic of science, then, either as logician or epistemologist or both, he will have a hand in the theoretical evaluation of science and, assuming significant influence, in the direction of its history.

Before concluding the discussion of the role of metaphysician, some general comments need to be made concerning the most imposing demand which is made of him, namely, that he produce a complete philosophy of life. It should be noted, first of all, that this demand cannot be justified merely by the fact that some of his philosophical progenitors have attempted to do so. It may be that, with the centuries, wisdom has come to him and he has learned that the subject matter and methods of his field of inquiry cannot furnish the clue to existence. Moreover, he may well point out that men are inclined to demand a so-called philosophy of life only when they have lost their place in the world. The philosopher, no matter what his specialty, is, after all, not a psychiatrist, specializing in the cure of cosmic neuroses. Cures of such unhappy states, like conversions, are sure to be extreme, substituting one kind of unbalance for another.

Yet, historically, philosophy and religion have been looked upon as the guides to life. Many educated people, including a great many philosophers, believe that religion has lost its effectiveness and is hard-

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ly likely to regain it. If now the metaphysician loses interest and denies responsibility and turns to occupation with highly technical specialized problems, where is mankind to find guidance? One answer is the old Socratic answer: not in knowledge of the essential nature and order of substance, of ultimate reality, of the first principle, or of universal predicates, but in knowledge of the needs and desires of man's own personality. Understanding of the nature, organization, and control of these constitutes knowledge of the good life, or wisdom. It is to the moralist, it is said, that we must look for a view of life.

4. THE ROLE OF THE MORALIST

If by view of life is meant a view of the *good* life, moralists will, in general, be willing to accept this responsibility. Most of the contemporary specialists in this field, however, will wish to define their task in less archaic and more specific terms, namely, as the identification of values which can and ought to be systematically realized in a rationally planned and directed life. Even this definition is much too general, for it fails even to suggest how moralists differ with respect to such matters as the character, authority, and interrelation of values. These differences are of course reflected in their conceptions of their professional task.

We cannot here be concerned with differences within the professional family which have no important bearing on the generic conception of the educational and social function of the moralist. Specialists may, for example, have very different notions concerning the number and relative importance of values but may nevertheless hold the same views concerning their practical availability and effectiveness. There are some family differences, however, which are logically determinative of sharply conflicting points of view concerning the role of the moralist.

Throughout the history of ethical thought, there has been a minority which has persistently maintained that the good life can exist only in thought. An ethical system, whether it be conceived as a catalogue of virtues or a system of values, is a work of art in the realm of the intellect. It is therefore suitable for aesthetic contemplation only. It is no more practically available than a dream. At best, it is a symbol of the good life, the contemplation of which brings a modicum of comfort

and peace to the frustrated spirit. An ethical system is not a plan for a better life but a refuge from a hopeless one.

It is easy to dismiss this view by characterizing it as decadent and its proponents as heartless and irresponsible. But this is not justified. It cannot be denied that there are individuals for whom the life of contemplation seems not merely the better but the only course. Moreover, if mankind is tending inevitably towards self-destruction, if reason is merely an eccentric moment in the irrational course of history, a man may be wise to withdraw within himself, where alone the life of reason can be lived. It is also well to remember that there is much of this kind of compensation concealed in systems which would not be characterized as decadent, for example, in Christian ethics, in various types of idealism, and in positivism. Even in allegedly practical and realistic plans for the organization or reform of social institutions, there are conceptions of value which are ideal, and sometimes even romantic, and schemes for their realization which are little more than prophecies. Often the confidence of the reformer is engendered by the contemplation of ideals and symbols rather than by critical judgment.

Whatever the moralist's final judgment may be concerning the function of an ethical system, it is clear that he of all men is best qualified to guide mankind in the differentiation of the ideal and the practical. If he is really an expert on human values and their realizations, it is his professional responsibility to teach men not to mistake the manipulation of ideas for the direction of human conduct. Furthermore, in view of the controversy between the absolutists and the relativists, which has now continued so long that the parties have become virtually immobilized in their respective positions, the moralist who has succeeded in preserving some degree of neutrality will do well to point out that the notions "ideal" and "practical" are not contradictions, and that in ethics it is not a question of finding ideals which individually or collectively are completely realizable but which are practically significant.

If he himself believes in the significance of his ethical conclusions, he must give serious consideration to the problem of making his professional knowledge "available." To make his ethical conclusions available, it is not enough to announce them in highly technical language to his colleagues. This is clear enough. It is not so clear, probably because

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philosophers have been so little concerned about it, what means are to be used to assure the impact of moral wisdom on human life. From the standpoint of education, it is unrealistic and, granting the premises, irresponsible, to rely upon undirected diffusion.

Although each has definite limitations, the following opportunities for systematic application of the professional knowledge of the moralist seem promising. Since social institutions are intended to promote the realization of values, the social sciences must of necessity be based on ethics. The moralist and the social scientist should therefore co-operate in the translation of moral wisdom into social practice. Obstacles to such co-operation are the deterministic philosophy of social institutions professed by some social scientists, the preoccupation of others with the mechanics of social processes, and the mutual professional isolation and antagonism of social scientists and philosophers. That the problems of the individual and of the social institution are so disparate and so unrelated as to forbid this co-operation is not an acceptable objection.

A second opportunity is available to the moralist in his own educational bailiwick. In his thinking, writing, and teaching he can himself be diligent in exhibiting the concrete significance of his concepts and principles. He would do well to follow the example of the old-fashioned logic texts and to interlard his theoretical expositions with concrete examples. He would himself greatly profit by this, for specific application is an excellent test of meaning and relevance.

To do this would fit him for a third task, namely, to serve as the critic of theoretical schemes of social betterment, political reform, and world organization, in short, as the intellectual conscience of the social theorists. Finally, because of his professional competence, no one would be better fitted than he to participate as an individual citizen who is at the same time a specialist in the troublesome process of solution and adjustment of social conflicts. The determination of whether his technique should be that of the creative bargainer, as advocated by Otto, or that of the expert bringing a supposedly wise and just solution which has been thought out in advance does not lie within the province of this paper. Whichever it may be, all philosophers will no doubt agree that mankind would be foolish to look for guidance in long-range social planning either to the service-while-you-wait opportunist or to

his opposite number, the authoritarian.

One of the most serious obstacles to the bridging of the gap between ethical theory and human conduct is the chronic aridity of so much ethical writing. The reader is constantly reminded of Meredith's lines on "The Moralist":

One to whose smooth-rubbed soul can cling
Nor form, nor feeling;
A reasoning, self-sufficing thing.

The "purely intellectual" is by definition the product of the "pure," that is of the self-sufficient intellect; and this product may easily die at its source since it feeds solely on itself. "The wit and mind of man," says Francis Bacon, in *The Advancement of Learning*, "if it work upon matter, . . . worketh according to the stuff and is limited thereby; but if it work upon itself, as the spider worketh his web, then it is endless, and brings forth, indeed, cobwebs of learning, admirable for the fineness of thread and work, but of no substance or profit."² One is hardly justified in speaking about *human* values when so much that is human is left out. It is not only that ethical values are treated in isolation from other types of value, but that a system of values is considered perfect if it is logically coherent. It is not mystical, or obscurantist, or sentimental to insist that a definition of the good life should take into account the whole human personality. It is bad enough that the concept of this personality must of necessity be to a large extent an abstraction without also making it fractional. So much of our ethical writing is suitable literature only for a disembodied intellect which could do nothing with moral wisdom if it discovered it.

5. CONCLUSION

With this discussion of the moralist, the analysis of the role of the philosophical specialist must, for the purposes of this paper, be concluded. In spite of the commitment of this paper to the particularistic approach, I wish in conclusion to consider briefly two general obstacles to the extension of the influence of philosophers which have no relation to the nature of the philosopher's special interest. The first obstacle is presented as a fact; the second as a hypothesis.

I believe it to be an incontrovertible and inexcusable fact that

² Book I.

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philosophers as a class have themselves unnecessarily reduced their actual and potential influence by their regrettable language habits. No discipline has so varied, so confused, and so unstable a vocabulary. Although these characteristics are to some extent the normal and justifiable consequence of continued refinement in analysis, they are to no inconsiderable extent the results of professional faults and foibles.

First of all, the profession seems to generate a tendency to create new but unnecessary terminologies. In consequence, philosophical controversies which seem to be concerned with basic differences are frequently nothing more than disputes over whose terminology is to prevail. Young philosophers quickly learn that originality in philosophy sometimes consists of nothing more than insistence upon one's own terminology. This tendency to pedantry is strengthened by the fact that a new terminology impresses laymen and, at least for a time, baffles colleagues.

Philosophical terminology is also frequently ambiguous and sometimes even irresponsible. Here are two metaphysicians of distinguished reputation, friends and associates for many years, each of whom asserts the same universal predicates of contrary, if not contradictory, ultimate substances. A certain type of philosophic mind in every age reveals a fondness for such expressions as "God both *is* and *is not*," "Chaos is the highest form of order," a weakness which is reminiscent of the exhibitionism of the later Sophists. Surely, philosophy can rid itself of this kind of double talk and of other manifestations of verbal irresponsibility or carelessness. There have been frequent suggestions that a series of conferences should be held at which, granting sufficient determination and good will, some degree of order and consistency in the use of terms might be established. If such conferences are wholly impracticable, as some stubbornly claim, philosophers would seem to be doomed to labor under a most unfortunate handicap.

The most serious source of misunderstanding and confusion in philosophy is the tendency of philosophic thought unwittingly to lose contact with reality. Men begin with devising verbal symbols for things; next they devise verbal symbols to signify types and collections and relations of the symbols in this original vocabulary; in a still higher stage of linguistic development and sophistication they contrive a third level of symbolism, and even a fourth and a fifth. The symbols on these

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higher levels are so many removes from reality that they are completely opaque as far as the original level of meaning is concerned. In consequence, the mind has lost contact with the reality it undertook to explain.

Two undesirable results are likely to follow: either the thinker becomes involved in pure verbalism, or he mistakes the higher level on which he is thinking for the first level and, like the denizens of Plato's cave, takes the shadow for the substance. Such a philosophy is literally lost. Here lies the explanation of a situation which often occurs in philosophy, and which the layman, even the trained scientist, can never understand, namely, two capable and earnest philosophers starting out from the same reality and ending up in a state of complete and hopeless disagreement. Neither common sense nor science can understand why the philosophers do not retrace their steps and start all over.

A word should also be said about the repetitiousness of philosophical writing. Sometimes this is the result, simply, of ignorance of the history of philosophy. Unless a repetition of a bit of philosophical analysis is characterized by special accuracy or distinction of expression, there seems little justification for its publication. Retracing old ground may be essential in the development of the thought of the philosopher, but there is no need of once again recording the familiar and tiresome details for history. Sometimes the repetitiousness is the consequence of the maintenance by contemporaries of strictly private vocabularies and is thus quite unsuspected. Whatever the explanation, such writing does not contribute to the solution of philosophical problems but only to the bulk of philosophical writing.

It is well for the budding philosopher to remember that he enjoys the freedom of expression of the literary artist, although his professional responsibilities are more nearly akin to those of the scientist. Moreover, in spite of this kinship, his ideas are not put to the practical tests which restrain his scientific colleagues from speculation. The social irresponsibility of many philosophers is one of the reasons for their bad language habits. The practice of the cult of unintelligibility deservedly brings upon a discipline the charge of attempting to preserve the "snob value" of education. With respect to our speaking and writing habits, there is often occasion for the injunction which Socrates laid upon Protagoras: "Come now, Protagoras, do not thou go forth

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on the gale, with every sail set, out of sight of land, into an ocean of words."

The second general obstacle to the extension of the influence of philosophy is a hypothetical one; its existence is suggested, not affirmed. To make such brief and inadequate mention of it here is justified only because of the dramatic implications of its existence. I have reference to the notion that the character and the direction of human thought is *naturally and necessarily, though unconsciously, controlled by nonintellectual determinants*. This implies, of course, that man is not a rational animal in the sense in which philosophy, and, for that matter all education, has assumed him to be. An extreme view holds that reason devises the means but unreason selects the ends. It is implied in this view that the thinker is, in the first place, not aware of this control, and, in the second place, that he could do nothing about it if he were. According to the more moderate view, the situation is not so desperate as all that: on the contrary, accurate psychosocial analysis might well lead us to the discovery of new conditioning techniques and thus to a new conception of education.

The basic assumption of this view is by no means a new one. The history of philosophy records several similar or analogous interpretations of man's intellectual life. The official German National Socialist philosophers not only accepted it but gloried in it. The more professional offered skillful dialectical analysis and defense. The last war has brought many thoughtful people to the point of asking if the history of civilization is explicable under any other assumption. Every self-critical individual has often been led to ask the same question about his own conscious life. Psychologists have shown a sporadic interest in the problem; but so far these scientists have not had much light to offer. The question is such an important one for philosophers, whatever their conception of the role of their own specialty, that they should join with their colleagues in psychology and other related fields in a systematic attack upon it.

Should this disturbing theory prove to be correct, a new conception of the role of the philosopher will doubtless be developed, and old conceptions will be variously affected. The Ivory Tower will offer even greater attractions than it does now. The philosopher who considers himself the intellectual conscience of the community will find the need

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for his pronouncements greatly increased but their effectiveness greatly diminished. The radical instrumentalist may discover that he has been proved right, possibly *too* right, and that he has suddenly been transformed into a technologist. Or he may flatter himself with the reflection that in being more interested in applicable means than in ideal ends, he was clearly in advance of his times.

For the present, we must be content with appraising the role of the philosophical specialist in the light of the present character of the several philosophical disciplines and of present opportunities. It has been the purpose of this paper to suggest that philosophers as a class have been neglectful of the opportunity of translating philosophical knowledge into wisdom of life, an opportunity which may justly be termed a duty if we look upon the philosopher as an educator. To protest that philosophers do not have enough knowledge about practical affairs is to invite the equally cogent counterargument that laymen do not know enough about philosophy. If both arguments are sound, then the situation is indeed hopeless, for then the philosopher *even as an individual* is too ignorant to apply his philosophical knowledge to social problems. If this is true, possibly he should be permitted to "think his crooked thoughts on life in the sere," only in the strictest privacy. It may be argued that this is better than leaving him at liberty to thrash around awkwardly in practical affairs, filled with vagueness and good will. Accepting this ineptness to be true of him when he comes fresh — and completely disoriented — from the study or the classroom, is it not likely that in the market place he will soon discover the relevance or irrelevance of his learning and be the wiser for it?

A final word in recapitulation. The principal contention of this paper obviously does not imply the denial of other values to philosophy and other roles to the philosopher. Although this has been indicated, it may be well to underscore this assumption by mentioning some of these roles. The philosopher should be valued as a "pure" logician, even if his refinements are beyond the comprehension of his colleagues and he indifferent to this; as a devotee and advocate of a life devoted to reflection and contemplation, an existence lived, insofar as this is possible, in the realm of ideas; as an expert in abstraction and speculation who constructs a perfectly ordered world out of cosmic chaos, even if that order is purely theoretical; as the commentator, sometimes

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kindly, sometimes sardonic, and sometimes bitter, who, like the Greek chorus, remarks on the actors and events on the stage of the world, even though he sometimes turns his back on them; as a dreamer who "takes his private dream to be the core of the universe"; even as the "glorified grammarian"; yes, even as a "doctor of philosophy" engaged, as a wit recently put it, in "the incestuous and unproductive operation" of turning out new doctors of philosophy, "whose secrets, like those of Ubangi witch doctors, seldom leak out for general consumption."³

Of all these types the world has need. But today mankind is in serious trouble and in special need of those who can *point the way*, the *good* way and the *practical* way. In a democracy, to which I take it we are as a profession committed, the philosopher has a unique responsibility. The Greek philosophers did not trouble about the common man; the scholastics were not concerned about him, for they assumed that his eternal destination was otherwise provided for. But the philosophers of democracy have undertaken to show every man the way to the good life. It is obvious that this was a rash promise, and that it can not be redeemed in full. But certainly, the philosophers have some help to give. If they have not, then the only role for them is that of Lucretius, standing on the shore, watching the distant ship in distress, not, to be sure, rejoicing in the tribulations of their fellowmen but content not to be sharing them.

MARTEN TEN HOOR

University of Alabama

³ Robert Lewis Taylor, "Profile of Frank Stanton," *The New Yorker* (Jan. 18, 1947), p. 32.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

1946-1947

TWENTIETH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF OFFICERS

AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LEARNED SOCIETIES

A special meeting of the Council was held in Boston on September 20 and 21, for the purpose of considering a revision of the Bylaws proposed by the Advisory Board and Executive Committee. The main features of the proposed revision were (a) the reduction of the representation of constituent societies from two delegates to one; (b) the establishment of a Board of Directors, charged with the two groups of functions now performed separately by the Advisory Board and the Executive Committee; (c) a provision for the election of members-at-large; and (d) certain limitations on length of service, particularly for members-at-large and members of the Board of Directors. It was hoped that this proposed reorganization would make the Council a more compact and efficient agency for the discharge of its functions and would provide for better regional, institutional, and disciplinary representation in its membership. After lengthy discussion the Council voted 31 for and 10 against the proposed revision. Since a three-fourths majority of all members (or 32 affirmative votes) is necessary for amending the Bylaws, the proposed amendment was declared lost. The size of the affirmative vote, however, indicates strong sentiment in favor of revision; and the Executive Committee plans to present the amendment again, with certain modifications designed to remove some objections, at the regular meeting of the Council in January. The representatives of the American Philosophical Association voted for the proposed amendment in September and intend to support it when it is presented again in January. One effect of the amendment, if adopted, will be to reduce the representation of the American Philosophical Association, as of every other constituent society, from two delegates to one. But we believe that the future of the A.C.L.S. depends upon the adoption of this amendment, or something like it; and that the interests of our Association will be adequately represented under the new plan of organization.

At this meeting the Council also accepted the resignation of Dr. Waldo Leland, who had been Director of the Council since its organization. Dr. Leland was appointed Director Emeritus as of October 1, 1946, and Dr. Richard H. Shryock was appointed Acting Director, to serve until the annual meeting in January

PROCEEDINGS

1947. Dr. Leland will render advisory services to the Council in the field of international intellectual relations and will engage in the preparation of a history of international intellectual relations since 1850.

C. J. DUCASSE
GLENN R. MORROW

COMMITTEES

Permanent Committee on Bibliography

Mr. Buchanan prepared a bibliography of about 400 titles on Descartes for Professor A. G. A. Balz in May of this year.

Your Committee has continued to co-operate with the French *Bibliographie de la philosophie*, which is edited by Professor Raymond Bayer. Mr. Emerson Buchanan forwarded to him the cards listing American books for 1946 and will forward during the next month the list for 1939-1945.

Professor Helmut Kuhn has prepared and forwarded to Professor Bayer a similar list for the periodical literature.

Professor Bayer, in collaboration with Professor G. Kersaint, is also undertaking the editing of a quarterly periodical of philosophical abstracts (*Bulletin analytique*), and he is asking the co-operation of American periodicals in this enterprise. Specifically, he asks your Committee to recommend to American periodicals that they exchange for this purpose, and your Committee asks the authorization to do so.

Your Committee has also been in touch with several American representatives of UNESCO, to inquire concerning the organization of its activities and the possibility that UNESCO may soon undertake a comprehensive bibliography in which philosophy would be included. It is too soon to report progress in this matter.

For the Committee,
HERBERT W. SCHNEIDER, *Chairman*

Publication Committee

Professor Gregory D. Walcott, General Editor of Source Books in the History of the Sciences, has sent in the following report on his series:

The war and its aftermath, coupled with the illness of a special editor, have caused the recent annual reports concerning Source Books to be rather monotonously alike. Dr. Fletcher, who is developing the manuscript for a *Source Book in Chemistry*, has been delayed by reason of the demands upon him in his position in the National Institute of Health, Bethesda, Maryland. In a recent letter he wrote, "the rather frantic chemical activity occasioned by the war has not abated noticeably." He hopes, however, "that the future will afford greater opportunity for historical work." The manuscript for a *Source Book in Botany* has not yet been completed, largely because Professor C. E. Allen, who has charge of it, has been ill in a hospital for a considerable period of time. Nonetheless the picture as a whole is brightened, since the McGraw-Hill Book Company, in a letter, dated November 8, 1946, has announced its intention to begin at once the publication of the manuscript for a *Source Book of Greek Science*, which has been prepared by Professor Morris R. Cohen and Dr. I. E. Drabkin. This is a very satisfactory termination of the long delay occasioned by the war. Still

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further, Professor Thomas S. Hall has addressed himself very vigorously to the task of developing a manuscript for a *Source Book in Zoology*. Formerly at Purdue University, he is now at Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri. Last spring, while still at Purdue, he had several assistants working on his project, and during the summer he worked in the Library of Congress at Washington, D. C. Consequently he has seventy titles ready for photostating, in addition to the material gathered at Purdue. He hopes, as he has stated in a recent letter, to have his compilation ready to submit to the publishers within five or six months. More than this cannot be reported at the present time.

No manuscripts have been submitted to the Committee during the year 1946. To inquiries the Chairman has had to reply that the A.C.L.S. has at present no funds for making grants in aid of publication. Since the A.C.L.S. has hitherto been the Committee's sole source of support for the publication of manuscripts, the Chairman has not encouraged the submission of manuscripts. The one manuscript under consideration by the Committee at the end of last year has since been recommended to the A.C.L.S. for a grant, but because of the circumstances just mentioned, this recommendation did not bear fruit. The author has, however, found other means of publication.

Even if the A.C.L.S. again has funds for grants in aid of publication, as is expected, it would seem desirable for your Committee, or some special committee of the Association, to explore the possibility of obtaining other sources of help for the publication of deserving manuscripts.

For the Committee,
GLENN R. MORROW, *Chairman*

Report of the Delegate of the American Philosophical Association to the American Association for the Advancement of Science

The year 1946-1947 has been by all odds the most fruitful one to date in the history of the affiliation of our Association with the A.A.A.S. The National Program Committee, made up of Professors Max Black, Rudolf Carnap, Ernest Nagel, and Hans Reichenbach, working with Dr. Raymond Seeger, the Secretary of Section L of the A.A.A.S., organized two seminars at the Boston meeting of the A.A.A.S. in December of 1946.

Two successful seminars with excellent attendance were carried through at this meeting. In one seminar, on the place of the philosophy of science in the curriculum, papers were read by Ralph Churchman, Philip Frank, Ralph Gerard, and A. P. Ushenko, with myself as Chairman. This symposium was exceedingly well balanced and brought out a diversity of approaches. Professor Frank emphasized the relation of the philosophy of science to physics and its importance for the physicists' understanding of theories in physics, such as the theory of relativity. Professor Churchman emphasized the role of the philosopher of science as expert methodologist, working with specialists in the different sciences on the methodological aspects of their own inquiries. He outlined a specific series of courses in logic and the philosophy of science with a view to preparing people properly in this approach to the subject. Professor Gerard, representing the biological sciences, warned of the danger of too standardized a conception of the scientific method and made everyone aware of the tentative trial-and-error type of investigation of the biologists, who are not yet fortunate enough to have neat,

PROCEEDINGS

mathematical, deductively formulated theories of their subject matter. Professor Ushenko emphasized the relation of the philosophy of science to metaphysics and brought forward considerations indicating the need of paying attention to this aspect of the subject if it is to be understood. There was a healthy discussion.

The second symposium had as its topic the question "Is Scientific Method Capable of Determining the Ends for Which Scientific Discoveries Are Used?" Professor P. W. Bridgman represented the physicists' approach to the problem; Dr. Felix Cohen spoke from the standpoint of the lawyer and an expert in a governmental administrative agency; Professor Talcott Parsons, representing the section on the social sciences in the A.A.A.S., spoke from the standpoint of his professional expertness; and I spoke, representing philosophy, replacing Professor C. I. Lewis, who was prevented unavoidably from participating. A large audience, filling almost every chair in one of the smaller ballrooms of the Copley-Plaza, testified to the interest in this topic. Professor Nagel was the Chairman of this symposium.

I also attended the meetings of the history of science portion of Section L and represented your Council in the Section committee meetings.

Professors Carnap and Nagel were voted in as members of the Council upon the recommendation of your National Committee. As I take over the chairmanship of Section L for the year 1947, Professor Charles Morris succeeds me as your representative. Thus the plans of the national philosophy of science committee worked out at the St. Louis meeting of the A.A.A.S. in March, 1946, are being carried out.

The fruits of the latter meeting are also showing in publication. Professor Rudolf Carnap's analysis of the inductive problem in the verification of theory, which was the topic of the two symposia at the St. Louis meeting, has been published under the title "Theory and Prediction in Science" in the December 6, 1946, issue of *Science*. Also, the March, 1947, issue of the *Scientific Monthly* includes the three papers by Professors Burr, Zirkle, and Margenau which comprised the philosophy of biophysics symposium of the St. Louis meeting.

The papers in the symposium on the place of the philosophy of science in the curriculum, read at the Boston meeting of the A.A.A.S. in December, 1946, are being published independently. The papers in the second of the two Boston symposia are being published in part in *Social Science* this summer and in part in the *Scientific Monthly* during the present year.

Many scientists as well as the philosophers attended these joint symposia at the Boston meeting. The number of preparatory school teachers of science who were interested was notable. Several from the New England preparatory schools were there and expressed the need for the more philosophical approach to science in the teaching of science in the liberal arts schools and colleges.

The next joint meeting of the A.P.A. and the A.A.A.S. will occur in Chicago around the first of the new year. The arrangement of the program is in the hands of Professors Carnap and Morris in conjunction with Professor Seeger of Section L.

F. S. C. NORTROP

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THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

Summary of Cash Transactions for the
Eighteen Months From January 1, 1946 to June 30, 1947

	General Treasury	Revolving Fund for Publication	Montague Adams Fund	Rock- efeller Fund
Cash Balance—December 31, 1945.....	\$1,231.94	\$10,765.24	\$ 123.11	—
<i>Cash Receipts:</i>				
Dues and proceedings:				
Eastern Division.....	545.99			
Western Division.....	259.42			
Pacific Division.....	100.55			
Sale of proceedings.....	3.00			
Sale of proceedings of Sixth Congress of Philoso- phy.....	2.50			
Royalties (McGraw-Hill Book Co.).....		246.62		
Interest on savings accounts and government bonds.....		333.86	1.86	
Grant-in-aid of Latin-American visiting pro- fessorships.....				\$10,000.00
<i>Total Cash Receipts</i>	<i>\$ 911.46</i>	<i>\$ 580.48</i>	<i>\$ 1.86</i>	<i>\$10,000.00</i>
<i>Total Available</i>	<i>\$2,143.40</i>	<i>\$11,345.72</i>	<i>\$ 124.97</i>	<i>\$10,000.00</i>
<i>Cash Disbursements:</i>				
Audit 1944 and 1945.....	\$ 20.00			
American Council of Learned Societies, dues... ..	25.00			
Printing proceedings, 1945-1946, PHILOSOPHI- CAL REVIEW.....	187.06			
Reprints and binding of Volume XIX, Banta Publishing Co.....	268.47			
Committee on Bibliography—preparation of 1939-1945 periodical list and book list.....	150.00			
Publication Committee—express and postage.....	5.12			
Travel expenses of F. S. C. Northrop and George Conger as delegates to special meeting of A.A.A.S. and 7th Carus Lectures, respec- tively.....	315.98			
Seventh Carus Lectures—printing, postage, and clerical help.....	85.39			
Printing and stationery, including Inter-Ameri- can Congress.....	46.55			
Postage.....	15.03			
Stenographic and clerical aid.....	113.04			
Organizing Committee of Inter-American Con- gress.....	14.78			
Telephone and telegraph.....	6.08			
Bank charges.....	4.20	3.60		
Advances to incoming National Treasurer....	200.00			
Preparation of <i>Source Book in Zoology</i>		443.31		
Copyright permissions for <i>Source Book in Greek Science</i>		221.15		
<i>Total Cash Disbursements</i>	<i>\$1,456.70</i>	<i>668.06</i>	<i>—</i>	<i>—</i>
Balance—June 30, 1947.....	\$ 686.70	\$10,677.66	\$ 124.97	\$10,000.00

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Recapitulation of Funds for the Eighteen Months From January 1, 1946 to June 30, 1947

General Treasury:

Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co., Middletown Branch, Middletown, Conn., checking account. \$ 686.70

Revolving Fund for Publication:

Middletown National Bank, Middletown, Conn., savings account No. 10604. 2,877.66
United States Government Bonds, Series "G" (on deposit in safe deposit vault of Middletown National Bank)—maturity value.. 7,800.00

Montague-Adams Fund:

Central National Bank & Trust Co., Middletown, Conn., savings account No. 19100. 124.97

Rockefeller Fund:

Middletown National Bank, checking account. 10,000.00

Total—All Funds. \$21,489.33

Report on THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION JUNE 30, 1947

The American Philosophical Association, Middletown, Connecticut

We have examined the accounts and records of Cornelius Krusé, Secretary-Treasurer, for the eighteen months ended June 30, 1947.

Recorded receipts were verified and compared with bank deposits and all expenditures were evidenced by cancelled checks and supporting vouchers.

Cash balances at the end of the period were confirmed to us directly by the depositories and Government Bonds on file for safe-keeping were inspected at the Middletown National Bank, Middletown, Connecticut.

Based upon the foregoing, we hereby certify that the attached statement of receipts and disbursements reflects the results of the financial operations for the eighteen months ended June 30, 1947.

KNUST, EVERETT & CAMBRIA
Certified Public Accountants

Hartford, Connecticut
July 8, 1947

Report of the Secretary of the Board of Officers

The past year has been one of marked activity on the part of the national association in the fields of both its international and domestic concerns. The national board of officers voted to instruct the organizing committee of the postponed Inter-American Congress to convene the Congress in the last days of

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December of this year (December 28-31, 1947). The invitation of Columbia University and the Eastern Division of the Association to hold the Congress at Columbia, with both the University and the Eastern Division serving as hosts, was gratefully accepted. The program committee of the Congress met with the program committee of the Eastern Division and formulated plans for the Congress, the announcements of which have gone out to all members. It is hoped that many representatives from Ibero-American countries, as well as a large number of our own members, will be present at this important meeting which is called for the purpose of establishing close cultural contacts with the philosophers of both Americas. Some kind of inter-American committee to ensure the continuance and extension of the work of co-operation will no doubt be created as a result of the Congress.

The expense involved in traveling from South America presents a problem. Foundations, understandably, are reluctant to make financial grants for the sole purpose of bringing foreign guests to a congress lasting but a few days. They, however, are greatly interested in furthering cultural interchange on the basis of a longer stay. Upon application by the Secretary the Rockefeller Foundation, accordingly, has very generously made a grant of \$30,000 to the Association for the purpose of aiding colleges and universities to defray the expense involved in having a limited number of Latin-American philosophers serve as visiting lecturers during the academic year 1947-1948 and the remainder of the calendar year 1948. Indirectly this grant will benefit the Congress if universities and colleges will extend invitations to Latin-Americans in time to enable visiting lecturers to attend the Congress. The grant should, however, be regarded as a serious effort, apart from the Congress, to promote mutual recognition and understanding by a more extended residence in this country on the part of Ibero-American philosophers. (The term "Ibero-American" may require some explanation. The more usual "Latin-American" technically includes French Canadians; "South American" excludes Mexico; "Hispano-American" excludes Brazil. Ibero-American, referring to the first settlers of the peninsula now occupied by Spain and Portugal, has the virtue of including all Spanish-American countries and Brazil and is a term that is gradually receiving general acceptance in the countries so designated.)

Application was also made to the Rockefeller Foundation for a travel grant to enable E. A. Burtt to explore ways and means of establishing closer relations with philosophers of the Far East. A grant of \$5,000 was received for this purpose. Professor Burtt will no doubt present concrete proposals for following up this exploratory visit with cultural projects of a far-reaching nature.

Members of the Association are urged to plan to attend the first international congress since the Congrès Descartes in 1937, which will be held in Amsterdam in the late summer of 1948.

Largely owing to the efforts of F. S. C. Northrop, who was the Association's delegate to the American Association for the Advancement of Science from 1939 to early 1947, a closer working relationship between the two Associations has been firmly established. Section L of the scientific Association is now devoted to the history and philosophy of science. Professor Northrop became Chairman of the Section for 1947, after having served as Vice-Chairman in 1946. The Chairman of the Board of Officers, upon nomination by Professor Northrop and a

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committee of the Section, has appointed Charles Morris official delegate of the Philosophical Association to the A.A.A.S. Ernest Nagel and Rudolf Carnap are members of the Council of Section L of the A.A.A.S. representing the American Philosophical Association. Charles Morris and Rudolf Carnap were asked to plan the program for the philosophy of science section of the meeting of the A.A.A.S. held in Chicago.

The American Council of Learned Societies of which our Association has been a constituent society from its inception has undergone an important reorganization. The National Board of Officers has ratified the revision of the Bylaws of the Council, the significance of which is reported elsewhere in the Proceedings by Glenn Morrow, who took an active part in the planning of the reorganization effected. Your Secretary has accepted, on a year's trial basis, the position of Director of the Council.

The retiring Secretary notes with gratification the action taken by the several divisions to amend the constitution to the effect that the dues to the national treasury are increased from twenty-five cents a member to fifty cents. If the national association is to make the most of its increased opportunities to widen the scope of its activity, these additional funds, modest in any case, are greatly needed. The membership now stands at 915, of which 51 are associate members.

The Carus Lecture Committee has selected George H. Sabine as the eighth Carus Lecturer. The Chairman of the Board of Officers appointed Harold A. Larrabee to succeed Glenn Morrow as Chairman of the Committee on Publication. G. P. Adams has been reappointed a member of the committee for a four-year term.

The Association through its Committee on Bibliography has responded to numerous requests by the Civil Affairs Division of the military government for expert bibliographical advice in the work of education and reorientation in the areas of military occupation. The following letter was received from the officer in charge:

Dear Professor Krusé:

Mr. John Marshall of the Rockefeller Foundation forwarded to the Reorientation Branch of the Civil Affairs Division in March 1947, a copy of a list of books on philosophy suggested as models of form and sources of fact for writers of German textbooks. Your association had compiled this list at Mr. Marshall's request.

More recently a longer list of 106 titles of "Books on Philosophy Recommended for Book Collections in Information Centers in Occupied Areas," prepared by Professor Herbert W. Schneider and Emerson Buchanan, has been received. This list was prepared in response to a request to you by this Division, dated 20 March 1947. It appears to be an excellent and painstakingly prepared compilation. Especially appreciated are the recommendations for translation into German, Japanese, and Korean.

This letter will gratefully acknowledge receipt of the two lists of books. Your effort in co-operating with the direct and indirect requests of the War Department is greatly appreciated. The titles suggested are being used to round out collections now being purchased for the Information Centers, and the titles recommended have been suggested to Military Government authorities for consideration in the program of translating outstanding American works into the languages of the occupied areas.

A separate acknowledgement is being sent to Mr. Buchanan.

Sincerely yours,
R. H. CHARD
Colonel, GSC Executive

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The Association has been represented by members at numerous academic functions in the past year.

The Board of Officers unanimously elected George R. Geiger to succeed Cornelius Krusé as Secretary-Treasurer of the national association.

Since this is my last report as Secretary, I wish to express my deep appreciation of the generous help and wise counsel given me on many occasions by members of the Association.

For the Board of Officers,
CORNELIUS KRUSÉ, *Retiring Secretary*

WESTERN DIVISION

Officers (1946-1947)

President: Marten ten Hoor

Vice-President: L. P. Chambers

Secretary-Treasurer: George R. Geiger

Executive Committee: The foregoing officers and George Gentry, Willis Moore, and Howard D. Roelofs

Newly Elected Officers (1947-1948)

President: A. Cornelius Benjamin

Vice-President: D. W. Gotshalk

Secretary-Treasurer: Wayne A. R. Leys

Executive Committee: The foregoing officers and A. C. Garnett (1950), Willis Moore (1949), and Howard D. Roelofs (1948)

The forty-fifth annual meeting of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association was held at the State University of Iowa, Iowa City, May 8-10, 1947. The following program was presented:

Thursday Afternoon, May 8

Session on General Philosophical Problems (Chairman, Willis Moore):

"Science, Power, and Utility" by James S. Fulton

"Edmund Montgomery's Theory of Knowledge" by Morris T. Keeton

"The Power of the Gods, and the Freedom of God" by Fritz Marti

Session on Logic and Epistemology (Chairman, Paul Henle):

"Absolute Truth and the Shadow of Doubt" by Gardner Williams

"Antinomies and the Structure of Infinity" by Laurence J. Lafleur

"Epistemological Relativism and the Sociology of Knowledge" by Virgil Hinshaw, Jr.

Friday Morning, May 9

Papers and panel discussion on "The Present Status of Naturalism" with O. K. Bouwsma, D. W. Gotshalk, and R. W. Sellars (Chairman, Richard McKeon)

Friday Afternoon

Session on Ethics (Chairman, Van Meter Ames):

"Definition and Postulation in Ethics" by S. S. S. Browne

"The Moral Situation: A Field Theory of Ethics" by Robert S. Hartman

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"Obligation and Moral Agency" by Lucius Garvin
Session on Theory of Meaning (Chairman, Herbert Feigl):
"Pictorial Meaning, Mystery, and Scepticism" by Virgil C. Aldrich
"Logical Nonsense" by Arthur Pap
"Epistemology in the New Way of Words" by W. S. Sellars
Public Lecture: "The Charted and the Uncharted" by Max C. Otto

Friday Evening

Annual dinner with presidential address by Marten ten Hoor on "The Role of the Philosopher"

Saturday Morning, May 10

Papers and panel discussion on "The Last Hundred Years in American Philosophy" with Max H. Fisch, Arthur E. Murphy, and Herbert W. Schneider (Everett Hall, Chairman). This session was to help commemorate the centennial anniversary of the State University of Iowa.

At the business meeting late Saturday morning, the following nominees were elected to full membership in the association: A. Robert Caponigri, James T. Culbertson, Leonard De Moor, Bernard J. Diggs, Sister M. Annice Donovan, D. Ivan Dykstra, Harold A. Durfee, John James Fitzgerald, Cornelius L. Go-lightly, Walter K. Klass, Frederick H. Leach, Quinter M. Lyon, John H. Melzer, David L. Miller, D. J. Morris, Michael V. Murray, Arthur Pap, Bernard Phillips, Cornelius A. Plantinga, Tunis Prins, William F. Quillian, Jr., William Francis Roemer, Yves Simon, Gerard Smith, Henry J. Stob, Jacob Van Tuinen, Paul Weaver, and Warren Cameron Young. Virgil Hinshaw, Jr., was advanced from associate to full membership; and the following nominees were elected to associate membership: May Brodbeck, Henry L. Drake, S. Morris Eames, Alexander D. Gordon, Wendell Q. Halverson, Douglas N. Morgan, Robert Sternfeld, and Thomas F. Storer.

To clarify the eligibility of associate membership, the division voted that the status of graduate student was itself neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for eligibility; nor was it to be considered a disqualification per se.

The Committee on Philosophy in Higher Education reported, the full text of the report being filed with the secretary. Its recommendations, adopted by the division, included the continuation of the Philosophers' Newsletter, the investigation and encouragement of local philosophy organizations and of adult education in philosophy, special research into teacher-training in connection with the granting of doctor's degrees, and research also into training for junior college teachers in philosophy in connection with work for the Master's Degree. It was also recommended that the division continue its co-operation with the National Placement Service, and that at least \$50 be appropriated to the service for the coming year.

The division voted to join with the Eastern and Pacific divisions for a joint meeting December 28-31, 1947, at Columbia University; the Inter-American Congress of Philosophy will also meet at this time.

A motion by Paul Henle to make the election of officers more democratic was favorably considered, and the executive committee was requested to poll the

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membership on this question and to devise a technique for such election and present it at the next meeting of the division.

A resolution by L. P. Chambers pertaining to this country's relations to the United Nations was tabled by vote of the division. Mr. Chambers' suggestion that the business meeting be changed from Saturday morning was favorably considered, and the executive committee was requested to consider a suitable time or times for the business meeting.

The following resolution, presented by Charles Hartshorne, was adopted by the division: That the Western Division wishes to record its sense of the value of the Library of Living Philosophers, and its hope that any obstacles to the continuance of this unique series will be overcome.

The following memorial notices were presented:

In the death of Guy Allan Tawney the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association has lost one of its oldest, most useful, and honored members. Mr. Tawney was born in Tippecanoe City, Ohio, March 11, 1877. He died at his home in Urbana, Illinois, January 12, 1947. He graduated with the degrees of B. A. and M. A. from Princeton University, and Ph.D. from the University of Leipzig. From 1908 to 1931 he was Professor of Philosophy at the University of Cincinnati. In 1930 he went to the University of Illinois where he remained as Professor of Philosophy until his retirement in 1939. To have known Guy Tawney was to have known a man in whom there was no guile. Our Association records his death with deep and lasting sorrow.

M. T. McCLURE

Stephen Lee Ely, Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin, died on May 7, 1947, at the age of 42, after a brilliant teaching career of fifteen years. Professor Ely was born in Davenport, Iowa, in 1905, and received his B.A., M.A., and Ph.D. degrees at the University of Wisconsin, where he studied under Professors McGilvary and Otto, and the late Professor F. C. Sharp. Besides writing many reviews and articles, he was the author of *The Religious Availability of Whitehead's God* published by the University of Wisconsin Press in 1941. He is survived by his wife Bertha, and a daughter, Elizabeth.

Professor Ely's colleagues and students knew him as one of the most brilliant members of the staff, and he was widely respected for his outstanding scholarship and clarity of thought. During his lingering and painful illness he continued to exercise the courage, humor, and critical attitude toward life which made him an outstanding teacher of philosophy.

ALBERT G. RAMSPERGER

Since no invitation has been received for the 1948 meeting, the division empowered the executive committee to act in deciding the time and place of the next spring meeting.

The following resolution was then adopted by the division: That the Western Division express and record its deep appreciation of the hospitality of the host institution, the State University of Iowa, on the occasion of the forty-fifth meeting of the division; that the division expresses special satisfaction in the fact that this meeting was contributory to the centennial celebration of the University; that the division further express and record its appreciation of the diligent and successful efforts of the local committee in arranging for this 1947 meeting.

The nominating committee reported its selection of officers (see above), and the slate nominated was elected by the division.

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FINANCIAL STATEMENT

Receipts:

Balance on hand, May 11, 1946.....	\$520.62	
Dues collected (to April 24, 1947).....	425.15	
<i>Total</i>		\$945.77

Expenditures:

Bank charges.....	\$ 7.96	
Returned uncollected check.....	2.00	
Clerical.....	15.00	
Dues and Proceedings payment to American Philosophi- cal Association.....	259.42	
Committee on Philosophy in Higher Education (includ- ing liquidating old placement service).....	44.61	
National Placement Service.....	100.00	
Mailing expenses.....	23.40	
Printing expenses.....	82.06	
Program committee traveling expenses.....	13.00	
<i>Total</i>		\$547.45
Cash balance, as of April 24, 1947.....		\$398.32

(Audited and signed by
John C. Freschl, Accountant,
Yellow Springs, Ohio)

Addenda:

Dues received April 24 to May 10, 1947.....	\$56.00
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Expenditures:

Bank charges.....	\$.30
Smoker for May meeting.....	10.92
Dinner for President and Mrs. Hancher.....	3.00
	<hr/>
	\$14.22

Final balance as of May 10, 1947.....	\$440.10
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GEORGE R. GEIGER, *Secretary-Treasurer*

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PACIFIC DIVISION

President: Hans Reichenbach

Vice-President: Paul Marhenke

Secretary-Treasurer: E. W. Strong

Executive Committee: The foregoing officers and Everett J. Nelson *ex officio* for one year, Robert E. Fitch (1947), Alexander P. Maslow (1947), and Herbert J. Phillips (1948)

The twentieth annual meeting of the Pacific Division was held at the University of Oregon, Eugene, on December 27, 28, and 29, 1946. The following program was presented:

Conscience and Naturalism.....	Edwin A. Garlan
Ethical Relativism: An Empirical Survey..	Robert E. Fitch (read by H. Bugbee)
Isolationist and Contextualistic Esthetics: Conflict and Resolution..	Melvin Rader
Three Fallacies.....	Arthur Smullyan
Animism as a World-Hypothesis.....	Elmo A. Robinson
What are Categories For?.....	Stephen C. Pepper
Going Beyond Experience.....	J. W. Robson
Science and Philosophy.....	V. F. Lenzen
A. B. Johnson on Language and Science.....	David Rynin
Pico della Mirandola on the Conflict of Rhetoric and Philosophy..	Quirinus Breen
Reason Against Itself: Some Remarks on Enlightenment.....	Max Horkheimer
The Presidential Address: A Defense of Substance.....	Everett J. Nelson
Historical Skepticism.....	Herbert J. Phillips
Fact and Understanding in History.....	E. W. Strong

The Pacific Coast Conference on the Teaching of Philosophy held its annual meeting in the morning of December 27, members of the American Philosophical Association attending by invitation. A panel discussion of "Philosophy in General Education" was conducted by Alburey J. Castell of the University of Minnesota, Joseph W. Cohen of the University of Colorado, and H. Jeffrey Smith of Stanford University.

The annual business meeting was held at 9:10 A.M. on December 29, President Nelson presiding. The Treasurer's report was read and approved as follows:

Receipts:

Balance on hand, December 28, 1945	
War bonds.....	\$ 296.00
Savings account.....	302.25
Commercial account.....	194.95
<i>Total</i>	<i>\$ 793.20</i>
Interest on savings, January 1 to June 30, 1946.....	1.51
Refund from the A.P.A. of general meeting expenses.....	85.39
Membership dues.....	204.00
<i>Total</i>	<i>\$1,084.10</i>

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Expenditures:

Mailing charges, A.P.A. general meeting.....	\$ 21.35
Resolution: mimeographing, postal cards, mailing.....	8.67
Announcements: mimeographing, postal cards, mailing.....	7.14
Mailing of programs.....	3.62
Secretarial supplies.....	2.17
Telegrams and telephone charges.....	6.74
Postage.....	1.02
Bank charges.....	2.70
<i>Total</i>	<hr/> \$ 53.41 <hr/>
<i>Balance on hand, December 24, 1946</i>	\$1,030.69

Audited by Paul Marhenke

The following recommendations from the Executive Committee were adopted by vote of members of the Pacific Division:

That the following nominees be elected to active membership: Henry G. Bugbee, Sterling M. McMurrin, Calvin Hugh Maxson, Frank F. Potter, Waldemer P. Read, and Arthur Smullyn.

That the following nominees be elected to associate membership: James L. Jarrett, Jr., Paul B. Means, Howard Lee Parsons, Hybert Pollard, and Wayne L. Sprague.

That the Pacific Division accept the invitation to hold its twenty-first annual meeting at the University of California at Los Angeles on December 29, 30, and 31, 1947.

That the following officers be elected: for President, Hans Reichenbach; for Vice-President, Paul Marhenke; for the Executive Committee to serve two years, Herbert J. Phillips.

That the following changes be made in the Constitution of the American Philosophical Association: (1) to increase dues payable to the National Association from 25 to 50 cents per member (effective 1946), and (2) to change the wording in Article III, Section 2, to read as follows: "The Secretary shall collect annually from the Treasurer of each division, at the rate of 50 cents per member, money to defray necessary expenses of the Board of Officers. The Secretary shall also apportion, collect, and disburse the pro rata share of the expenses of special joint projects voted by the three divisions."

That the Pacific Division assume its *pro rata* share of the \$300.00 needed for the preparation of a single volume covering books and articles for the years 1939-1945 and requested by the Bibliography Committee of the National Association.

The Secretary reported on the results of the Resolution submitted by the Executive Committee to members of the Pacific Division for their adoption in May, 1946. The Resolution was submitted to the President and the Congress of the United States on June 12, 1946, and receipt was subsequently acknowledged. The vote on the Resolution, as set forth in accompanying letters, was as follows:

RESOLVED that the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association should advocate the following actions:

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I. That the United States government urge prompt action by the Security Council of the United Nations in establishing an International Development Authority, and that it approve in principle and in main outline the Report of the Acheson Committee as a basis for its negotiations to realize this objective.

Affirmative 56; Negative 3; Abstaining 1.

II. That domestic control of atomic power should be under the top policy makers of the government who, by a wise tradition of our country, are always civilians.

Affirmative 58; Negative 1; Abstaining 1.

III. That a voluntary moratorium on atomic bomb manufacture be declared at the earliest practicable moment, since continued production of bombs casts doubt upon our professed international intentions and encourages a secret armaments race.

Affirmative 53; Negative 7.

Paul Marhenke, the Pacific Division representative, reported on the work of the Information Service. He read a letter from L. W. Beck about plans to have the Information Service operate as a clearing house by listing of applications and providing information about applicants as requests were received. He reported also that \$50.00 had been appropriated by the Executive Committee as the *pro rata* share of the Pacific Division to defray expenses of the Information Service.

The President reported upon the proposal to hold the Inter-American Congress of Philosophy at Columbia University in December, 1947.

It was moved, seconded, and passed that the Secretary-Treasurer be allotted the sum of ten dollars each year as a blanket sum for incidental expenses.

It was moved, seconded, and passed that the Executive Committee appoint a press representative each year for its annual meeting.

A resolution expressing the thanks of the Pacific Division for the hospitality shown to it by the University of Oregon and its Department of Philosophy and instructing the Secretary to communicate this resolution to the President of the University was adopted by standing vote.

The business meeting adjourned at 10:05 A.M.

E. W. STRONG, *Secretary-Treasurer*

EASTERN DIVISION

President: Cornelius Krusé

Vice-President: Arthur E. Murphy

Secretary-Treasurer: Roger W. Holmes

Executive Committee: The foregoing officers and Katharine E. Gilbert *ex officio* for one year, George Boas (1948), Otto F. Kraushaar (1948), Milton C. Nahm (1949), H. Richard Niebuhr (1949), George F. Thomas (1947), Donald C. Williams (1947)

The forty-third meeting of the Eastern Division was held at Yale University in New Haven, Connecticut, on December 26, 27, 28, 1946. The following program was presented:

Panel Discussion:

The Nature of Man (Chairman, John Herman Randall, Jr.): Brand Blanshard, Abraham Edel, Lewis M. Hammond, Paul Tillich

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Concurrent Sessions:

Planning and Democracy (Chairman, Herbert W. Schneider)	
Planning and Democracy.....	Joseph L. Blau
Economic Principles Implicit in a Planned or Free Economy.....	
.....	Sarah M. Watson
Ideology and Peace.....	John Somerville

Also:

Entity and Aspects as Pertaining to Physical Theory.....	Erwin Biser
Mysticism and Mechanics.....	Robert C. Baldwin
Reason and Existence.....	Maximilian Beck

Presidential Address:

Recent Poets on Man and His Place.....	Katharine E. Gilbert
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Concurrent Sessions:

The Bearing of the Arts on Philosophic Issues (Chairman, Theodore M. Greene)	
Some Philosophic Issues Implicit in the Theory of the Artist as Creator.....	
.....	Milton C. Nahm
The Challenge of the Arts to Philosophy.....	Irwin Edman
What Is Empirical Method? (Chairman, Sterling Lamprecht)	
The Distinctive Traits of Empirical Method.....	Lewis W. Beck
On God and Immortality.....	Frederick B. Fitch
Empirical Method in Metaphysics.....	Victor Lowe

Panel Discussion:

The Contribution of Education to Philosophy (Chairman, Katharine E. Gilbert):
Scott M. Buchanan, Charles W. Hendel, Raphael Demos, Harold Taylor

The Business Meeting was held at 11:15 A.M. on December 28, with President Gilbert presiding. The Minutes of the Forty-Second Annual Meeting were approved as printed.

The following Treasurer's report was read and approved:

Receipts:

Balance brought forward.....	\$2,976.85	
Dues.....	901.00	
Sale of abstracts.....	11.30	
Interest on government bonds.....	18.75	\$3,907.90

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Expenditures:

Program Committee.....	\$ 164.64
Printing.....	109.75
Stationery and postage.....	107.72
Secretarial aid.....	30.62
Telephone and Telegraph.....	4.40
Bank charges.....	2.71
Nominating Committee.....	4.40
Dues refunded.....	1.00
Exchange on foreign check.....	.25
Cost of Abstracts.....	24.00
Committee on International Co-operation.....	4.00 \$ 453.49

Balance on hand..... \$3,454.41

Audited by Ellen S. Haring and Holcombe M. Austin

The Auditing Committee reported that the Treasurer's report had been examined and was found correct.

The following report was presented by Harold A. Larrabee:

"Because of unavoidable delays in its appointment and organization, the committee to consider the possibility of initiating a movement, together with the American Council of Learned Societies and the American Association for the Advancement of Science, for establishing a weekly newspaper or magazine to present impartial and responsible news and opinions of leaders of our country (consisting of Susanne K. Langer, Arthur E. Murphy, and Harold A. Larrabee, chairman) is able to report only progress at this time. Correspondence with Professor W. P. Montague, who suggested the investigation, indicates the desirability of broadening the scope of the committee's inquiry to include the feasibility of any machinery which might be set up to bring before the public considered statements expressing the views of members of the division concerning matters of moment about which there was virtual unanimity."

For the committee,

HAROLD A. LARRABEE, *Chairman*

The following report was presented by Lewis W. Beck on behalf of the Committee on Information Service: Vacancies and Available Personnel.

1. The committee consists of three members, one from each division. They are: Paul Marhenke, Wayne A. R. Leys, and Lewis W. Beck, representing the Pacific, Western, and Eastern Divisions, respectively. L. W. Beck is chairman, and the central files of the committee will be kept in his office at the University of Delaware.

2. Since each division referred to the committee under slightly varying titles, the committee selected its own name, as shown in the title of this report.

3. The committee was constituted too late in this year to begin functioning for the academic year 1946-1947. Plans have now been made for the committee to begin work as a "clearing house" for information early in 1947.

4. The committee will send a blank form to every member of the association. Those who wish to be registered with the committee will fill out these forms. These forms, plus one photograph, will be all the information the committee will handle; the committee will not file credentials, publications, letters of recommendation, and the like.

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5. The committee will send an announcement of its project to all colleges and universities as soon as a fair number of candidates have registered. Specific information concerning the openings in various schools will be requested; on the basis of these specific requirements and a comparison of them with the specific information on each candidate's card, likely combinations of vacancies and candidates can be made. School officials will be sent a list of persons who might be interested in the position. Further correspondence must be between the schools and the candidates. The committee will make no recommendations except the tacit recommendation implied in the decision that a certain person has the qualifications required by the school.

6. Later the committee hopes to expand its coverage so that members of other philosophical associations may be registered. In the near future the committee expects to publish its plans in journals read by philosophers and in those for school administrators, and thus to invite those who are interested to participate. Professors with graduate students about to be graduated will be asked, of course, to have their students register with the committee, and extra registration cards can be obtained at any time by writing the committee.

7. This committee is a joint committee to be supported by the three divisions on a pro rata basis. The Western Division last year appropriated \$150 as its share. At the moment the committee is operating on a loan of \$150 from Professor Krusé, as treasurer of the national office. This will be returned to his office when the Divisional appropriations are made available to the committee.

The Nominating Committee (Sterling Lamprecht, Chairman; Glenn R. Morrow and G. Watts Cunningham) presented the following nominees: for President, Cornelius Krusé; for Vice-President, Arthur E. Murphy; for members of the Executive Committee for terms of three years, Milton C. Nahm and H. Richard Niebuhr. All were unanimously elected.

The following recommendations from the Executive Committee to the Division were adopted:

That the Eastern Division invite the Association to hold the Inter-American Congress of Philosophy in 1947, that the Eastern Division act as host for this meeting, that the other two Divisions be invited to meet jointly at this time, and that the place of this meeting be Columbia University.

That the following applicants be elected to full membership: Swami Akhilananda, John T. Andrews, Louise Antz, J. A. Bacoats, Joseph D'Alfonso, George V. Edwards, Jr., Emil Ludwig Fackenheim, George G. Fox, Ernest H. Freund, Robert Grinnell, Paul Collins Hayner, Abraham Joshua Heschel, William Armstrong Hunter III, Charles Hillis Kaiser, Paul Kuntz, Marcus Long, Robert MacGowan, Raymond J. McCall, William P. McEwen, Ian McGreal, Richard Milton Martin, John A. Maurant, Reginald C. Perry, Richard Henry Popkin, Julius Portnoy, N. E. Richardson, Jr., William John Scarborough, John Milton Smith, Arthur Szathmary, Sydney A. Temple, Jr., Manley H. Thompson, Jr., Vincent Anthony Tomas.

That the following applicants be elected to associate membership: Newton L. Carroll, Elisha B. Chrakian, Dorothea Stats Johnson, Elliot Russell Moore, Charles B. Oldfield, Rosamund Kent Sprague.

That the following be changed from associate to full membership: Marie S. Copp, Thomas E. Hill.

The following amendment to the National Constitution was moved and accepted:

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That the following changes be made in the Constitution of the American Philosophical Association: (1) to increase dues payable to the National Association from 25 cents to 50 cents per member (effective 1946), and (2) to change the wording in Article III, Section 2, to read as follows: "The Secretary shall collect annually from the Treasurer of each division, at the rate of 50 cents per member, money to defray necessary expenses of the Board of Officers. The Secretary shall also apportion, collect, and disburse the pro rata share of the expenses of special joint projects voted by the three divisions."

The following motion from the floor was accepted:

That the Eastern Division express to President Seymour and to Professor Northrop its sincere appreciation of the generous hospitality of Yale University, and particularly of Silliman College, on the occasion of the Division's forty-third annual meeting. The Secretary was instructed to convey this appreciation to President Seymour and Professor Northrop.

The following motion from the floor was rejected:

That in the future the Nominating Committee be instructed to present a double slate of nominees for each of the offices to be filled.

The following memorial notices were read, and by a rising vote were adopted and ordered printed in the *Proceedings*:

Dr. Herman Harrell Horne (November 22, 1874–August 16, 1946), Professor Emeritus of the History of Education and the History of Philosophy at New York University. During a teaching career of forty-eight years, he served at the University of North Carolina, Dartmouth College, and New York University. His influence in the field of Philosophy of Education was great, both in this country and abroad.

A peerless teacher, one of the most beloved men ever to teach at New York University, his greatest influence was doubtless through his brilliant artistry in daily classroom leadership. To the end he practiced careful new preparation for each lesson. He might be tired or ill, but his students rarely knew it, for he managed even under these circumstances to bring wit, humor, and sympathy to the discussion. It was a joy to watch his skilled Socratic craftsmanship as he awakened the student's mind, led him to see the possible implications of his own statements, and inspired him to study deeply and to think with both careful logic and unleashed creative imagination. Deeply religious and a confirmed idealist, Professor Horne expressed his own views in his many writings. But in the classroom his devotion was to the intellectual life itself, and he believed his best service to philosophy, to religion, and to education was in helping students uncover their own presuppositions and in leading them to the widest philosophic horizons of which they themselves were capable. Intensely practical, he never encouraged the learner's remaining too long in the realm of the abstract but insisted on his thinking through the possible implications for life and education of any theoretical positions he might be studying.

LOUISE ANTZ

Rudolf Kagey, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Washington Square College, New York University, died after a prolonged illness on May 13, 1946. He was born September 5, 1904, in Tuscola, Illinois, and received his A.B. in 1926 and his M.A. in 1927 from the University of Illinois. His work for his Ph.D. was completed at Columbia University in 1930 with a dissertation on *The Growth of F. H. Bradley's Logic*. In 1928 he was appointed an instructor in philosophy at Washington Square College and was promoted to the rank of assistant professor in 1934. In addition to his teaching duties, he carried out administrative assignments as Director of Evening Studies and Assistant to the Dean. During 1940 he served as Director of Public Education at the New York World's Fair.

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Years ago Rudolf Kagey learned that he had been stricken with a mortal ailment. In such circumstances it is hard to say where true wisdom lies. There are many who would have hoarded their energies and doled them out carefully and reluctantly, who would have lived the life of valetudinarians in order to prolong the span of their invalid years. But he chose to give of himself freely, sometimes extravagantly, and to participate creatively in what went on around him.

His work was marked by a conscientiousness and zest that impressed all who knew him. His most abiding satisfactions were derived from his teaching. Despite the variety of his interests and activities, teaching was his first and lasting professional love. He brought many students through the portals of philosophy and left behind him deep and rich memories of his personality.

SIDNEY HOOK

David Frederick Bowers met his death, at the age of 38, in a railroad accident on July 17, 1945. He was born at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on October 20, 1906, and received his A.B. degree at Capital University, Columbus, Ohio, in 1929. He did his postgraduate work at Princeton where he obtained his A.M. in 1930 and his Ph.D. in 1932. He married in 1932 Ruth E. Doescher. In 1934 he received his first teaching appointment as an instructor at Princeton. He became assistant professor at the same institution in 1939, and associate professor in 1945, less than a month before his death.

He died too young to have achieved anything like the peak of his creative powers. Yet, highly valued in his own university, he was beginning already to achieve recognition in the wider philosophical world. At the time of his death he was writing a book on Emerson, which had been undertaken as a project for the Guggenheim Fellowship which he won in 1943. His manuscript is now being edited with a view to publication. He edited a book entitled *The Heritage of Kant*, published in 1939, to which he contributed a chapter, and another book, *Foreign Influences in American Life*, published in 1944, to which he contributed two chapters. He was the author of a chapter in the *Literary History of the United States*, which is shortly to be published, and of a number of philosophical articles and reviews in the *Journal of Philosophy*, of which he was a book editor at the time of his death.

The quality of his mind was broad and sympathetic. There was no branch of philosophy which did not interest him, and he was widely read in English and American literature. Those broad interests were integrated in a singularly rich, sensitive, and rounded personality. It was these characteristics which impelled his many friends and his colleagues frequently to consult him in regard to their own writings and projects. For they found in him a critic who, though severe, had the capacity to enter imaginatively and sympathetically even into points of view which he did not himself share. For similar reasons he was highly successful as a teacher. It is the considered belief of those who had the opportunity to observe him at close range that American philosophy has lost in him one of its most promising younger men.

W. T. STACE

ROGER W. HOLMES, *Secretary-Treasurer*

OFFICERS AND COMMITTEES OF THE ASSOCIATION FOR 1947

(Addresses are given in the list of members)

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Cornelius Kruse, *Chairman*, Marten ten Hoor, Hans Reichenbach, Roger W. Holmes, E. W. Strong, George R. Geiger, *Secretary-Treasurer*

Delegates to the American Council of Learned Societies:

C. J. Ducasse (1948), Glenn R. Morrow (1950)

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Delegate to the Council of the American Association for the Advancement of Science:

Charles Morris

Delegate to the American Documentation Institute:

R. P. Hawes

Committees:

Bibliography—

H. W. Schneider, *Chairman*, C. J. Ducasse, W. P. Montague, W. R. Dennes, D. S. Robinson, Maurice Mandelbaum, Emerson Buchanan, *Secretary*

Carus Lectures—

E. K. Schaub, *Chairman*, C. J. Ducasse, A. E. Murphy, Irwin Edman, W. R. Dennes, H. G. Townsend, E. A. Burt

Publication—

Harold Larrabee, *Chairman* (1949), G. P. Adams (1950), R. W. Sellars (1947), Katharine Gilbert (1947), Max Black (1948)

Organizing Committee of the Second Inter-American Congress of Philosophy—

Cornelius Krusé, *Chairman*, Edgar Brightman, W. R. Dennes, Charles W. Hendel, W. P. Montague, Everett J. Nelson, Herbert Schneider, George Thomas, Radoslav A. Tsanoff, Donald Williams, Eliseo Vivas, *Secretary*

LIST OF MEMBERS

- Abarbanel, Prof. Albert, 319 W. 108th St., New York, N. Y.
 Abernethy, Prof. George, Davidson College, Davidson, N. C.
 Adams, Prof. Eugene Taylor, Colgate University, Hamilton, N. Y.
 Adams, Prof. George P., University of California, Berkeley, Calif.
 Adams, Dr. John Stokes, Jr., University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa.
 Adler, Prof. Mortimer J., 227 E. Delaware Pl., Chicago, Ill.
 Ahlén, Dr. A. Carl M., University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn.
 Aiken, Prof. Henry D., Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
 Aikens, Prof. H. Austin, 2611 Edgehill Rd., University Center Sta., Cleveland, Ohio.
 Akers, Prof. S. L., Wesleyan College, Macon, Ga.
 Akhilananda, Swami, Ramakrishna Vedanta Society of Mass., 52 Deerfield St., Boston 15, Mass.
 Albert, Dr. Sidney P., Triple Cities College, Syracuse University, Endicott, N. Y.
 Aldrich, Prof. Virgil C., Kenyon College, Gambier, Ohio.
 Alexander, Prof. Hubert G., University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, N. M.
 Allan, Prof. Denison Maurice, Hampden-Sydney, Va.
 Allen, Prof. Warren D., Stanford University, Calif.
 Alles, Prof. Adam, Long Island University, 375 Pearl St., Brooklyn 1, N. Y.
 Ambrose, Dr. Alice, Smith College, Northampton, Mass.
 Ames, Prof. E. S., University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.
 Ames, Prof. Van Meter, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio.
 Anderson, Prof. Frederick, Stanford University, Calif.
 Anderson, Prof. Fulton H., University of Toronto, Toronto, Can.
 Anderson, Professor John M., Pennsylvania State College, State College, Pa.
 Anderson, Pres. Paul Russell, Pennsylvania College for Women, Pittsburgh, Pa.
 Anderson, Dr. Wilhelm, Senior Agricultural Economist, Department of Agriculture, Washington, D. C.
 Andrews, Prof. John T., 5 Storrs Ave., Middlebury, Vt.
 Anshen, Dr. Ruth Nanda, 14 E. 81st St., New York City.
 Antz, Prof. Louise, New York University, Washington Square East, New York 3, N. Y.
 Apostle, Prof. Hippocrates G., 37 Spring St., Amherst, Mass.
 Arbaugh, Prof. George Bartholomew, 1114-15th Ave., Rock Island, Ill.
 Arndt, Prof. Elmer J., Eden Theological Seminary, Webster Groves, Mo.
 Aschenbrenner, Dr. Karl, University of California, Berkeley 4, Calif.
 Ascher, Dr. Anita, Smith College, Northampton, Mass.
 Auld, Mrs. J. W., Red Cloud, Neb.
 Avey, Prof. Albert E., Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio.
 Ayres, Prof. Edith, Palisades, N. Y.
- Bachman, Prof. Walter E., York College, York, Neb.
 Bacoats, Pres. J. A., Benedict College, Columbia, S. C.
 Bahm, Prof. Archie J., University of Denver, Denver, Colo.
 Bajema, Prof. Jacob, University of Dubuque, Dubuque, Iowa.
 Baker, Prof. John Tull, Ohio View, Athens, Ohio.
 Bakewell, Prof. C. M., Yale University, New Haven, Conn.
 Baldof, Dean E. W., Roosevelt College of Chicago, 231 S. Wells St., Chicago 4, Ill.

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- Baldwin, Prof. Robert C., University of Connecticut, Storrs, Conn.
 Ballaine, Prof. Francis Knight, Adelphi College, Garden City, N. Y.
 Ballard, Rev. J. Hudson, 15 Foss Ave., San Anselmo, Calif.
 Balz, Prof. Albert, University of Virginia, University, Va.
 Bancroft, Prof. William Wallace, 942 Main St., Collegeville, Pa.
 Barrett, Prof. Clifford L., Scripps College, Claremont, Calif.
 Barton, Prof. George E., Jr., 5635 Kenwood, Chicago, 37, Ill.
 Barzin, Dr. Marcel, University of Brussels, Belgium.
 Baum, Prof. Maurice, Kent State College, Kent, Ohio.
 Baumgardt, Prof. David, 214 Massachusetts Ave., N. E., Washington 2, D. C.
 Baxter, Dr. Clayton A., McMaster University, Hamilton, Ont., Can.
 Baylis, Prof. Charles A., Brown University, Providence, R. I.
 Beach, Prof. Waldo, Duke University, Durham, N. C.
 Beals, Dr. Lawrence W., Williams College, Williamstown, Mass.
 Beardslee, Prof. Claude G., 472 Vine St., Bethlehem, Pa.
 Beardsley, Prof. Monroe C., Yale University, New Haven, Conn.
 Beck, Prof. Lewis W., University of Delaware, Newark, Del.
 Beck, Prof. Maximilian, University of Illinois, Urbana, Ill.
 Beck, Prof. R. Lloyd, Marshall College, Huntington, W. Va.
 Becker, Prof. Frank C., Lehigh University, Bethlehem, Pa.
 Beiswanger, Dr. G. W., Georgia State College for Women, Milledgeville, Ga.
 Belknap, Dr. George N., University of Oregon, Eugene, Ore.
 Benjamin, Prof. A. C., University of Missouri, Columbia, Mo.
 Benne, Lt. (j.g.) Kenneth D.
 Bennion, Prof. Milton, 2385-7th East, Salt Lake City, Utah.
 Benson, Mr. Arthur J., 1628 Walnut St., Berkeley 9, Calif.
 Bentley, Prof. John E., American University, Washington, D. C.
 Benton, Prof. John Keith, Wesley Hall, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tenn.
 Berenda, Dr. Carlton W., University of Oklahoma, Norman, Okla.
 Bergmann, Prof. Gustav, State University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa.
 Berndtson, Dr. Arthur, University of Missouri, Columbia, Mo.
 Bernhardt, Prof. William Henry, 2180 S. Clayton, Denver, Colo.
 Bernstein, Prof. B. A., University of California, Berkeley, Calif.
 Bertocci, Dr. Peter A., 243 Park Ave., Arlington Heights, Mass.
 Bettelheim, Prof. Bruno, 1365 E. 60th St., Chicago, Ill.
 Bewkes, Pres. E. G., St. Lawrence University, Canton, N. Y.
 Bidney, Dr. David, 420 W. 119th St., New York 27, N. Y.
 Bisbee, Prof. Eleanor, 399 Roosevelt Way, San Francisco 14, Calif.
 Biser, Prof. Erwin, University of Kansas City, Kansas City, Mo.
 Bixler, Prof. J. S., 33 College Ave., Waterville, Me.
 Black, Dr. G. A., 156 Park St., Gardner, Mass.
 Black, Prof. Max, Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y.
 Blake, Prof. R. M., Brown University, Providence, R. I.
 Blanshard, Prof. Brand, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.
 Blanshard, Mrs. Frances B., St. Ronan St., New Haven, Conn.
 Blau, Dr. Joseph L., 1149 Brunswick Ave., Far Rockaway, N. Y.
 Block, Dr. Marguerite, 401 Low Memorial Library, Columbia University, New York, N. Y.
 Bloté, Dr. Harold C., 228 Scenic Ave., Piedmont, Calif.
 Blyth, Prof. John W., College Hill, Clinton, N. Y.
 Boas, Prof. George, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.
 Bøgholt, Prof. Carl, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis.
 Bogoslovsky, Dr. Boris B., Cherry Lawn, Darien, Conn.
 Bolman, Dr. Frederick deWolfe, Jr., 8 E. 77 St., New York 21, N. Y.
 Bonner, Prof. Hubert, Ohio Wesleyan University, Delaware, Ohio.
 Boodin, Prof. J. E., University Club, 614 S. Hope St., Los Angeles, Calif.
 Bosley, Dr. Harold, Mt. Vernon Place Church, Baltimore, Md.
 Boswell, Prof. Foster P., Hobart College, Geneva, N. Y.
 Boughton, Prof. Jesse Scott, Westminster College, Salt Lake City, Utah.
 Bourke, Prof. Vernon J., St. Louis University, St. Louis, Mo.

PROCEEDINGS

- Bouwsmas, Prof. O. K., University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Neb.
 Bowden, Prof. D. J., Elon College, Elon, N. C.
 Boyer, Prof. Merle William, Carthage College, Carthage, Ill.
 Boynton, Prof. Richard W., University of Buffalo, Buffalo, N. Y.
 Bradshaw, Prof. M. J., Bangor Theological Seminary, Bangor, Me.
 Brameld, Prof. Theodore B., New York University, Washington Sq., New York, N. Y.
 Brandt, Prof. Richard B., Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Pa.
 Brautigam, Prof. Herman A., Colgate University, Hamilton, N. Y.
 Brennan, Prof. Joseph G., College of New Rochelle, New Rochelle, N. Y.
 Brightman, Prof. Edgar S., Box 35, Newton Center, Mass.
 Brinton, Prof. Howard, Pendle Hill, Wallingford, Pa.
 Brogan, Prof. A. P., University of Texas, Austin, Tex.
 Bronstein, Dr. D. J., College of the City of New York, New York, N. Y.
 Broudy, Dr. Harry S., State Teachers College, North Adams, Mass.
 Brown, Prof. A. E., 701 W. Center St., Alma, Mich.
 Brown, Principal James G., Union College, Vancouver, B. C.
 Brown, Prof. Kenneth Archibald.
 Browne, Prof. Samuel S. S., University of Cincinnati, Ohio.
 Browning, Prof. Robert W., Syracuse University, Syracuse, N. Y.
 Bryan, Pres. W. L., Indiana University, Bloomington, Ind.
 Buchanan, Mr. Emerson, Room 228M, Butler Library, Columbia University, New York, N. Y.
 Buchanan, Prof. Scott M., The Parsonage, Richmond, Mass.
 Buchler, Dr. Justus, Columbia University, New York, N. Y.
 Buckley, Prof. Joseph W., Notre Dame Seminary, New Orleans, La.
 Bugbee, Prof. Henry G., University of Nevada, Reno, Nev.
 Burch, Dr. George B., Tufts College, Medford 55, Mass.
 Bures, Prof. Charles E., Olive View, Calif.
 Burkhardt, Pres. Frederick H., Bennington College, Bennington, Vt.
 Burns, Dr. Arthur W., University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich.
 Burnham, Prof. James, New York University, Washington Sq., New York, N. Y.
 Burr, Prof. E. A., Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y.
 Buschman, Prof. Harold, University of Kansas City, Kansas City, Mo.
 Bussey, Prof. Gertrude C., Goucher College, Baltimore, Md.
 Butler, Pres. N. M., Columbia University, New York City.
 Butt, Dr. S. McClellan, 1908 Florida Ave. N. W., Washington, D. C.
 Butterfield, President Victor L., Wesleyan University, Middletown, Conn.
 Calhoun, Dr. Robert L., Yale University, New Haven, Conn.
 Campbell, Prof. Ivy G., Wells College, Aurora-on-Cayuga, N. Y.
 Cannabrava, Dr. Euryalo, Rainha Elisabeth, 62, ap. 5, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
 Cannom, Dean C. W.
 Caponigri, Prof. A. Robert, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Ind.
 Carmichael, Prof. Peter A., Louisiana State University, University, La.
 Carmichael, Prof. R. D., University of Illinois, Urbana, Ill.
 Carnap, Prof. Rudolf, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.
 Case, Prof. Mary S., 70 Church St., Wellesley, Mass.
 Cattell, Dr. J. McKeen, Garrison-on-Hudson, N. Y.
 Cerf, Dr. Walter H., University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn.
 Chambers, Prof. L. P., Washington University, St. Louis, Mo.
 Chandler, Prof. Albert R., Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio.
 Chanter, Prof. William G., 5 Academy Road, Madison, N. J.
 Chapman, Prof. Emanuel, Hunter College, New York City.
 Chapman, Prof. Harmon M., New York University, University Heights, New York, N. Y.
 Child, Dr. Arthur, 301 Swift Hall, University of Chicago, Chicago 37, Ill.
 Childs, Prof. John L., Teachers College, Columbia University, New York, N. Y.
 Chisholm, Prof. Roderick M., 14 South Street, Plainville, Mass.

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- Christ, Dr. Paul S., Liberty High School, Bethlehem, Pa.
 Christian, Prof. William A., Jr. Smith College, Northampton, Mass.
 Church, Prof. Ralph W., Santa Barbara, Calif.
 Churchman, Dr. C. West, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa.
 Clapp, Dr. James Gordon, Hunter College, New York, N. Y.
 Clark, Prof. Gordon H., Butler University, Indianapolis, Ind.
 Clark, Prof. John A., 56 Leighton Rd., Wellesley, Mass.
 Clarke, Prof. Francis P., University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa.
 Clarke, Prof. Mary E., Smith College, Northampton, Mass.
 Cleve, Dr. Felix, 634 Columbus Ave., New York 24, N. Y.
 Cobb, Prof. Henry V., University of South Dakota, Vermillion, S. D.
 Coffman, Dr. David R., 54 Claremont Ave., Maplewood, N. J.
 Cohen, Dr. Felix S., Office of Solicitor, Dept. of Interior, Washington, D. C.
 Cohen, Prof. Joseph W., University of Colorado, Boulder, Colo.
 Collins, Dr. James, St. Louis University, St. Louis, Mo.
 Conger, Prof. G. P., University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn.
 Connette, Prof. Earle, Syracuse University, Syracuse, N. Y.
 Coolidge, Dean Mary Lowell, Wellesley College, Wellesley, Mass.
 Cope, Dr. J. Raymond, 2425 Bancroft Way, Berkeley 4, Calif.
 Copp, Prof. Marie S., Wilson College, Chambersburg, Pa.
 Cory, Prof. C. E., Washington University, St. Louis, Mo.
 Costello, Prof. H. T., Trinity College, Hartford, Conn.
 Cowan, Prof. Thomas A.
 Cowling, Pres. D. J., 444 Otis Ave., St. Paul 4, Minn.
 Craig, Dr. Wallace, 10 Bowdoin St., Cambridge 38, Mass.
 Crawford, Prof. Lucy S., Sweet Briar College, Sweet Briar, Va.
 Creed, Dr. Isabel, 128 Indian Rd., Piedmont, Calif.
 Cresswell, Prof. John R., West Virginia University, Morgantown, W. Va.
 Crissman, Prof. Paul, University of Wyoming, Laramie, Wyo.
 Crowley, Prof. W. A., 5819 Glenview Ave., College Hill, Cincinnati, Ohio.
 Culbertson, Prof. James T., Michigan State College, E. Lansing, Mich.
 Cunningham, Dean G. Watts, Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y.
 Currie, Dr. Cecil, McGill University, Montreal, Can.
 Curry, Prof. Haskell B.
 Cushman, Dr. Robert, Duke University, Durham, N. C.
 Cutler, Prof. Anna A., 407 Whitney Ave., New Haven, Conn.
- Dakin, Dr. Arthur Hazard, Darley-in-the-Dale, Amherst, Mass.
 D'Alfonso, Dr. Joseph, 301 Pine St., Lewiston, Me.
 Davenport, Prof. Charles K., Box 1233, University of Virginia, University, Va.
 Davidson, Prof. Robert F., University of Florida, Gainesville, Fla.
 DeBoer, Prof. C., University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, Ark.
 Deglman, Prof. G. A., Rockhurst College, Kansas City, Mo.
 DeLacy, Prof. Estelle Allen, Roosevelt College, 231 S. Wells St., Chicago, Ill.
 DeMoor, Prof. Leonard, Hastings College, Hastings, Neb.
 Demos, Prof. Raphael, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
 Dennes, Prof. W. R., University of California, Berkeley, Calif.
 Dewey, Prof. John, 1158 Fifth Ave., New York 29, N. Y.
 DeWolf, Prof. L. Harold, Boston University, Boston, Mass.
 Dickinson, Prof. F. W., University of Denver, Denver, Colo.
 Diggs, Prof. Bernard J., University of Illinois, Urbana, Ill.
 Diller, Prof. Elliott Van N., Mills College, Oakland, Calif.
 Dodd, Mrs. Edwin M., Jr., 999 Memorial Dr., Cambridge, Mass.
 Doescher, Prof. Waldemar D., Capital University, Columbus, Ohio.
 Dolson, Dr. Grace N., St. Mary's Free Hospital for Children, Inc., 407 W. 34th St., New York, N. Y.
 von Domarus, Dr. E., 471 Park Ave., New York 22, N. Y.
 Dommeyer, Dr. Frederick C., 21 Elm St., Canton, N. Y.
 Donovan, Sister M. Annice, St. Mary's College, Holy Cross, Ind.
 Dotterer, Prof. Ray H., 825 W. Foster Ave., State College, Pa.

PROCEEDINGS

- Dowling, Mr. John W., Williams College, Williamstown, Mass.
 Drabkin, Dr. Israel E., 44 W. 96th St., New York 25, N. Y.
 Druckmann, Prof. A., Pennsylvania State College, State College, Pa.
 Dubs, Prof. Homer H., University College, Oxford, England.
 Ducasse, Prof. C. J., Brown University, Providence, R. I.
 Dunham, Prof. Barrows, 127 Bentley Ave., Cynwyd, Pa.
 Dunham, Dr. James H., Temple University, Philadelphia, Pa.
 Durfee, Prof. Harold A., Park College, Parkville, Mo.
 Duvall, Prof. T. G., Ohio Wesleyan University, Delaware, Ohio.
 Dwight, Prof. Charles A. S., Box 1574, Oak Bluffs, Mass.
 Dykhuizen, Prof. George, University of Vermont, Burlington, Vt.
 Dykstra, Prof. D. Ivan, Hope College, Holland, Mich.
- Eaton, Prof. Howard O., University of Oklahoma, Norman, Okla.
 Eckhardt, Prof. L. R., DePauw University, Greencastle, Ind.
 Eckstein, Dr. Walter, 3900 Greystone Ave., New York, N. Y.
 Edel, Prof. Abraham, College of the City of New York, N. Y.
 Edgar, Dr. Earl, 1429 Legore Drive, Manhattan, Kans.
 Edman, Prof. Irwin, Columbia University, New York, N. Y.
 Edwards, Prof. George V., Jr., Associated Colleges of Upper New York, Plattsburg, N. Y.
 Eggleston, Sister Mary Frederick, 2935 Upton St. N. W., Dumbarton College, Washington, D. C.
 Elder, Prof. Lucius W., Knox College, Galesburg, Ill.
 Emch, Dr. Arnold F., 1210 Astor St., Chicago 10, Ill.
 Emery, Prof. Stephen A., University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N. C.
 Ericksen, Prof. E. E., University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah.
 Erickson, Dr. Harris D., Seattle Pacific College, Seattle, Wash.
 Erickson, Prof. Ralph W., Carleton College, Northfield, Minn.
 Eshleman, Prof. Martin, Carleton College, Northfield, Minn.
 Estall, Dr. Henry M., Queen's University, Kingston, Ont., Can.
 Evans, Prof. D. Luther, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio.
 Evans, Dr. W. Vince, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, Calif.
 Everett, Prof. Millard S., Roosevelt College, 231 S. Wells St., Chicago 4, Ill.
- Fackenheim, Dr. Emil Ludwig, 99 Myrtle Ave., Hamilton, Ontario, Can.
 Fales, Dr. Walter, Lincoln University, Pa.
 Fallico, Dr. Arturo B., 2142 E. 69th St. Chicago 49, Ill.
 Farber, Prof. Marvin, University of Buffalo, N. Y.
 Feibleman, Mr. James K., 1424 Canal Bldg., New Orleans, La.
 Feigl, Prof. Herbert, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn.
 Fenlon, Prof. Edward J., 1976 E. 23rd St., Brooklyn, N. Y.
 Fern, Prof. Vergilius, College of Wooster, Wooster, Ohio.
 Ferré, Prof. Nels F. S., 44 Stearns St., Newton Center, Mass.
 Feuer, Dr. Lewis S., Vassar College, Poughkeepsie, N. Y.
 Finch, Prof. Henry A., The College, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.
 Firth, Dr. Roderick, Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Pa.
 Fisch, Prof. M. H., University of Illinois, Urbana, Ill.
 Fisher, Dr. Donald Warren, Noe Ave., Madison, N. J.
 Fitch, Dr. Frederick B., Silliman College, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.
 Fitch, Prof. Robert E., Occidental College, Los Angeles, Calif.
 Fite, Prof. Warner, Hopewell, N. J.
 FitzGerald, Prof. John James, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Ind.
 Flewellling, Prof. Ralph T., University of Southern California, Los Angeles, Calif.
- Flower, Dr. Elizabeth, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa.
 Fort, Prof. William Edwards, Jr., Rollins College, Winter Park, Fla.
 Foss, Dr. Martin, 1a College Lane, Haverford, Pa.
 Fox, Prof. George G., University of Florida, Gainesville, Fla.
 Frank, Dr. Erich, Bryn Mawr College, Bryn Mawr, Pa.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW

- Frankel, Prof. Charles, Dept. of Philosophy, Columbia University, New York 27, N. Y.
- Frankena, Prof. Wm., University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich.
- Fr nqu z, Prof. Jos  A., West Virginia Wesleyan College, Buckhannon, W. Va.
- Freund, Prof. Ernest H., 319 W. Fairmount Ave., State College, Pa.
- Friedmann, Prof. F. G., University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, Ark.
- Fries, Prof. Horace S., University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis.
- Friess, Prof. Horace L., Columbia University, New York, N. Y.
- Fritz, Mrs. Charles A., Jr., 78-10 34th Ave., Jackson Heights, N. Y.
- Frye, Prof. A. Myrton, 2525 College Ave., Berkeley, Calif.
- Fuller, Prof. B. A. G., 6887 Alta Loma Terrace, Hollywood 28, Calif.
- Fulton, Prof. James S., Rice Institute, Houston, Texas.
- Gabbert, Prof. M. R., University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pa.
- Gamertsfelder, Dean W. S., Ohio University, Athens, Ohio.
- Garlan, Dr. Edwin N., Reed College, Portland, Ore.
- Garnett, Prof. A. C., University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis.
- Garnett, Prof. Christopher Browne, Jr., The George Washington University, Washington, D. C.
- Garvin, Prof. Lucius, Oberlin College, Oberlin, Ohio.
- Gauss, Prof. Charles E., George Washington University, Washington, D. C.
- Geiger, Prof. George R., University of Wisconsin, Madison 6, Wis.
- Gentry, Prof. George, University of Texas, Austin, Tex.
- Geyer, Prof. Denton L., Chicago Normal School, 68th and Stewart Ave., Chicago, Ill.
- Gifford, Prof. A. R., University of Vermont, Burlington, Vt.
- Gilbert, Dr. Katharine E., 516 Carolina Circle, Durham, N. C.
- Gildmeister, Prof. Theda, 311 W. Tremont St., Hillsboro, Ill.
- Girvetz, Prof. Harry, Santa Barbara State College, Santa Barbara, Calif.
- Glick, Prof. Harry N., 30 N. Hadley Rd., Amherst, Mass.
- Gloyd, Prof. Cyril K., Occidental College, Los Angeles 41, Calif.
- Godcharles, Prof. C. A., Union College, Schenectady, N. Y.
- Goertz, Dean P. S., Bethel College, North Newton, Kans.
- Goheen, Dr. John, Queens College, Flushing, N. Y.
- Golightly, Prof. Cornelius L., Olivet College, Olivet, Mich.
- Gonso, Prof. Raymond, Michigan State College, E. Lansing, Mich.
- Goodman, Prof. Nelson, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa.
- Gotesky, Prof. Rubin, New York University, Washington Square College, New York, N. Y.
- Gotshalk, Prof. D. W., University of Illinois, Urbana, Ill.
- Goudge, Prof. Thomas A., University of Toronto, Toronto, Ont., Can.
- Gould, Prof. William D., Dickinson College, Carlisle, Pa.
- Gramlich, Prof. Francis W.
- Gray, Dr. J. Glenn, 3d Mil. Govt. Regt., Educ. & Religious Affairs, APO 170, Postmaster, New York, N. Y.
- Gray-Smith, Prof. Rowland, Hingham, Mass.
- Greene, Prof. Theodore M., Yale University, New Haven, Conn.
- Greene, Prof. Marjorie, R. R. 1, Lemont, Ill.
- Griffith, Prof. C. R., University of Illinois, Urbana, Ill.
- Grinnell, Prof. Robert, Stanford University, Calif.
- Gross, Dr. Mason W., Rutgers University, New Brunswick, N. J.
- Groth, Prof. John Henry, Eastern Washington College of Education, Cheney, Wash.
- Gruen, Dr. William, 922-16th St. S., Arlington, Va.
- Gurvitch, Prof. George, International Universities Press, 227 West 13th St., New York 11, N. Y.
- Gurwitch, Dr. Aron, 10 Agassiz St., Cambridge, Mass.
- Guthrie, Dean Hunter, Georgetown University, Washington 7, D. C.
- Guthrie, Prof. E. R., University of Washington, Seattle, Wash.
- Gutmann, Prof. James, Columbia University, New York, N. Y.

PROCEEDINGS

- Haag, Prof. Alvin S., North Central College, Naperville, Ill.
 Hafkesbrink, Prof. Hanna, Connecticut College, New London, Conn.
 Hahn, Prof. Lewis E., University of Missouri, Columbia, Mo.
 Hall, Prof. Everett W., University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa.
 Hamblin, Prof. Frances Murphy, Wells College, Aurora, N. Y.
 Hammerschmidt, Dr. William, Norwich University, Northfield, Vt.
 Hammond, Dr. Lewis M., University of Virginia, University, Va.
 Hantz, Prof. Harold D., Oklahoma A. and M. College, Stillwater, Okla.
 Haring, Mrs. Ellen Stone, 672 Washington St., Wellesley 81, Mass.
 Harkness, Prof. Georgia E., Garrett Biblical Institute, Evanston, Ill.
 Harmon, Dr. Frances B., Scarborough, N. Y.
 Harris, Prof. Marjorie S., Randolph-Macon Woman's College, Lynchburg, Va.
 Harris, Pres. M. LaFayette, Philander Smith College, Little Rock, Ark.
 Hart, Prof. Charles A., Catholic University of America, Washington, D. C.
 Hartman, Prof. H. G., 542 Northeast 107 St., Miami, Fla.
 Hartman, Dr. Robert S., College of Wooster, Wooster, Ohio.
 Hartshorne, Prof. Charles, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.
 Hartt, Dr. Julian N., Yale University Divinity School, 409 Prospect St., New Haven, Conn.
 Harvanek, Dr. Robert F., West Baden College, W. Baden Springs, Ind.
 Haserot, Dr. Francis S., William and Mary College, Williamsburg, Va.
 Havice, Prof. Charles William, Northeastern University, Boston, Mass.
 Hawes, Prof. R. P., Goucher College, Baltimore, Md.
 Hawkins, Prof. David, Apt. 4, 1721 Rhode Island Ave. N. W., Washington, D. C.
 Hay, Prof. William Henry, University of Wisconsin, Madison 6, Wis.
 Hayner, Mr. Paul Collins, Hamilton College, Clinton, N. Y.
 Hazelton, Prof. Roger, Andover Newton Theological School, Newton Center 59, Mass.
 Headley, Prof. Leal A., Carleton College, Northfield, Minn.
 Healey, Prof. Francis G.
 Heath, Prof. Louise R., Keuka College, Keuka Park, N. Y.
 Hefelbower, Prof. Samuel G., Wagner College, Staten Island, N. Y.
 Helsel, Prof. Paul R., 5502 Rimpau Blvd., Los Angeles 43, Calif.
 Hempel, Prof. Carl G., Queens College, Flushing, N. Y.
 Hendel, Prof. Charles W., Yale University, New Haven, Conn.
 Henderson, Prof. Edgar, 213 Oberlin Road, Raleigh, N. C.
 Henderson, Dr. Thomas G., 1556 Summerhill Ave., Montreal, Can.
 Henle, Prof. Paul, Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill.
 Henry, Prof. Carl F. H., 3040 Washington Blvd., Chicago, Ill.
 Hepp, Prof. Maylon H., Denison University, Granville, Ohio.
 Heschel, Prof. Abraham Joshua, 3080 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y.
 Hickson, Dr. J. W. A., 3428 Ontario Ave., Montreal, Can.
 Hildebrand, Prof. Carroll DeWitt, DePauw University, Greencastle, Ind.
 von Hildebrand, Prof. Dietrich, 448 Central Park W., New York, N. Y.
 Hill, Dr. A. R.
 Hill, Prof. Thomas E., Macalester College, St. Paul 5, Minn.
 Hill, Dr. Walker H., Michigan State College, East Lansing, Mich.
 Hillman, Dr. Owen N., 713 Dartmouth Ave., Silver Spring, Md.
 Hinman, Prof. E. L., University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Neb.
 Hinshaw, Dr. Virgil G. Jr., Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio.
 Hite, Prof. L. F., 42 Arlington St., Cambridge, Mass.
 Hocking, Prof. Richard, University of Chicago, Chicago 37, Ill.
 Hocking, Prof. W. E., 188 Columbia Heights, Brooklyn, N. Y.
 Hodgson, Prof. James B., Coe College, Cedar Rapids, Iowa.
 Hoekstra, Prof. Raymond, Wayne University, Detroit, Mich.
 Hofstadter, Prof. Albert, New York University, Washington Sq., New York, N. Y.
 Hoke, Prof. Roy Edward, Davidson College, Davidson, N. C.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW

- Holbrook, Dean Clyde A., Shove Chapel, Colorado College, Colorado Springs, Colo.
- Holcomb, Prof. Louise, Wilson College, Chambersburg, Pa.
- Hollands, Prof. E. H., University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kans.
- Holmer, Dr. Paul L., University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn.
- Holmes, Prof. Eugene C., Howard University, Washington, D. C.
- Holmes, Prof. Roger W., Mount Holyoke College, South Hadley, Mass.
- Holtzclaw, Prof. B. C., University of Richmond, Richmond, Va.
- Hong, Prof. Howard B., St. Olaf College, Northfield, Minn.
- Hook, Prof. Sidney, New York University, Washington Sq., New York, N. Y.
- Hope, Prof. Richard, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pa.
- Horkheimer, Dr. Max, 13524 D'Este Drive, Pacific Palisades, Calif.
- Houf, Prof. H. T., 17 Second St., Athens, Ohio.
- Howard, Prof. D. T., Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill.
- Howell, Dr. C. T., 1st Presbyterian Church, 214 W. 6th St., Rochester, Ind.
- Hudson, Prof. J. W., University of Missouri, Columbia, Mo.
- Hughes, Prof. Percy, Belvedere, N. J.
- Hungerland, Dr. Isabel C., University of California, Berkeley 4, Calif.
- Hunter, Prof. Armstrong, 6 Copeland Place, Roxbury 19, Mass.
- Hutchison, Prof. John A., College of Wooster, Wooster, Ohio.
- Iredell, Prof. Francis R., Pomona College, Claremont, Calif.
- Irving, Prof. John Allan, Victoria College, University of Toronto, Toronto, Can.
- Jaffe, Dr. Haym, 69 Merwood Dr., Upper Darby, Pa.
- Jefferson, Pres. Howard B., Clark University, Worcester, Mass.
- Jeffery, Prof. Harriet, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colo.
- Jellema, Prof. Harry, University of Indiana, Bloomington, Ind.
- Jenkins, Prof. Iredell, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.
- Jessup, Prof. Bertram E., University of Oregon, Eugene, Ore.
- Johnson, Dr. Allison Hertz, University of Western Ontario, London, Can.
- Johnson, Prof. George, 706 Nottingham Road, Wilmington, Del.
- Johnson, Prof. Paul E., 130 Day St., Auburndale, Mass.
- Johnson, Prof. R. B. C., Kittery Point, Me.
- Jones, Prof. A. H., University of Rochester, Rochester, N. Y.
- Jones, Prof. Rufus M., Haverford College, Haverford, Pa.
- Jones, Dr. William T., Pomona College, Claremont, Calif.
- Jordan, Prof. E., Butler University, Indianapolis, Ind.
- Jordan, Prof. H. P., Washington Square College, New York University, New York, N. Y.
- Kaiser, Dr. Charles Hillis, Bennington College, Bennington, Vt.
- Kallen, Prof. Horace, 66 W. 12th St., New York, N. Y.
- Kantonen, Prof. T. A., Wittenberg College, Springfield, Ohio.
- Kantor, Prof. J. R., Indiana University, Bloomington, Ind.
- Katsoff, Dr. Louis O., University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N. C.
- Kaufmann, Prof. Felix, 533 W. 232nd St., New York, N. Y.
- Kaufmann, Prof. Fritz, University of Buffalo, Buffalo, N. Y.
- Kearney, Prof. Chester M., Aurora College, Aurora, Ill.
- Keeton, Prof. Morris T., Antioch College, Yellow Springs, Ohio.
- Kemmerer, Dr. Mabel C., State Laboratory, Old Capitol, Jackson, Miss.
- Kennedy, Prof. Gail, Amherst College, Amherst, Mass.
- Kerby-Miller, Prof. S., 222 Lincoln Ave., Alameda, Calif.
- Kimpel, Dr. Ben F., Drew University, Madison, N. J.
- King, Prof. Albion R., Cornell College, Mount Vernon, Iowa.
- Kirn, Dean G. J., North Central College, Naperville, Ill.
- Klass, Prof. Walter K., North Central College, Naperville, Ill.
- Klausner, Prof. Neal W., Grinnell College, Grinnell, Iowa.
- Knight, Prof. Edward C., Calle Montes de Oca, 168, Mexico City, D. F.
- Knight, Prof. Frank H., University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.

PROCEEDINGS

- Knodel, Prof. Jay C., University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, N. M.
 Knudson, Dean Emeritus Albert C., 18 Forest St., Cambridge, Mass.
 Koch, Dr. Adrienne, 28 East 10th St., New York 3, N. Y.
 Koch, Dr. G. Adolf, 55 E. 10th St., New York, N. Y.
 Konvitz, Prof. Milton R., Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y.
 Kotkov, Dr. Benjamin, 133 Lucerne St., Dorchester, Mass.
 Koyré, Prof. Alexandre, New School for Social Research, New York, N. Y.
 Krait, Dr. Julius, 120 Stonelea Place, New Rochelle, N. Y.
 Kraushaar, Prof. Otto F., Smith College, Northampton, Mass.
 Kretschmann, Prof. Philip M., Brooklyn College, Brooklyn, N. Y.
 Krikorian, Prof. Yervant H., College of the City of New York, New York, N. Y.
 Kristeller, Dr. Paul Oskar, Columbia University, New York, N. Y.
 Kroner, Prof. Richard, 99 Claremont Ave., New York, N. Y.
 Krug, Prof. C. A., Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston, Ontario, Can.
 Kruse, Prof. Cornelius, Wesleyan University, Middletown, Conn.
 Kubitz, Prof. Oscar, University of Illinois, Urbana, Ill.
 Kuhn, Prof. Helmut, Emory University, Ga.
 Kuntz, Dr. Paul Grimley, Smith College, Northampton, Mass.
- Lafferty, Prof. T. T., University of South Carolina, Columbia, S. C.
 Laflue, Prof. Laurence J., Antioch College, Yellow Springs, Ohio.
 de Laguna, Prof. Grace A., 221 Roberts Rd., Bryn Mawr, Pa.
 Lamont, Dr. Corliss, 450 Riverside Dr., New York, N. Y.
 Lamont, Mrs. Robert P., Jr., Rt. No. 1, Thiensville, Wis.
 Lamprecht, Prof. Sterling P., Amherst College, Amherst, Mass.
 Landon, Dr. K. P., 4711 Fulton St., N. W., Washington 7, D. C.
 Lane, Prof. W. B., Picton, Ontario, Can.
 Langer, Dr. Susanne K.
 Langford, Prof. Cooper H., University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich.
 Larrabee, Prof. Harold A., Union College, Schenectady, N. Y.
 Lavelly, Prof. Horace T., Allegheny College, Meadville, Pa.
 Lazerowitz, Prof. Morris, Smith College, Northampton, Mass.
 Leach, Prof. Frederick H., Drake University, Des Moines, Iowa.
 Leavenworth, Dr. Isabel F., 277 Park Ave., New York City.
 LeBoutillier, Prof. Cornelia G., 1105 Park Ave., New York, N. Y.
 Leckie, Prof. G. G., 44 Washington Sq. S., New York, N. Y.
 Lee, Prof. Otis Hamilton, Vassar College, Poughkeepsie, N. Y.
 Leidecker, Prof. Kurt, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, N. Y.
 Leighton, Prof. J. A., 817 Oxford St., Worthington, Ohio.
 Lenzen, Prof. V. F., University of California, Berkeley, Calif.
 Leonard, Prof. Henry S., Duke University, Durham, N. C.
 Lepley, Prof. Ray, Bradley University, Peoria, Ill.
 Levi, Prof. Albert W., Black Mountain College, Black Mountain, N. C.
 Levinson, Prof. Ronald B., University of Maine, Orono, Me.
 Lewis, Prof. Clarence I., Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
 Lewis, Dr. Leicester C., 477 Hudson St., New York 14, N. Y.
 Leys, Dean W. A. R., Roosevelt College of Chicago, 231 S. Wells St., Chicago 4, Ill.
 Liddell, Prof. A. Forbes, Florida State College for Women, Tallahassee, Fla.
 Litman, Dr. Alexander, 80-11 180th St., Jamaica, L. I., N. Y.
 Locke, Prof. Alain Leroy, 1326 R St., N. W., Washington, D. C.
 Lodge, Prof. R. C., University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Can.
 Loemker, Prof. Leroy E., Emory University, Atlanta, Ga.
 Loewenberg, Prof. J., University of California, Berkeley, Calif.
 Long, Prof. Marcus, University of Toronto, Toronto, Can.
 Long, Prof. W. H., University of Southern California, Los Angeles, Calif.
 Lovejoy, Prof. A. O., 827 Park Ave., Baltimore, Md.
 Lowe, Prof. Victor, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.
 Lowinger, Dr. Armand, 163 Lafayette Ave., Brooklyn, N. Y.
 Löwith, Prof. Karl, Hartford Seminary Foundation, Hartford, Conn.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW

- Lucas, Prof. Martha B., 140 Hesketh St., Chevy Chase, Md.
 Lyman, Prof. Eugene W., Sweet Briar College, Sweet Briar, Va.
 Lynch, Dr. Jarmon A., 1456 W. 91st Place, Los Angeles 44, Calif.
 Lynd, Dr. Helen Merrell, Sarah Lawrence College, Bronxville 8, N. Y.
 Lyon, Prof. Quinter M., University of Mississippi, University, Miss.
- McCall, Prof. Raymond J., 123 S. Bay Ave., Freeport, N. Y.
 McClure, Dean M. T., University of Illinois, Urbana, Ill.
 McCracken, Prof. Anna, University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kans.
 McCulloch, Prof. Gerald O., Garrett Bible Institute, Evanston, Ill.
 McEwen, Pres. Robert Ward, Blackburn College, Carlinville, Ill.
 McEwen, Prof. William P., Hofstra College, Hempstead, L. I., N. Y.
 McGill, Prof. V. J., Hunter College, New York, N. Y.
 McGilvary, Prof. E. B., 1920 Arlington Pl., Madison, Wis.
 McGreal, Mr. Ian, Brown University, Providence, R. I.
 McKeon, Prof. Charles, University of Idaho, Moscow, Idaho.
 McKeon, Dean Richard, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.
 McKown, Dean Edgar Monroe, Evansville College, Evansville, Ind.
 McLarty, Dr. Furman Gordon, Duke University, Durham, N. C.
 McMurrin, Prof. Sterling M., University of Southern California, Los Angeles 7, Calif.
- McWilliams, Prof. J. A., St. Louis University, St. Louis, Mo.
 Macintosh, Prof. Douglas C., 25 Woodlawn St., Hamden, Conn.
 Mack, Prof. Robert, 183 Williams St., New London, Conn.
 Mackay, Prof. D. S., University of California, Berkeley, Calif.
 MacGowan, Prof. Robert, Florida Southern College, Lakeland, Fla.
 MacLennan, Prof. Roderick, McGill University, Montreal, Can.
 MacMillan, Dr. D. F., Hebron, Yarmouth Co., Nova Scotia, Can.
 Magid, Dr. Henry M., College of the City of New York, New York, N. Y.
 Mahan, Prof. W. B., University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, Ark.
 Malcolm, Prof. Norman, Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y.
 Manasse, Dr. Ernest M., North Carolina College for Negroes, Durham, N. C.
 Mandelbaum, Prof. Maurice H., Dartmouth College, Hanover, N. H.
 Manry, Prof. James C., Forman College, Lahore, India.
 Marck, Prof. Siegfried, Roosevelt College, 231 S. Wells St., Chicago 4, Ill.
 Marcuse, Dr. Herbert, 4609 Chevy Chase Blvd., Washington 15, D. C.
 Margolius, Dr. Hans, 621 S. W. 14th Ave., Miami 35, Fla.
 Marhenke, Prof. Paul, University of California, Berkeley, Calif.
 Maritain, Prof. Jacques, French Ambassador to the Holy See, Palazzo Taverna, Via di Monte Giordano, Roma, Italy.
- Marlatt, Dean Earl, Boston University School of Theology, Boston, Mass.
 Marshall, Prof. Donald K., Trinity College, Hartford, Conn.
 Marshall, Prof. John S., University of the South, Seawanee, Tenn.
 Marti, Prof. Fritz, Marietta College, Marietta, O.
 Martin, Prof. Herbert, University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa.
 Martin, Prof. Richard Milton, Bryn Mawr College Library, Bryn Mawr, Pa.
 Martin, Prof. William Oliver, 24 Woodward Ave., Athens, Ohio.
 Marvin, Prof. Edwin L., Montana State University, Missoula, Mont.
 Maslow, Prof. Alexander P., University of British Columbia, Vancouver, B. C., Can.
- Mason, Prof. M. Phillips, Bowdoin College, Brunswick, Me.
 Mauzey, Prof. Jesse V., Skidmore College, Saratoga Springs, N. Y.
 Maxson, Prof. Calvin Hugh, Box 259, Moscow, Idaho.
 Mead, Prof. Hunter, San Diego State College, San Diego, Calif.
 Means, Dr. Blanchard W., Trinity College, Hartford, Conn.
 Meier, Dr. Frederick W., P. O. Box 642, Louisiana State University, University, La.
- Meiklejohn, Prof. Alexander, 1525 La Loma Ave., Berkeley, Calif.
 Meiklejohn, Prof. Donald.
 Melden, Prof. A. J., University of Washington, Seattle, Wash.

PROCEEDINGS

- Melvin, Prof. Georgiana, Mills College, Oakland, Calif.
 Mercier, Prof. Louis J. A.
 Melzer, Prof. John J., University of Kentucky, Lexington, Ky.
 Merlan, Prof. Philip, Scripps College, Claremont, Calif.
 Metzger, Dr. Arnold, Simmons College, Boston, Mass.
 Meyerson, Dr. Helen C., 349 E. 49th, New York 17, N. Y.
 Miller, Prof. Allen Ott, Eden Theological Seminary, Webster Groves, Mo.
 Miller, Mr. Cecil H., Kansas State College, Manhattan, Kans.
 Miller, Prof. David L., University of Texas, Austin, Texas.
 Miller, Dr. Dickinson S., 95 Pinckney St., Boston, Mass.
 Miller, Prof. Hugh, University of California at Los Angeles, Los Angeles, Calif.
 Miller, Prof. James W., College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Va.
 Miller, Prof. Robert H., Manchester College, North Manchester, Ind.
 Minor, Prof. William S., W. Virginia University, Morgantown, W. Va.
 Mitchell, Prof. E. T., University of Texas, Austin, Texas.
 Mitchell, Prof. Wilfred M., College of the Pacific, Stockton 27, Calif.
 Mitrany, Prof. David, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, N. J.
 Montague, Prof. W. P., Barnard College, Columbia University, New York, N. Y.
 Moody, Dr. Ernest A., Dilley, Texas.
 Moore, Prof. Charles A., University of Hawaii, Honolulu 10, Hawaii.
 Moore, Pres. Dale H., Cedar Crest College, Allentown, Pa.
 Moore, Dr. E. C., 516 Woodruff Ave., Los Angeles 24, Calif.
 Moore, Prof. Jared S., Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio.
 Moore, Prof. John M., Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Pa.
 Moore, Dr. Kate Gordon, 516 Woodruff Ave., Los Angeles, Calif.
 Moore, Prof. Meritt H., Knox College, Galesburg, Ill.
 Moore, Prof. Willis, University of Missouri, Columbia, Mo.
 Morgan, Dr. Barbara S., 840 Park Ave., New York, N. Y.
 Morgan, Prof. George Allen, Jr., Apt. 2, 1813 F St., N. W., Washington 6, D. C.
 Morgan, Prof. W. J., Washburn College, Topeka, Kans.
 Morgan, Pres. William S., 1683 La Loma Ave., Berkeley, Calif.
 Morris, Prof. Bertram, Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill.
 Morris, Prof. Charles W., University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.
 Morris, Prof. D. J., University of Illinois, Urbana, Ill.
 Morris, Prof. Frank E., Connecticut College, New London, Conn.
 Morrow, Dean Glenn R., University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa.
 Mothershead, Prof. John L., Jr., Stanford University, Palo Alto, Calif.
 Maurant, Prof. John A., Pennsylvania State College, State College, Pa.
 Muelder, Prof. Walter G., 72 Mt. Vernon St., Boston 8, Mass.
 Mueller, Prof. Gustav, University of Oklahoma, Norman, Okla.
 Mulherin, Father W. A., Loyola University, New Orleans, La.
 Munitz, Prof. Milton K., Washington Square College, New York University,
 New York, N. Y.
 Munro, Prof. Thomas, Museum of Art, Cleveland, Ohio.
 Murphy, Prof. Arthur E., Cornell University Ithaca, N. Y.
 Murray, Prof. Michael V., Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wis.
 Myers, Prof. Orvil, Los Angeles City College, Los Angeles, Calif.
 Myerson, Dr. Helen C., 29 Washington Square W., New York 11, N. Y.
 Nagel, Prof. Ernest, Columbia University, New York, N. Y.
 Nahm, Prof. Milton C., Bryn Mawr College, Bryn Mawr, Pa.
 Nason, Pres. John W., Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Pa.
 Nathanson, Mr. Jerome, 2 West 64th St., New York 23, N. Y.
 Negley, Prof. Glenn R., Duke University, Durham, N. C.
 Nelson, Prof. Everett J., University of Washington, Seattle, Wash.
 Nelson, Prof. R. W., Phillips University, Enid, Okla.
 Newhall, Dr. Jeanette E., Andover Harvard Theological Library, Francis Ave.,
 Cambridge, Mass.
 Newlin, Prof. W. J., Amherst College, Amherst, Mass.
 Nicholson, Prof. J. A., University of Illinois, Urbana, Ill.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW

- Nickels, Prof. Horace J.
 Nicol, Prof. Carl C. W., Oberlin College, Oberlin, Ohio.
 Niebuhr, Prof. H. Richard, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.
 Nilson, Dr. Sven, Trinity College, Hartford, Conn.
 Norborg, Prof. Sverre, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn.
 Norris, Prof. Louis William, DePauw University, Greencastle, Ind.
 Northrop, Prof. F. S. C., Silliman College, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.
 Norton, Prof. William Joseph, Jr., 206 Hale St., New Brunswick, N. J.
 Oliver, Prof. Donald, University of Missouri, Columbia, Mo.
 O'Meara, Prof. William, University of Chicago, Chicago 37, Ill.
 Organ, Prof. Troy, Pennsylvania College for Women, Pittsburgh, Pa.
 Osborne, Prof. C. P., University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kans.
 Otto, Prof. M. C., University of California at Los Angeles, Los Angeles, Calif.
 Overstreet, Prof. Harry A.
 Pap, Dr. Arthur, University of Chicago, Chicago 37, Ill.
 Pape, Dr. L. M.
 Parker, Prof. D. H., University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich.
 Parkhurst, Prof. Helen H., Barnard College, New York City.
 Patrick, Prof. G. T. W., 1440 California Ave., Palo Alto, Calif.
 Patterson, Prof. Charles H., University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Neb.
 Patterson, Dean Herbert, Oklahoma A. & M. College, Stillwater, Okla.
 Patterson, Dr. Robert Leet, 1707 Columbia Rd., Washington, D. C.
 Payne, Prof. Wilfred, Municipal University of Omaha, Omaha, Neb.
 Pegis, Prof. Anton C., Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, Toronto, Can.
 Pell, Prof. Orlie A. H., 27 E. 94th St., New York, N. Y.
 Penrose, Prof. Stephen B. L., Jr., 50 W. 50th St., New York, N. Y.
 Pepper, Prof. S. C., University of California, Berkeley, Calif.
 Pérez-Marchand, Prof. Monelisa, University of Puerto Rico, Rio Piedras, Puerto Rico.
 Perry, Prof. Charner, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.
 Perry, Prof. Ralph B., 445 Widener Library, Cambridge 38, Mass.
 Perry, Dr. Reginald C., Syracuse University, Syracuse, N. Y.
 Peterson, Dr. Houston, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, N. J.
 Pfeiffer, Prof. Frederick L., 2351 Chilcombe Ave., St. Paul, Minn.
 Pfeutze, Prof. Paul E., University of Connecticut, Storrs, Conn.
 Phillips, Prof. Bernard, Carleton College, Northfield, Minn.
 Phillips, Prof. Herbert J., University of Washington, Seattle, Wash.
 Piatt, Prof. D. A., University of California at Los Angeles, Los Angeles, Calif.
 Picard, Prof. Maurice, Dartmouth College, Hanover, N. H.
 Piper, Prof. Raymond F., Syracuse University, Syracuse, N. Y.
 Plantinga, Prof. Cornelius A., Jamestown College, Jamestown, N. D.
 Pollock, Prof. Robert, Fordham University, New York, N. Y.
 Popkin, Mr. Richard Henry, University of Connecticut, Storrs, Conn.
 Porteous, Prof. A. J. D., 3 Kingsmead Rd. North, Birkenhead, Cheshire, England.
 Portnoy, Dr. Julius, University of Connecticut, Fort Trumbull Branch, New London, Conn.
 Pott, Pres. W. S. A., Elmira College, Elmira, N. Y.
 Potter, Prof. Frank F., The State College of Washington, Pullman, Wash.
 Powell, Prof. Elmer E., 208 E. High St., Oxford, Ohio.
 Prins, Prof. Tunis, University of Denver, Denver, Colo.
 Proctor, Prof. Thomas Hayes, Wellesley College, Wellesley, Mass.
 Pyle, Prof. C. B., Kansas State Teachers College, Pittsburg, Kans.
 Quine, Dr. Willard V., Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
 Quillian, Prof. William F., Jr., Ohio Wesleyan University, Delaware, Ohio.
 Rader, Prof. Melvin, University of Washington, Seattle, Wash.

PROCEEDINGS

- Ramsdell, Prof. Edward T., Vanderbilt University School of Religion, Nashville, Tenn.
- Ramsden, Dr. Raymond, State Teachers College, Oshkosh, Wis.
- Ramsperger, Prof. A. G., University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis.
- Randall, Prof. J. H., Jr., Columbia University, New York, N. Y.
- Rathbun, Miss Constance, 15 Beaton St., Wellesley, Mass.
- Ratner, Dr. Joseph, 468 Riverside Dr., New York, N. Y.
- Raup, Prof. R. Bruce, Teachers College, Columbia University, New York, N. Y.
- Read, Prof. Waldemar P., University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah.
- Regester, Prof. J. D., College of Puget Sound, Tacoma, Wash.
- Reichenbach, Prof. Hans, University of California at Los Angeles, Los Angeles, Calif.
- Reid, Prof. John R., Stanford University, Calif.
- Reinhardt, Prof. Kurt F., Stanford University, Palo Alto, Calif.
- Rein'l, Dr. L. C., University of Missouri, Columbia, Mo.
- Reis, Prof. Lincoln, Bard College, Annandale-on-Hudson, N. Y.
- Reiser, Prof. Oliver L., University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pa.
- Reither, Prof. W. H., Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio.
- Remsberg, Prof. Robert G., Wittenberg College, Springfield, Ohio.
- Reynolds, Prof. Paul A., Maple Shade Rd., Middletown, Conn.
- Rice, Prof. Philip B., Kenyon College, Gambier, Ohio.
- Rich, Dr. Gertrude V. B., Barnard College, New York, N. Y.
- Richardson, Prof. N. E., Jr., Gettysburg College, Gettysburg, Pa.
- Richter, Prof. Werner, 177 Virginia St., Elmhurst, Ill.
- Riesen, Prof. E. R., University of Arizona, Tucson, Ariz.
- Rieser, Dr. Max, 519 W. 121st St., New York, N. Y.
- Riezler, Dr. Kurt, 270 Riverside Dr., New York, N. Y.
- Rist, Prof. Martin, The Iliff School of Theology, Denver, Colo.
- Roback, Dr. A. A., 8 Prescott St., Cambridge, Mass.
- Robbins, Mr. Reginald C., 390 Picacho Lane, Santa Barbara, Calif.
- Roberts, Prof. David E., Union Theological Seminary, Broadway at 120th St., New York, N. Y.
- Roberts, Prof. W. H.
- Robins, Prof. Sidney S., 414 N. Pleasant St., Amherst, Mass.
- Robinson, Prof. Daniel S., University of Southern California, Los Angeles 7, Calif.
- Robinson, Prof. E. A., San Jose State College, San Jose, Calif.
- Robinson, Prof. Edward S., University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kan.
- Robson, Prof. J. W., University of California at Los Angeles, Calif.
- Roelofs, Prof. Howard D., University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio.
- Roemer, Prof. William Francis, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Ind.
- Rohrbaugh, Prof. L. G., Dickinson College, Carlisle, Pa.
- Rolbiecki, Prof. John J., Catholic University, Washington, D. C.
- Romanell, Prof. P., Wells College, Aurora-on-Cayuga, N. Y.
- Rome, Dr. Sydney, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Va.
- Rose, Dr. Grace L., Wheaton College, Norton, Mass.
- Rosenstock-Huessy, Prof. Eugen, Dartmouth College, Hanover, N. H.
- Rosinger, Dr. Kurt Edward.
- Ross, Dr. Ralph Gilbert, Division of General Education, New York University, New York, N. Y.
- Roth, Prof. Joseph M., College of Mines and Metallurgy, El Paso, Texas.
- Rougier, Prof. Louis, 270 Riverside Dr., New York, N. Y.
- Ruby, Dr. Lionel, Indiana University, Calumet Center, East Chicago, Ind.
- Ruddick, Dr. C. T., 115 Simpson Rd., Ardmore, Pa.
- Ruja, Dr. Harry, Compton Junior College, Compton, Calif.
- Ryan, Most Reverend James H., 2507 Cass St., Omaha, Neb.
- Rynin, Prof. David, University of California, Berkeley, Calif.
- Sabine, Prof. George H., Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y.
- Sabin-Smith, Prof. Ethel, Mills College, Oakland, Calif.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW

- Sait, Prof. Una B., Claremont College, Claremont, Calif.
 Sampson, Prof. Floyd Luman, University of Denver, Denver, Colo.
 Sanborn, Prof. Herbert C., "Isartal," Brentwood, Tenn.
 Sander, Prof. Herman J., 768 Madison Ave., New York 21, N. Y.
 Savery, Dr. Barnett, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, B. C., Can.
 Savides, Prof. A. P., 182 Allerton Rd., Newton Highlands, Mass.
 Scarborough, Pres. William John, West Virginia Wesleyan College, Buckhannon, W. Va.
 Scharfstein, Dr. Ben-Ami, 310 W. 105th St., New York 25, N. Y.
 Schaub, Prof. E. L., Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill.
 Schermerhorn, Prof. R. A., Almsted Falls, Ohio.
 Schilpp, Prof. P. A., Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill.
 Schipper, Mrs. Edith, 826 S. W. 1st Ave., Miami, Fla.
 Schipper, Prof. Gerrit J., 826 S. W. 1st Ave., Miami, Fla.
 Schmidt, Prof. Karl, Tamworth, N. H.
 Schneider, Prof. Herbert W., Columbia University, New York, N. Y.
 Schrecker, Prof. Paul, Columbia University, New York, N. Y.
 Schrickel, Prof. Harry G., University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Neb.
 Schuetz, Dr. Alfred, 25 W. 81st St., New York, N. Y.
 Schuhmann, Prof. Alfred, Dakota Wesleyan University, Mitchell, S. D.
 Scoon, Prof. Robert M., Princeton University, Princeton, N. J.
 Scott-Craig, Prof. Thomas S. K., Dartmouth College, Hanover, N. H.
 Searles, Prof. H. L., University of Southern California, Los Angeles, Calif.
 Sears, Prof. Lawrence, Mills College, Oakland, Calif.
 Seelye, Prof. Laurens Hickok, Robert College, Istanbul, Turkey.
 Sellars, Prof. R. W., University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich.
 Sellars, Prof. Wilfrid Stalker, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn.
 Sellen, Prof. Arthur G., Washburn College, Topeka, Kan.
 Selsam, Dr. Howard, Jefferson School of Social Science, 575 Sixth Ave., New York, N. Y.
 Shafer, Prof. Robert, Graduate School, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio.
 Sharrard, Prof. J. A., University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, Sask., Can.
 Shaw, Prof. C. G., New York University, Washington Square, New York, N. Y.
 Shaw, Dr. Mary, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn.
 Shearer, Prof. Edna A., Smith College, Northampton, Mass.
 Sheffer, Prof. H. M., Emerson Hall, Harvard University, Cambridge 38, Mass.
 Sheldon, Prof. W. H., 169 Bishop St., New Haven, Conn.
 Sheriff, Prof. Wilbur S., 210 Vine St., Johnstown, Pa.
 Sherman, Prof. C. L., Willamette University, Salem, Ore.
 Shimer, Pres. Wm. A., Marietta College, Marietta, Ohio.
 Shirk, Miss Evelyn Urban, Brooklyn College, Brooklyn, N. Y.
 Shuder, Lt. Col. H. A., Baxter General Hospital, Seattle, Wash.
 Shute, Prof. Clarence, Lake Erie College, Painesville, Ohio.
 Sibley, Prof. William M., University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Man., Can.
 Simkovitch, Prof. Vladimir, Columbia University, New York, N. Y.
 Simon, Prof. Yves, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Ind.
 Singer, Prof. Edgar A., University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa.
 Singer, Dr. Milton B., University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.
 Sisson, Prof. E. O., P. O. Box 1774, Carmel, Calif.
 Sloane, Prof. Eugene H., Connecticut State Teachers College, Willimantic, Conn.
 Slonimsky, Dr. Henry, 40 W. 68th St., New York, N. Y.
 Smart, Prof. Harold R., Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y.
 Smith, Prof. Gerard, Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wis.
 Smith, Dr. H. Jeffery, Stanford University, Palo Alto, Calif.
 Smith, Prof. John Milton, Benedict College, Columbia, S. C.
 Smith, Prof. Ignatius, Catholic University, Washington, D. C.
 Smith, Prof. T. V., University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.
 Smullyan, Prof. Arthur, University of Washington, Seattle, Wash.
 Snow, Dr. Adolph J., 1320 Ashland Ave., Wilmette, Ill.

PROCEEDINGS

- Solmsen, Prof. Friedrich, Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y.
 Somerville, Dr. John, Hunter College, New York, N. Y.
 Soto, Dr. Juan B., Chancellor of the University of Puerto Rico, University of
 Puerto Rico, Rio Piedras, P. R.
 Speight, Dean H. E. B., 201 Tower Road, Ithaca, N. Y.
 Spencer, Prof. Margaret N., Miami University, Oxford, Ohio.
 Spencer, Prof. W. Wylie, Miami University, Oxford, Ohio.
 Spiegelberg, Dr. Frederic, 135 Harriet Ave., Palo Alto, Calif.
 Spiegelberg, Prof. Herbert, Lawrence College, Appleton, Wis.
 Sprague, Prof. Paul W., Wheaton College, Norton, Mass.
 Stace, Prof. Walter T., Princeton University, Princeton, N. J.
 Stalknecht, Prof. Newton P., Bowdoin College, Brunswick, Me.
 Stalnakier, Dean Luther W., Drake University, Des Moines, Iowa.
 Stearns, Prof. Isabel, Bryn Mawr College, Bryn Mawr, Pa.
 Steere, Prof. Douglas V., Haverford College, Haverford, Pa.
 Stephens, Prof. I. K., Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas.
 Stephens, Prof. Robert G., Indiana University, Bloomington, Ind.
 Stevenson, Prof. Charles L., University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich.
 Stewart, Prof. Malcolm F., Illinois College, Jacksonville, Ill.
 Stine, Prof. Russell W., Muhlenberg College, Allentown, Pa.
 Stob, Prof. Henry J., Calvin College, Grand Rapids, Mich.
 Stokes, Dr. Ella H., William Penn College, Oskaloosa, Iowa.
 Stokes, Prof. Mack B., Candler School of Theology, Emory University, Atlanta,
 Ga.
 Stone, Dean Wendell C., Rollins College, Winter Park, Fla.
 Stoops, Prof. J. D., Grinnell College, Grinnell, Iowa.
 Storer, Dr. Morris B., 3712 Fordham Rd., Washington, D. C.
 Storrs, Dr. Margaret, 66 Massasoit St., Northampton, Mass.
 Strong, Prof. E. W., University of California, Berkeley, Calif.
 Stuart, Prof. H. W., P. O. Box 1943, Carmel, Calif.
 Stuurman, Prof. Douwe, Santa Barbara College, Santa Barbara, Calif.
 Sullivan, Prof. C. J., University of Oregon, Eugene, Ore.
 Swabey, Prof. Marie Collins, New York University, Washington Square, New
 York, N. Y.
 Swabey, Prof. W. Curtis, New York University, University Heights, New York,
 N. Y.
 Swift, Prof. R. F.
 Szathmary, Dr. Arthur, Princeton University, Princeton, N. J.
 Tausch, Dr. C. F., St. Louis University, St. Louis 3, Mo.
 Talbert, Prof. Ernest L., University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio.
 Talbot, Prof. Ellen B., Mt. Holyoke College, South Hadley, Mass.
 Taylor, Pres. Harold, Sarah Lawrence College, Bronxville, N. Y.
 Temple, Dr. Sydney A., Jr., 260 W. 231 St., New York 63, N. Y.
 ten Hoor, Dean Marten, 4 Forest Lake Dr., Tuscaloosa, Ala.
 Tenney, Prof. Charles D., Southern Illinois Normal University, Carbondale, Ill.
 Tenney, Prof. E. V., Fresno State College, Fresno, Calif.
 Thalheimer, Dr. Ross.
 Thomas, Dr. Francis A., Wilberforce University, Wilberforce, Ohio.
 Thomas, Prof. George F., Princeton University, Princeton, N. J.
 Thompson, Prof. Golden O., Western Union College, LeMars, Iowa.
 Thompson, Prof. Hugo W., 1165 Lincoln Ave., St. Paul, Minn.
 Thompson, Dr. Manley H., Jr., University of Toronto, Toronto 5, Can.
 Thompson, Prof. R. C., University of Nevada, Reno, Nev.
 Thompson, Prof. Samuel, Monmouth College, Monmouth, Ill.
 Thompson, Prof. M. K., 11 S. Summit St., Ypsilanti, Mich.
 Thorndike, Prof. E. L., Columbia University, New York, N. Y.
 Tilley, Prof. Ethel, Greensboro College, Greensboro, N. C.
 Tillich, Prof. Paul, Union Theological Seminary, New York, N. Y.
 Titus, Prof. Harold H., Denison University, Granville, Ohio.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW

- Toll, Prof. C. H., Amherst College, Amherst, Mass.
 Tomas, Prof. Vincent Anthony, Brown University, Providence, R. I.
 Tonness, Dr. Alfred.
 Tornay, Dr. Stephen, 16 18th Place, Long Beach 3, Calif.
 Tower, Prof. C. V., Ursinus College, Collegeville, Pa.
 Townsend, Prof. H. G., University of Oregon, Eugene, Ore.
 Trap, Prof. William M., Wayne University, Detroit, Mich.
 Trivers, Dr. Howard, 524 Maple Ridge Rd., Bethesda, Md.
 Trueblood, Prof. D. Elton, Earlham College, Richmond, Ind.
 Tsanoff, Prof. R. A., The Rice Institute, Houston, Texas.
 Tufts, Dr. Matilde Castro, 1600 State St., Santa Barbara, Calif.
 Turner, Prof. John Pickett, 430 W. 116th St., New York 27, N. Y.
 Turquette, Dr. Atwell R., University of Illinois, Urbana, Ill.
 Tuttle, Prof. John R., Elmira College, Elmira, N. Y.
 Tuttle, Prof. Tom Hollingsworth, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, Ohio.
 Urban, Prof. Wilbur M., Yale University, New Haven, Conn.
 Ushenko, Prof. A. P., Princeton University, Princeton, N. J.
 Vander Lugt, Pres. G. T., Central College, Pella, Iowa.
 Vander Lugt, Prof. William, Central College, Pella, Iowa.
 Van Riper, Dr. Benjamin W., The Republic Building, 209 South State St., Chicago, Ill.
 Van Saun, Prof. Walter, Hope College, Holland, Mich.
 Van Tuinen, Prof. Jacob, Carroll College, Waukesha, Wis.
 Veatch, Dr. H., Indiana University, Bloomington, Ind.
 Venable, Prof. Vernon, Vassar College, Poughkeepsie, N. Y.
 Vibbert, Prof. Charles B., 1710 Hermitage Rd., Ann Arbor, Mich.
 Virtue, Prof. Charles F., University of Maine, Orono, Me.
 Vivas, Prof. Eliseo, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.
 Vlastos, Prof. Gregory, Queen's University, Kingston, Ont., Can.
 Wahl, Prof. Jean, Faculté des Lettres, Sorbonne, University of Paris, Paris, France.
 Walcott, Prof. G. D., Long Island University, Brooklyn, N. Y.
 Walker, Prof. Edwin R., Oklahoma A. & M. College, Stillwater, Okla.
 Wallraff, Dr. Charles Frederic, University of Arizona, Tucson, Ariz.
 Walsh, Prof. Dorothy, Smith College, Northampton, Mass.
 Warbeke, Prof. John M., Mt. Holyoke College, South Hadley, Mass.
 Ward, Prof. F. Champion, 5602 Ingleside Ave., Chicago 37, Ill.
 Ward, Prof. Leo R., Notre Dame University, Notre Dame, Ind.
 Ward, Prof. Paul W., Syracuse University, Syracuse, N. Y.
 Warren, Dr. Roland L., Alired University, Alired, N. Y.
 Warren, Dean William M., Boston University, Boston, Mass.
 Warren, Prof. W. P., Bucknell University, Lewisburg, Va.
 Watson, Prof. A. C., Marietta College, Marietta, Ohio.
 Watson, Dr. Sarah M., Triple Cities College of Syracuse University, Endicott, N. Y.
 Weaver, Prof. Paul, Stephens College, Columbia, Mo.
 Weber, Dr. Alden O., 252 First St., Osawatomie, Kans.
 Weedon, Dr. William Stone, University P. O. Box 1746, Charlottesville, Va.
 Weinberg, Dr. Carlton B., 515 W. 110th St., New York, N. Y.
 Weinberg, Prof. Julius, University of Wisconsin, Madison 6, Wis.
 Weinreich, Dr. Marcel, University of Puerto Rico, Rio Piedras, Puerto Rico.
 Weiss, Dr. Charles, 2205 Davidson Ave., Bronx 53, New York, N. Y.
 Weiss, Prof. Paul, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.
 Weitz, Prof. Morris, Vassar College, Poughkeepsie, N. Y.
 Welch, Dr. Livingston.
 Weld, Dr. Hiram C., Elm Park Church, Scranton 10, Pa.

PROCEEDINGS

- Wellmuth, Prof. John J., S. J., Loyola University, Chicago, Ill.
 Wells, Prof. John M., Hillsdale College, Hillsdale, Mich.
 Wells, Dr. Rulon, 445 Orange St., New Haven, Conn.
 Wells, Prof. Wesley R., Syracuse University, Syracuse, N. Y.
 Wendel, Prof. Hugo C. M., Long Island University, Brooklyn, N. Y.
 Wenrick, Prof. John E., Otterbein College, Westerville, Ohio.
 Werkmeister, Prof. W. H., University of Nebraska, Lincoln Neb.
 Weyer, Dean Edward M., 49 S. College St., Washington, Pa.
 Whallon, Dr. Robert E., University of Chicago, Chicago 37, Ill.
 Wheelwright, Prof. Philip E., Dartmouth College, Hanover, N. H.
 Whitchurch, Dean Irl Goldwin, University of Southern California, Box 33, Los Angeles 7, Calif.
 White, Dr. Morton G., University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa.
 White, Prof. Stephen S.
 Whitehead, Prof. Alfred N., Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
 Wick, Prof. Warner Arms, 304 Swift Hall, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.
 Widgery, Prof. Alban G., Duke University, Durham, N. C.
 Wiederhold, Dr. Albert George, 305 Melville Ave., Palo Alto, Calif.
 Wieman, Prof. Henry N., University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.
 Wiener, Prof. Philip P., 192 Coligni Ave., New Rochelle, N. Y.
 Wiggins, Dr. Forrest Oran, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn.
 Wild, Prof. John, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
 Will, Prof. Frederick L., University of Illinois, Urbana, Ill.
 Williams, Prof. D. C., Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
 Williams, Prof. Daniel D., Chicago Theological Seminary, Chicago, Ill.
 Williams, Prof. Gardner, University of Toledo, Toledo, Ohio.
 Williams, Prof. Milton, Syracuse University, Syracuse 10, N. Y.
 Williams, Prof. S. P., Lake Forest University, Lake Forest, Ill.
 Williamson, Prof. Mary, Hollins College, Hollins, Va.
 Wilson, Prof. H. Van Rensselaer, 2711 Ave. K, Brooklyn, N. Y.
 Wilson, Dr. Mabel Virginia, 205 Cayuga Heights Rd., Ithaca, N. Y.
 Winn, Dr. Ralph B., 265 Wilson Ave., Long Branch, N. J.
 Wolfson, Prof. Harry A., Harvard University, Cambridge Mass.
 Wood, Prof. Ledger, Princeton University, Princeton, N. J.
 Woods, Mrs. James K., 9 Denton Road W., Wellesley, Mass.
 Wright, Prof. H. W., University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Man., Can.
 Wright, Prof. William K., Dartmouth College, Hanover, N. H.
- Young, Prof. Warren Cameron, 3040 W. Washington Blvd., Chicago 12, Ill.
- Zerby, Dr. Lewis, Michigan State College, East Lansing, Mich.
 Zink, Dr. Sidney, 6125 S. Kenwood Ave., Chicago, Ill.

ASSOCIATE MEMBERS

- Adlerblum, Mrs. Nima H., Box 253, General Postoffice, New York, N. Y.
 Babcock, Mr. Donald C., Durham, N. H.
 Bradley, Dr. J. H., 138 S. Camden Drive, Beverly Hills, Calif.
 Brodbeck, Miss May, University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa.
 Carroll, Mr. Newton L., University of Connecticut, Storrs, Conn.
 Chrakian, Prof. Elisha B., 12 Adams Ave., Watertown, Mass.
 Cooley, Mr. Alan Ashton, 180 Appleton Ave., Pittsfield, Mass.
 Drake, Mr. Henry L., 215 East New York St., Indianapolis, Ind.
 Douglass, Pres. Paul F., American University, Washington, D. C.
 Dowdell, Dr. Victor L., Albion, Mich.
 Eames, Mr. S. Morris, University of Missouri, Columbia, Mo.
 Erdos, Dr. Leslie, 570 W. 156th St., New York 32, N. Y.
 Forkosch, Dr. Morris D.
 Forrester, Prof. James, Brandon College, Brandon, Manitoba, Can.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW

Frank, Dr. Solomon, 911 Garfield St., Winnipeg, Manitoba, Can.
 Fritz, Mr. Charles A., Jr., 78-10 34th Ave., Jackson Heights, N. Y.
 Gilbert, Dr. Albin, 808 West End Ave., Apt. 3B, New York, N. Y.
 Goldenson, Dr. Robert, 545 W. 230th St., Riverdale, N. Y.
 Goldshur, Dr. David, 498 Vernon St., San Francisco 12, Calif.
 Gordon, Mr. Alexander D., University of Missouri, Columbia, Mo.
 Halverson, Dr. Wendell Q., Heidelberg College, Tiffin, Ohio.
 Hattersley, Prof. L. W., Pasadena Junior College, Pasadena, Calif.
 Hughes, Dr. W. Hardin, Tuskegee Institute, Alabama.
 Jarrett, Mr. James L., Jr., University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah.
 Johnson, Mrs. Dorothea Stats, 183 W. Calthrop Ave., Syracuse, N. Y.
 Kamiat, Mr. Arnold H., Hotel Martinique, New York, N. Y.
 Karlin, Mr. Eli, 60 College Street, New Haven, Conn.
 Leavens, Dr. R. F., 1900 Yosemite Rd., Berkeley, Calif.
 McConnell, Bishop Francis J., 150 Fifth Ave., New York, N. Y.
 McLaren, Mr. Myron, 545 West 148th St., New York 31, N. Y.
 Mason, Dr. Gabriel R., Abraham Lincoln High School, Brooklyn, N. Y.
 Mattern, Dr. Charles D., Ursinus College, Collegeville, Pa.
 Means, Prof. Paul B., University of Oregon, Eugene, Ore.
 Miller, Mr. Taylor Edward, Syracuse University, Syracuse, N. Y.
 Moore, Mr. Elliott Russell, 311 Rich St., Syracuse, N. Y.
 Morgan, Mr. Douglas N., University of Illinois, Urbana, Ill.
 Oldfield, Col. Charles B., 1705 Bolling Ave., Norfolk 8, Va.
 Owen, Prof. David, United Colleges, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Can.
 Parsons, Prof. Howard Lee, 1237 W. 37th Place, Los Angeles 7, Calif.
 Pettegrove, Mr. James P.
 Piest, Mr. Oskar, 121 W. 72nd St., New York, N. Y.
 Pollard, Prof. Hybert, Linfield College, McMinnville, Ore.
 Reidenbach, Rev. Clarence, First Congregational Church, Oakland, Calif.
 Rosenbaum, Mr. Ira, 47 Plaza St., Brooklyn, N. Y.
 Rosenfield, Dr. Leonora Cohen, 3600 38th, N. W., Washington 16, D. C.
 Schneider, Dr. Edward, 3010 Fulton St., San Francisco, Calif.
 Simpson, Prof. Kenneth, Santa Barbara College, Santa Barbara, Calif.
 Skulsky, Mr. Samuel, 415 Lefferts Ave., Brooklyn, N. Y.
 Smith, Mr. John E., Barnard College, Columbia University, New York, N. Y.
 Sprague, Dr. Rosamund Kent, Bryn Mawr College, Bryn Mawr, Pa.
 Sprague, Mr. Wayne L., Multnomah College, Portland, Ore.
 Sternfeld, Mr. Robert, University of Illinois, Urbana, Ill.
 Storer, Mr. Thomas F., University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Neb.
 Thalheimer, Mr. A., Roxbury Pl. Mt. Washington, Baltimore, Md.
 Urban, Prof. Percy L., Berkeley Divinity School, New Haven, Conn.
 Weinberg, Miss Yehuda L., American Preparatory School, 1214 Spruce St., Philadelphia, Pa.
 Whitman, Miss Mary, Vassar College, Poughkeepsie, N. Y.
 Wilson, Dr. David H., "Brickends," Alfred, Me.
 Wohlstetter, Dr. Albert, 308 W. 106th St., New York, N. Y.

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AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION
EASTERN DIVISION

Constitution

Adopted March 31, 1902

Article I - Name and Object

1. The name of this organization shall be the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association. (As amended December 30, 1919)
2. Its object shall be the promotion of the interests of philosophy in all its branches, and more particularly the encouragement of original work among the members of the Association.

Article II - Membership

1. Candidates for membership must be proposed by two members of the Association and recommended by the Executive Committee before their names are voted upon by the Association.
2. There shall be two classes of members, full members and associate members. Full membership. Eligibility to full membership shall be limited to the following classes of persons:
(a) Persons whose training in philosophy has been advanced and systematic enough to make them competent to teach the subject at the college or university level. Prima facie evidence of such competence will ordinarily be considered afforded by possession of a Ph.D. degree in philosophy from a reputable American university or from some foreign university having like standards; or by successful teaching of philosophy over a number of years with the rank of instructor or higher in a college of good academic standing. (b) Persons who have published contributions, whether in philosophy itself or in borderline fields, which in the opinion of the Executive Committee are of substantial value to Philosophy. Associate membership. Persons who are ineligible to full membership, but whose interest or achievements in philosophy are regarded by the Executive Committee as warranting their affiliation with the Association, shall be eligible to associate membership. Associate members shall be entitled to all of the privileges of full membership except voice and vote in its business meetings. (As amended February 23, 1946)
3. The annual dues of full and associate members shall be two dollars, failure in payment of which for three consecutive years shall ipso facto cause membership to cease. (As amended February 23, 1946) Active members of thirty years' good and regular standing who are no longer actively engaged in teaching are automatically relieved of further payment of dues. (Adopted December 31, 1935)*

* Note: The Executive Committee at its regular session of December 30, 1935 voted that "no longer actively engaged in teaching" meant "full time academic work", i.e., either engaged in teaching or administrative work.

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Article III - Officers

1. The officers of the Association shall be a President, Vice-President, and Secretary-Treasurer. The President and Vice-President shall be elected by the Association at each annual meeting. The Secretary-Treasurer shall be elected for a period of three years. (As amended December 30, 1919)
2. There shall be an Executive Committee composed of ten members, three of whom shall be the officers of the Association, and six of whom shall be members at large, two members elected each year for a period of three years. The retiring president shall be ex officio member for one year. (As amended December 28, 1918 and December 30, 1920)
3. There shall be a committee of three to nominate officers for the Division. The Senior member (Chairman) shall retire each year to be replaced by a new member appointed by the President. (As amended December 30, 1936)

Article IV - Meetings

1. There shall be an Annual Meeting of the Association at such time and place as may be decided on at the previous annual meeting, or, in case no such decision is reached, at such time and place as the Executive Committee may determine.
2. Special meetings may be called by the Executive Committee at any time and place that they may deem advisable.
3. At each annual meeting the Executive Committee shall present a report of the progress of the Association.
4. The Executive Committee shall arrange the programme and direct all other arrangements for the meetings; in particular, they shall have the power to determine what papers shall be read at the meetings.
5. A majority of its members shall constitute a quorum of the Executive Committee.

Article V - Amendments

Amendments to this Constitution, which must be submitted in writing, may be made by a vote of two thirds of the members present at any meeting subsequent to that at which such amendments have been proposed.

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CONSTITUTION OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

Article I - NAME

The name of this organization shall be the American Philosophical Association.

Article II - MEMBERSHIP

1. The membership shall be divided into three divisions -- Eastern, Western, and Pacific.
2. Each division shall elect its own members.

Article III - OFFICERS

1. The officers of this Association, hereafter known as the Board of Officers, shall consist of the following duly elected officers of the several divisions - the Presidents and Secretary-Treasurers - ex officio, and a secretary elected by the foregoing members for a three year term, and eligible for re-election. The President of the Western Division shall become the first chairman of this board for one year. The following year the President of the Pacific Division shall be chairman and the third year the President of the Eastern Division shall be chairman and thereafter in rotation annually. In calculating the terms of office for members of the Board of Officers the calendar year beginning January 1 shall be the unit.
2. The Secretary shall collect annually from the Treasurer of each division, at the rate of 50 cents per member, money to defray necessary expenses of the Board of Officers. The Secretary shall also apportion, collect, and disburse the pro rata share of the expenses of special joint projects voted by the three divisions. (As amended December 28, 1946).
3. The Board of Officers shall transact all legal business for the Association, co-ordinate the interests of the several divisions and act for the Association as a whole (1) in International correspondence, (2) in the election or appointment of delegates to the American Council of Learned Societies or similar societies, (3) in the administration of permanent funds now or hereafter belonging to the Association.

Article IV - PUBLICATIONS

The Association shall publish annually the proceedings and presidential addresses of the divisions together with the combined list of members and a report of the Board of Officers. This publication shall be in charge of the Secretary who shall furnish a copy to each member. The expense of publication shall be borne pro rata by the several divisions.

Article V - AMENDMENTS

Amendments to this constitution may be made by a concurrent majority vote of the members of each division present at its regular annual meeting.

